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Abstract
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMPLEX EXAMINATION OF ITS
DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES
By Sheila Kathleen Keener
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy at
Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2019
Major Director: Dr. Sven Kepes, Professor of Management, Department of Management and
Entrepreneurship
This dissertation examined the controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation paid to
university presidents. To do this, the first half of this dissertation includes a systematic review of
the existing literature regarding the relation between university performance and university
president compensation in nonprofit universities. The second half of this dissertation attempts to
replicate the findings from the systematic review with more current data. Several gaps identified
in the literature, including the effects of analyzing specific compensation components, the effect
of university president compensation on subsequent university performance, potential nonlinear
relations, and how relations between university performance and university president
compensation change over time, are examined as well. Specific hypotheses and research
questions are derived from compensation and motivation theories used in the for-profit context
as well as findings from both the for-profit and nonprofit executive compensation literature.
Results indicated that university performance had a weak effect on compensation in private
universities and no effect in public universities. Findings suggested that there may be differences
in this effect depending on the component of compensation examined. Compensation appears to
have a negative or nil effect on subsequent university performance. Evidence of differential
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effects over time were not observed. Although some nonlinear effects were detected, they did not
take the form expected. Potential reasons for these findings, as well as their implications for
research and practice, are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
Problem Statement
The compensation of university1 presidents has been an increasingly controversial topic
over the past several years (Dillon, 2004; Ginsberg, 2011; Glater, 2007; Krupnick & Marcus,
2015; Stripling & Fuller, 2011). During this time, total public funding per full-time equivalent
student for colleges and universities has steadily decreased (Mitchell, Leachman, Masterson, &
Waxman, 2018; Woodhouse, 2015). To make up for the lack of funding, universities have opted
to raise tuition (American Association of University Professors, 2017). This has resulted in
higher net costs of attending college and, therefore, increased student loan debt (Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 2013; Seltzer, 2017). Yet, although reduced funding has negatively impacted
students, the compensation of university presidents has continued to rise (Bauman, Davis, Myers,
& O'Leary, 2017). This has led many to speculate about whether the presidents are being
overcompensated (Dillon, 2004; Krupnick & Marcus, 2015; Saul, 2017; Stripling & Fuller,
2011).
The situation in academia is similar to that of executive compensation as a whole.
Adjusting for inflation, the pay of CEOs from the 350 largest U. S. firms grew by 937% between
1978 and 2016 (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Just as in academia, the rising compensation of
executives has led many people to believe that executives are overpaid (Kiatpongsan & Norton,
2014; Walsh, 2008, 2009). However, there are also many who suggest that university presidents
and CEOs are not overpaid and that their high levels of compensation are necessary to attract
high-quality individuals as well as to incentivize their future performance (Agarwal, 1981;
Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Kaplan, 2008a, 2008b; Vroom, 1964; Worstall, 2014). This

The terms “university” and “college” are used interchangeably; thus, university president compensation refers not
only to the compensation of presidents employed at universities, but also to presidents employed at colleges.
1
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suggests that current levels of pay may be justified if they result in comparable future
performance increases. Others have argued that high levels of pay are acceptable if they are
commensurate with past organizational performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If future pay is
contingent on performance, it is reasoned that university presidents and other executives will be
motivated to perform at high levels. These arguments suggest that the rising pay of university
presidents and other chief executives can be justified, beneficial, and, because of the increases in
motivation resulting from the performance-compensation linkage, may lead to future high
performance.
Unfortunately, although executive compensation research has flourished over the past
several decades (Agarwal, 1981; Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Gomez-Mejia &
Wiseman, 1997; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; van Essen, Otten, & Carberry,
2015), our current understanding of the extent to which executive compensation and
organizational performance are actually related is incomplete. This is particularly true within the
context of academia where there has been a relative dearth of research exploring how president
compensation and university performance are related and almost no research examining the
complexities and nuances of these relations. The lack of research in the nonprofit educational
context is particularly problematic because there are important differences between the for-profit
context typically studied by executive compensation researchers and the nonprofit educational
context. Thus, the extent to which even the limited knowledge gained from for-profit context
generalizes to the nonprofit educational context is largely unknown.
Specifically, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the dominant theory used in the
for-profit executive compensation literature, includes assumptions and suggestions that may not
be upheld in the nonprofit educational context. For instance, agency theory assumes that
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executives are self-interested and will attempt to shirk their duties if steps are not taken to align
their interests with the ones of the owners of the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
However, some have argued that university presidents are not self-interested, but rather, they are
intrinsically motivated to perform to the best of their ability due to their commitment to the goals
of their organization (Handy & Katz, 1998; see also, Bai, 2014). If true, it would not be
necessary to provide performance incentives to university presidents and there would be no
relation expected between university president compensation and university performance.
However, even if university presidents are self-interested and it is necessary to take steps
to align their interests to the performance of their universities, it may be, practically, very
difficult to do so. This is because performance is defined differently in for-profit contexts and
nonprofit educational contexts and the control mechanisms available to university Boards of
Visitors/Trustees/Regents (hereafter the term “Board” is used to refer to Boards in general as
well as specific Boards) are different than those available to Boards of for-profit organizations
(e.g., universities do not have stock options). These substantive differences between the forprofit and nonprofit educational contexts make it necessary to thoroughly study the extent to
which theories from the for-profit literature generalize to the nonprofit educational context.
Thus, the objective of this dissertation is to explore similarities and differences between
the for-profit context and the nonprofit educational context to gain a better understanding of the
nature of the relation between university president compensation and university performance. In
so doing, this dissertation will fill many of the gaps that currently exist within the literature
regarding university president compensation and university performance. Filling these gaps will
shed light on the controversy surrounding the pay of university presidents and help to determine
whether their high average levels of pay are justified.
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The first step in attempting to fill existing gaps within the literature is to determine the
current state of our cumulative knowledge of the relation between executive compensation and
organizational performance in both the for-profit and nonprofit educational contexts. The first
way in which this dissertation aims to address the controversy surrounding president
compensation is to conduct a systematic review of the existing literature on the relation between
university performance and subsequent university president compensation. After providing a
thorough review of the existing literature, this dissertation will also examine a series of open
questions in the literature. First, although there has been a substantial amount of research aimed
at determining the effect that financial organizational performance has on future pay in the forprofit context (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000), there has been relatively little research that attempts to
explore the effect of university president compensation on future performance. Given that
different theories support both the link between performance and future pay (e.g., agency theory;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and pay and future performance (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom,
1964), it is important to test both sets of relations.
Second, because relatively few studies have examined the relation between executive
compensation and organizational performance, researchers have also failed to integrate findings
and theories across literature areas. Thus, little is known about the potential reciprocal effects
that pay and performance may have on each other (Devers et al., 2007) and how these relations
evolve over time. Third, the existing studies assessing the relation between performance and pay
have been overly simplistic. For instance, few studies have examined the potential that nonlinear
effects exist between these two variables due to, for instance, the diminishing marginal utility of
compensation (i.e., additional increases in pay do not result in similar increases in motivation
after a given point; see Aaron, Harris, McDowell, & Cline, 2014 for an exception).
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Considering the nonprofit educational context, the same set of questions exist. In fact,
although there have been a handful of studies that have assessed the impact of university
performance on pay (e.g., Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg,
Cheslock, & Epifantseva, 2001), only three studies have assessed the impact of president
compensation on future university performance (Hunt, Tandberg, & Park, 2019; Parsons &
Reitenga, 2014; Tang, Tang, & Tang, 2004). Consequently, there has also been no attempt to
integrate the various theories which suggest that the relation between pay and performance may
go in either direction (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Vroom, 1964). Also, there has been no
consideration of potential reciprocal relations involving these two variables. Additionally, there
are no studies in the nonprofit educational context that have examined potential nonlinear effects
between president compensation and university performance.
These unanswered questions, present in both academia and the broader literature of
executive compensation, highlight the limitations of our current understanding of the relation
between executive compensation and organizational performance and could have significant
practical implications. Thus, another goal of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of
the potentially complex relation between university president compensation and university
performance over time. Given that these same gaps exist in the larger for-profit executive
compensation literature, the findings of this study may also provide a starting point for future
for-profit executive compensation research.
In sum, this dissertation will address several open questions, grouped into two
overarching gaps, in the university president compensation and university performance literature.
In so doing, this dissertation not only aims to shed light on the continuing controversy
surrounding the growing levels of president pay in universities, it may also help to address this
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controversy as it exists in the broader area of executive compensation, which has many of the
same open questions. Specifically, I explore the following research questions aimed to address
the open questions noted previously.
Gap 1: Systematic review of university performance and university president
compensation studies
Research question 1: What impact, if any, does university performance have on president
compensation?
Gap 2: A comprehensive assessment of the complexities in the relation between
university president compensation and university performance
Research question 2a: Does university performance predict future university president
compensation?
Research question 2b: Is there a reciprocal relation between university president
compensation and university performance?
Research question 2c: How does the link between university performance and university
president compensation change over time?
Research question 2d: Is the relationship between university performance and university
president compensation linear?
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CHAPTER 2
Is Pay Influenced by Past Performance? A Systematic Review of the Antecedents of
University President Pay
The rising levels of compensation paid to university presidents has received increasing
attention and scrutiny over the past several years from both the popular press (Dillon, 2004;
Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011) and researchers (Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina,
2005; Cheng, 2014; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). While public funding for universities has
decreased, the compensation of university presidents has continued to rise (Bauman et al., 2017;
Woodhouse, 2015). Considering that average costs to attend college increased by 57% between
2007 and 2017 (Boyington, 2017) and student loan debt increased by 250% during a similar time
period (2004 and 2014; Martin, 2017), many have claimed that university presidents are being
paid too much (Dillon, 2004; Krupnick & Marcus, 2015; Saul, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011).
For instance, Richard Vedder, the director of the Center for College Affordability and
Productivity at Ohio University stated, “Schools are resisting changes [to reduce the cost of
attending college], but they’re going ahead and continuing to make these large payments to
university presidents, and I think it’s the height of irresponsibility” (cf. Binkley, 2016, para. 8).
However, many Boards and presidents have argued that the compensation of university
presidents is based on the requirements of the job as well as the performance of the president,
and, therefore, is quite reasonable. For instance, referring to Arizona State University’s
President, Michael Crow (the highest paid public university president in 2017), Board of Regents
Vice Chairman, Bill Ridenour said, “Crow is an entrepreneur, a visionary and a leader […] My
thoughts are you can’t pay Dr. Crow enough” (cf. Ryman, 2017, paras 9-10). This suggests that
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some Boards do not feel as though presidents are overcompensated, but rather that their high
salaries and benefits are reflective of the value they add to the university.
Yet, in spite of the claim by many that presidents are fairly and reasonably compensated
and that their high level of compensation reflects the value that they add to universities (e.g.,
Cotton, 2012; Roediger, 2005), there is very little convincing evidence to support such claims.
For instance, the evidence suggesting that the actual performance of the university factors into
the level of president compensation is mixed. Results of one study indicated that president total
compensation was positively related to performance variables such as student SAT scores (Tang,
Tang, & Tang, 2000). In contrast, another study found that there was no statistically significant
relation between university president compensation and SAT scores (or any other performance
variable that was used; Cheng, 2014). Still another study showed that, although some measures
of performance were related to president compensation, the results depended on whether the
president was employed at a top-tier university (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005). Specifically, Bartlett
and Sorokina (2005) found that SAT scores were only positively related to university president
compensation in top-tier universities, yet SAT scores had no effect on compensation at tier 2, 3,
or 4 universities. Mixed results have been reported for several other performance variables as
well, including endowment (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Huang & Chen, 2013; Parsons &
Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016), alumni giving rate (Langbert, 2006; Langbert & Fox, 2013;
Sorokina, 2003), and retention rate (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Langbert, 2006).
These mixed results make it difficult to determine what, if any, effect university performance has
on president compensation.
If university president compensation is determined by the actual performance of the
university, the notion that university presidents are compensated appropriately is more credible.
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Conversely, if the compensation of university presidents is not responsive to university
performance, the concern that presidents are overcompensated would have more credence. This
study aims to help settle this controversy. To do this, I conduct a systematic review of primary
studies that have examined determinants of university president compensation, including various
dimensions of university performance (e.g., financial performance, academic performance,
university selectivity). In so doing, this study will be able to identify the factors which influence
university president compensation and the extent to which they do so.
The results of this study, by providing an overall assessment of the current literature on
the relation between university performance, and other potential determinants, on president
compensation, will help to address the continuing controversy regarding the appropriateness of
the high levels of president compensation. Thus, the findings of this study could have a
significant impact on compensation policies at universities. For instance, if the results indicate
that president compensation is not related to university performance, Boards may want to
consider ending the practice of providing large compensation increases to university presidents.
Furthermore, the decision by some states to limit the amount of a president’s compensation that
can come from public funds would be supported (e.g., Fla. Stat., 2017). If, however, evidence
suggests that presidents are paid commensurate with the performance of the university, state
policies which limit the amount of money that university presidents can be paid should be
eliminated because the high levels of compensation paid to university presidents is money wellspent.
Background
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Executive Compensation
The broader field of executive compensation can be used to gain insight into university
president compensation as the field of executive compensation faces many of the same
controversies and attempts to answer many of the same questions that exist regarding university
president pay. For instance, adjusting for inflation, CEO compensation grew by up to 937%
between 1978 and 2016 and the median compensation of CEO from the 350 largest organizations
in the U. S. was $15.6 million dollars in 2016 (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Although average
CEO compensation has dropped slightly since its peak in 2000, it is still an average of 270.5
times the compensation of the average worker (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, 74% Americans believe that CEOs are overpaid compared to average workers
(Miller, 2016) while 75% of CEOs and directors of Fortune 500 companies feel that CEOs are
fairly compensated.
Consequently, there has been extensive investigation of the determinants of CEO
compensation (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 2000; van
Essen et al., 2015). Two narrative reviews highlight that firm performance has been the most
frequently studied variable in relation with executive compensation (Devers et al., 2007; GomezMejia & Wiseman, 1997). However, both reviews also highlight other variables that have been
examined as predictors of executive compensation. For instance, in addition to organizational
performance, variables such as CEO behavior, firm size, CEO personal characteristics, CEO role
responsibilities, governance influences/failures and equity considerations have been examined.
The relation between each of these predictors and executive compensation is supported by
several theories, including agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managerialism (e.g., Aoki,
1984; Herman, 1981), human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), social
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comparison theory (O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988), managerial power theory (Bebchuk &
Fried, 2004, 2006), neoclassical labor market theory (e.g., Boyer & Smith, 2001), and
tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Table 1 provides a brief overview of the
aforementioned determinants of executive compensation, example operationalizations of these
predictors, and the theories used to support the relations between these variables and executive
compensation. Table 1 also includes examples of studies that have examined the relation
between each of these determinants (e.g., organizational performance, CEO behavior, firm size,
governance influences/failures) and compensation.
Although each of these predictors has received empirical attention, some avenues have
been more fruitful than others. Specifically, the relations between firm performance, firm size,
governance influences/failures, and CEO compensation have garnered the most attention and
empirical support (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al., 2000;
van Essen et al., 2015). Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 1, three meta-analyses have been
conducted on these relations (Deutsch, 2005; Tosi et al., 2000; van Essen et al., 2015). Using
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981),
Tosi et al. (2000) examined the effects of organizational performance and organizational size on
executive compensation and found that both variables were positively associated with executive
compensation, with organizational size accounting for more variance. Another meta-analysis
used managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, 2006) to examine the relation between
multiple governance-related variables (e.g., CEO duality2, Board size, Board independence) and
compensation (van Essen et al., 2015). They found that CEO duality, Board size, and Board
independence were positively associated with total compensation, whereas ownership

2

CEO duality refers to a situation where the CEO is also the chairman of the Board (van Essen et al., 2015).
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concentration and institutional ownership were negatively related to total compensation. No
statistically significant association was found between CEO tenure and total pay. Finally,
Deutsch (2005), using agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), examined the effect of the
proportion of outside directors on a firm’s Board (one example of a governance-related variable)
on executive compensation. He found no statistically significant relation between the proportion
of outside directors on a firm’s Board and total pay. The remaining predictors (e.g., CEO
behavior, CEO personal characteristics, CEO role responsibilities, labor market influences,
equity considerations) have received less attention and support (Devers et al., 2007; Fulmer,
2009; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).
Although each of the variables that have been examined in the executive compensation
literature (e.g., organizational performance, organizational size, CEO behavior, equity
considerations) could potentially influence university president compensation, there has been
less extensive examination of the relations between these variables and university president
compensation. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables that have been examined, along
with example operationalizations and the theories used to support the relations between these
variables and university president compensation. As can be seen from the table, none of the
existing studies concerning the determinants of university president compensation have
examined the role of president behavior, president role responsibilities, governance
influences/failures, or equity considerations. Rather, studies examining university president
compensation have focused on university performance, university size and complexity, and
university president personal characteristics (e.g., educational background, gender). Therefore,
this systematic review focuses on the influence of these three sets of variables: university
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performance, university size and complexity, and president personal characteristics on university
president compensation.
In the following sections, I review the ways in which each of these variables (i.e.,
performance, size and complexity, and personal characteristics) has been operationalized in the
existing literature on university president compensation. I also discuss the most frequently used
theories that explain why each of these factors is theoretically related to executive compensation
(i.e., agency theory, managerialism, human capital theory). In addition, I provide an overview of
the current state of evidence regarding the extent to which each of these variables is predictive of
executive compensation. Lastly, I highlight how these theories may inform predictions regarding
the potential relations between university performance, non-performance institutional
characteristics (including size and complexity), president personal characteristics, and university
president compensation and discuss existing evidence on these relations. The predicted relations
are displayed in Figure 1. This figure suggests that each of these factors (i.e., university
performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, president personal characteristics)
are positively associated with the level of president compensation. In addition, Figure 1 shows
that the extent of the impact of each of these factors on president compensation may be
moderated by the type of university (public or private).
In the following sections, I first review performance and its relation to executive
compensation. I then consider how non-performance institutional characteristics, including size
and complexity, may influence executive compensation. Lastly, I discuss the relation between
personal characteristics and executive compensation.
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Performance
Operationalizations of University Performance. University performance has been
operationalized inconsistently throughout the existing primary studies. This makes it difficult to
draw definitive conclusions regarding the nature of the relation between university performance
and university president compensation. Depending on the study, performance has been defined
and measured as, for instance, total revenue, total enrollment, endowment per student, average
SAT score, freshman retention rate, acceptance rate, operating surplus, average professor salary,
and/or amount of alumni giving, among many other metrics (e.g., Bai, 2014; Bartlett & Sorokina,
2005; Cheng, 2014). With so many different operationalizations of university performance, it is
difficult to determine what performance actually is, or consists of, let alone whether or not it
affects president compensation. Therefore, I provide an overview of the different
operationalizations of university performance before addressing other factors in the current
literature that contribute to the difficulty of drawing definite conclusions regarding the relation
between university performance and president compensation.
A review of the university president compensation literature reveals that two studies (i.e.,
Banker, Plehn-Dujowich, & Xian, 2009; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014) created categories into
which they sorted the various measures of performance previously used. Banker et al. (2009) had
one category of performance (e.g., university stature), which included average professor salary,
tuition, endowment, and average SAT score3. Parsons and Reitenga (2014) sorted their measures
into four categories of performance (i.e., student quality/reputation, academic environment,
resources, attract and retain faculty). The student quality/reputation dimension included

3

Banker et al. (2009) also included one dimension meant to measure the experience level of the president, termed
Experience. This dimension included measures such as university tenure, president tenure, number of working years,
and age.
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measures such as SAT score, acceptance rate, the proportion of students who graduated in the
top 10% of their high school class, and peer assessment scores. The academic environment
dimension included the following measures: the proportion of classes with fewer than 20
students, the proportion of classes with greater than 50 students, freshman retention rate, and
graduation rate. Enrollment, tuition, and endowment were included in the resources dimension.
Lastly, the attract and retain faculty dimension included average faculty salary. Note that
although Parsons and Reitenga created performance categories, their results were reported at the
measure-level, not the category-level.
The remaining studies used other measures that could also be sorted into categories, even
though the authors of those studies did not do so. Thus, when creating categories for this study, it
was necessary to consider the totality of measures used across all studies of determinants of
president compensation. During this process it became necessary to create new dimensions,
rename dimensions to make them more descriptive and to divide categories used by the previous
authors (i.e., Banker et al., 2009; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014) into multiple categories. When
creating new dimensions, I considered the broader executive compensation literature (e.g.,
Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000), particularly for the development of a financial
performance dimension.
Table 3 presents an overview of measures that I categorized into the various dimensions
of performance. As can be seen from the table, a total of seven different performance dimensions
were developed: financial performance, academic and research performance, faculty quality,
reputation, academic and research quality, selectivity, and other performance measures.
Although each of these dimensions includes different types of measures (discussed in the
following sections), they can all be considered measures of performance because they represent
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how well universities are doing at meeting their core goals (i.e., research and teaching) rather
than reflecting personal characteristics of the university president or non-performance related
institutional characteristics, such as the number of academic departments.
Financial performance. There are 14 measures categorized into the financial
performance dimension: alumni giving rate, cost efficiency, endowment, equity ratio,
fundraising/gifts, grants received, gross margin, investment revenues/returns, bond rating,
operating surplus, other revenues, financial risk, total assets, total liabilities (see Table 3)4. Each
of these measures involve financial resources that the university receives or illustrates how
efficiently/effectively the university uses these resources.
For instance, alumni giving rate was categorized into the financial performance
dimension. Alumni giving rate is the percentage of graduates who donate to the university postgraduation. Because higher rates of alumni giving are indicative of the number of donations
made to the university by alumni, it is reasonable to categorize this measure into the financial
performance dimension. Alumni giving rate has been used in several primary studies (e.g.,
Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Langbert, 2006; Sorokina, 2003).
Endowment was also categorized into the financial performance dimension. An
endowment represents the amount of wealth available to the university, which could be
considered analogous to financial assets in the executive compensation literature. Financial
assets are typically considered a measure of performance in the executive compensation
literature (Tosi et al., 2000).

4

Note that each of these measures, as well as those in the remaining categories, could be operationalized as either
the level of a measure (e.g., alumni giving rate of 12%) or change in the level of a measure (e.g., a 1.5% increase in
alumni giving rate from the previous year). Because all of these measures can be conceptualized this way, no
distinctions were made between these two conceptualizations when reviewing the literature.
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Another example of a measure of financial performance is gross margin, which is
typically measured as revenue minus expenses (Langbert, 2006). Therefore, this measure is
similar to profit margin, which is a financial performance measure in the executive compensation
literature (Tosi et al., 2000). Table 3 displays the remaining measures that I categorized into the
financial performance dimension of university performance.
Academic and research performance. The second performance dimension is academic
and research performance. Two measures were categorized into this dimension. They include
graduation rate and retention rate. The graduation rate represents the percentage of enrolled
students who graduate within 150% of the expected amount of time. The retention rate indicates
the percentage of first-year students who return for a second year at the university. Because one
of the primary goals of universities is to educate students, graduation and retention rates provide
an indication of how well universities are performing their duties; therefore, both can be
considered measures of academic performance. These rates were used in several studies (Cheng,
2014; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003, see Table 3).
Academic and research quality. I identified seven measures of academic and research
quality: academic support expenses, instructional and research expenses, research and
development expenses, faculty resource rank, student/faculty ratio, proportion of classes with
less than 20 students, and proportion of classes with more than 50 students. Although the
academic performance dimension included student outcomes, such as graduation rate, measures
in the academic and research quality dimension reflect the amount of resources that universities
devote to student instruction and to research. For instance, academic support expenses are “the
sum of all operating expenses associated with activities and services that support the institution’s
primary missions of instruction, research, and public service” (Cheng, 2014, p. 591). Therefore,
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this measure represents how much money universities invest to promote instruction and research.
In this way, academic support expenses are similar to instructional and research expenses as well
as research and development expenses. These measures were used in two studies (Cheng, 2014;
Ehrenberg et al., 2001).
The student/faculty ratio is also representative of the amount of resources universities
devote to student education. A high student/faculty ratio indicates that there are more students
per faculty member than when the ratio is low, which means that students receive less
individualized attention (Friedman, 2016). Therefore, this ratio is an indicator of academic
quality, with a lower ratio indicating higher quality.
Faculty quality. One measure was categorized as an indicator of faculty quality – faculty
salaries. High faculty salaries are used to attract and retain high-quality faculty members (Fisher
& Govindarajan, 1992; Kroll, Simmons, & Wright, 1990; Nguyen, 2012). Furthermore, faculty
salary is, in large part, determined by the number of top-tier publications that a faculty member
has (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Therefore, higher salaries are indicative of higher quality
faculty members, as measured by their research productivity. Because research productive
faculty tend to work for more prestigious universities, faculty salaries is likewise then an
indicator of the quality of faculty and thus, the performance or prestige of the university. See
Table 3 for studies that have used this measure (e.g., Bai, 2014; Cheng, 2014; Monks, 2007).
Reputation. The fourth performance dimension is reputation and includes a total of four
measures: number of applicants, peer assessment score, whether or not the university was on
Princeton review’s best college list, and university ranking according to U.S. News and World
Report. Each of these measures represents the standing of the university in the academic
community which affects students’ likelihood of applying. For instance, high school students
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would like to apply to universities with good reputations, ceteris paribus (Luca & Smith, 2013);
therefore, as a university gains a better reputation, more individuals are likely to apply. Thus, I
categorized the number of applicants as a measure of reputation. Number of applicants was used
as an indicator of performance in one study (i.e., Cheng, 2014).
Peer assessment scores reflect the perceptions that top academics outside of a given
university have about that university’s quality. These scores are gathered through U. S. News and
World Report and allow top academics to provide ratings of other universities that are not easily
measured, including faculty dedication to teaching (Morse, 2017). Therefore, such assessment
scores reflect universities’ reputations. Several studies used such measures (e.g., Langbert, 2006;
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014).
Whether or not a university made it onto Princeton Review’s list of best colleges and
other college rankings was also considered a measure of reputation. Princeton Review’s list of
best colleges is based on student responses to subjective questions on a number of issues (The
Princeton Review, 2018). When these responses are combined in a holistic manner to determine
which universities make it onto the “best colleges” list, they reflect the university’s reputation.
The same is true for other rankings, as they are also a holistic measure of reputation (Bastedo &
Bowman, 2010; Huang & Chen, 2013). These college rankings were used in several studies (e.g.,
Bai, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Saunders, 2007; Tang et al., 2000). Table 3 shows each of the
measures in the reputation dimension and the studies in which they were used.
Selectivity. Past research has used several measures of selectivity: acceptance rate,
admission rating, freshman in the top of their class, percentage of students who graduate in the
top 10% of their high school class, SAT scores, and student quality. These measures provide an
indication of the quality of the students in the university. For instance, the acceptance rate is a
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measure of selectivity because it represents how many students were admitted to the university
compared to how many had applied. A higher acceptance rate signifies that a university is less
selective about whom gets admitted, whereas a lower acceptance rate suggest that the university
is more selective. Higher quality universities are generally more selective because they have
greater numbers of applicants and thus, can afford to select only the best students. Therefore, the
acceptance rate should be related to the overall quality of the students. This measure was used in
four studies (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons &
Reitenga, 2014).
Similarly, the number of students who graduated in the top of their class, the percentage
of students who graduated in the top 10% of their high school class, and SAT scores also each
provide an indication of the quality of enrolled students. Specifically, universities with a higher
percentage of students who graduated in the top of their high school class are expected to have,
generally, more high-quality students. Likewise, universities with high average SAT scores are
expected to have higher quality students than universities that have lower average SAT scores.
These measures were used in several primary studies (e.g., Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett &
Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003). Table 3 displays the
remaining measures that I categorized into the selectivity dimension of university performance.
Other performance measures. Three measures were categorized in the other
performance measures dimension, including student service expenses, environmental
sustainability score, and social sustainability score (see Table 3). The measures in this category
either did not fit into the other dimensions or were not clearly defined. For instance, although
research output could be a measure of academic and research performance, it was not clearly
defined by He and Callahan (2017), and therefore, was categorized into the “other” dimension.
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Although student service expenses were clearly defined by Cheng (2014), this measure
did not fit into any other dimension. Specifically, student service expenses reflect the amount of
money spent to “contribute to students’ emotional and physical well-being and to their
intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context of the formal instruction
program” (Cheng, 2014, p. 591). Because these expenses are not specifically directed at
instruction or research, they do not fit into the academic and research quality dimension. Yet, this
measure does represent part of the investment universities make into their students, and,
therefore, may still influence president’s compensation. Similarly, although both environmental
sustainability and social sustainability scores were defined by Pati and Lee (2016) and were
considered by these authors to be measures of performance, they do not fit into any of the
previously discussed performance dimensions.
Summary. The preceding discussion and an examination of Table 3 demonstrates the
diversity of university performance measures that have been used in the university president
compensation literature. With so many different performance dimensions and measures, it is
difficult to determine what performance is and how it is best measured. This increases the
difficulty in drawing conclusions regarding the relation between university performance and
university president compensation. In the next section, I discuss why a relation between
performance and compensation may be expected.
Overview. Performance is the most frequently studied variable related to compensation
(Devers et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Although there are several theories that can
be used to justify a relation between performance and compensation (e.g., equity theory [Adams,
1965]; expectancy theory [Vroom, 1964]), in the context of executive compensation (including
university president compensation), agency theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is the most
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prominent one. In fact, an examination of the three meta-analytic reviews on executive
compensation (Deutsch, 2005; Tosi et al., 2000; van Essen et al., 2015) and two narrative
reviews (Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) shows that equity theory and
expectancy theory are rarely mentioned. Although each review addresses agency theory in depth,
equity theory is only mentioned twice and expectancy theory is only mentioned once across all
of the five papers reviewed. Furthermore, neither equity theory nor expectancy theory are
mentioned in any of the primary studies that have examined determinants of university president
compensation. Therefore, I will provide a relatively thorough explanation of agency theory in the
following sections.
Agency theory. Agency theory is relevant to situations where one individual (the
principal) delegates work to another individual (the agent; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This type
of relationship, although possible in any situation where work is delegated, is particularly
relevant to most modern organizations. Ownership in modern organizations is frequently
separated from control of the organization (Berle & Means, 1932). Stated differently, the owners
of most organizations are now shareholders (i.e., principals) and the heads of organizations are
professional managers, also called executives (i.e., agents), hired by the owners of the firm, or
their representatives (i.e., the Board of Directors). This has the potential to lead to several
problems. Agency theory attempts to addresses two of these problems (1) the agency problem;
and (2) risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The agency problem. The first problem, referred to as the agency problem, exists because
principals and agents have conflicting goals resulting from the desire to maximize one’s own
benefits (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In essence, principals’ and agents’ goals
are often diametrically opposed. For instance, principals generally want agents to work as hard as
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possible to increase the success of the organization. Agents, however, want to pursue their own
goals, even if actions taken in the pursuit of those goals may not be in the best interest of the
organization. In addition to conflicting goals, there is also information asymmetry between the
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). This exists because agents have more direct access to
relevant organizational information than principals do just by the fact that principals have
delegated the work. Although there are many potential issues stemming from the agency
problem, the two most common ones are adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g., Eisenhardt,
1989; Shapiro, 2005). Both issues result from the conflicting goals of principals and agents and
information asymmetries between the parties; however, they arise at different stages of the
contracting process.
Adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs during the selection stage where a principal
is selecting the agent from a pool of potential candidates (Eisenhardt, 1989). At this stage, the
principal would like to delegate work to the most qualified candidate who will ultimately provide
the most benefit to the principal. Each potential agent would like to be awarded the work because
it is associated with some other desirable outcome (e.g., a higher paycheck) (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Shapiro, 2005). Therefore, while the principal is trying to determine a potential agent’s
qualifications as accurately as possible, each potential agent is trying to show himself or herself
in the best possible light, regardless of whether it is an accurate portrayal. Unfortunately for the
principal, it can be difficult to know which agent is best qualified because the principal does not
have complete access to information and it may be difficult to verify information presented by
the potential agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). Considering the information asymmetry between the
principal and potential agents, and the difficulty that the principal may have in verifying
information provided by potential agents, it is possible that potential agents misrepresent their
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level of experience and capabilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). Thus, the principal must
decide which potential agent to hire based on incomplete, and potentially inaccurate,
information. If the position an agent is being hired for is that of a CEO of a large organization, it
presents a very costly problem. In fact, Forbes estimates that it can cost up to 52 million dollars
to replace a bad CEO hire (Stoddard & Wyckoff, 2009).
Moral hazard. Even if the best candidate is chosen, moral hazard can still be an issue.
Moral hazard occurs because of conflicting goals between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt,
1989; Shapiro, 2005). For example, a principal wants an agent to work very hard to maximize
beneficial outcomes for the principal (e.g., profit, long-term health of the organization), whereas
the agent wants to work as little as possible, but still receive high levels of compensation.
Furthermore, there is information asymmetry between the parties (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro,
2005). Specifically, the principal does not know if the agent is working hard and pursuing the
principal’s goals, or, if instead, the agent is shirking his or her duties and pursing self-interested
goals at the expense of the success of the organization. This is problematic because, for example,
if a CEO’s compensation is fixed, regardless of the performance of the organization, the
compensation risk is squarely on the principal. Stated differently, in this instance, regardless of
whether the organization’s performance or market value drops significantly (to the financial
detriment of principals) or increases significantly (to the financial benefit of principals), the
CEO’s compensation remains the same. Thus, because there is no risk to the CEO’s
compensation, and principals do not have access to all relevant information, the CEO may
choose to pursue his/her own goals without fearing any negative financial consequences. This
can be very costly for organizations. For instance, CEO shirking (as measured by the amount of
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golf played) has been shown to reduce the market value of a firm’s assets by up to 10%
(Biggerstaff, Cicero, & Puckett, 2016).
Risk sharing. The second problem that agency theory addresses is financial risk sharing.
This problem occurs because principals and agents may be comfortable with different levels of
financial risk, and therefore, may prefer different policies and actions (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, &
Dolton, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). The general assumption is that agents are more
risk-averse than principals because principals are able to diversify their investments (i.e., they
disperse their level of risk), while agents are not able to spread out their risk as they are only
working for one organization (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). The risk sharing problem is
particularly important to consider when developing ways to manage agency problems, such as
adverse selection and moral hazard, because the ways in which these problems are mitigated
(discussed in the next section) often involve the transfer of financial risk from the principal to the
agent. Given that agents are generally risk averse, they may engage in undesirable behaviors to
mitigate this increased risk (Shapiro, 2005). For instance, CEOs may manipulate the earnings of
their organization to artificially inflate the value of their stock options (Zhang, Bartol, Smith,
Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008). Therefore, it is important to consider the impact of this transfer of risk
when determining the optimal way to manage agency problems.
Managing the agency problem. There are two ways to manage the agency problem. The
first way to deal with this problem is to reduce information asymmetries by increasing the
monitoring of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporations attempt to
do this by having a Board that is supposed to monitor the CEO. Monitoring may have two
benefits. First, monitoring is intended to allow principals to have access to the same information
that the agent has and to more accurately determine what the agent is actually doing. Second,
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there is evidence to suggest that, just by monitoring managers, they perceive themselves to be
more accountable, which tends to increase their level of performance (Mero, Guidice, & Werner,
2014). However, monitoring may not always be feasible, and is sometimes virtually impossible,
as it may be too costly and/or time consuming for principals. Also, if Board members do not
have the necessary expertise, they may not be able to effectively monitor the CEO. Therefore,
monitoring is often supplemented with incentives.
Using incentives allows principals to bring the goals of agents into alignment with their
own goals (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, a
CEO’s compensation package may include stocks and stock options. Because the ultimate value
of these options depends on the market value (e.g., stock market performance) of the
organization, the CEO should, theoretically, work hard and make good management decisions to
increase the value of the stock as it will increase his/her wealth. This is also the goal of the
principal (assuming the stock price is due to genuine high levels of performance rather than by
manipulation by the agent). In essence, by using stocks and stock options, agents are becoming
principals; thus, their goals are, theoretically, perfectly aligned (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt,
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, agents are generally risk averse. Therefore, because
there are aspects of the organization’s performance which are out of their control (e.g.,
unanticipated setbacks or changes in laws that negatively affect an organization’s stock price), it
is expected that agents will be less comfortable with tying their compensation to organizational
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). To balance out this increased risk to the agent, principals may
use a combination of compensation methods (e.g., fixed salary, stocks, stock options, bonuses).
However, although there may be stable components to the agent’s compensation, it is still
beneficial to have part of the agent’s total compensation tied to performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).
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In addition to the consideration of agents’ risk tolerance, there are two other factors that
influence the extent to which compensation is tied to performance: task programmability and
outcome measurability (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). Task programmability is the extent to which
the correct course of action for high performance is known (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990).
Generally, task programmability of any management position, including a CEO or university
president, is low because it is difficult to know what the best course of action is in any given
situation. When task programmability is low, agency theory suggests that it is best to tie
compensation to organizational performance more strongly (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is due to the
fact that monitoring is virtually impossible when task programmability is low because one does
not know what to monitor. Further, because the best behavior is not always known, incentives
may not be able to be effectively tied to behavior, and thus, must be tied to performance
outcomes. In sum, agency theory suggests that because the job of executives has very little task
programmability, their pay should be more strongly tied to organizational performance.
It is also important to consider outcome measurability, which refers to the extent to which
outcomes (e.g., performance) can be easily and accurately measured (Anderson, 1985;
Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). Outcome measurability at the individual level is unlikely to be high for
executives as it can be difficult to quantify their individual performance. Furthermore, some
results of the executives’ decisions and action may not be realized for a long period of time (i.e.,
they have a long time horizon; Eisenhardt, 1989). When outcome measurability at the individual
level is low, individual performance tends to have a minimal effect on compensation, but rather
compensation will be relatively stable and mainly based on a fixed salary (rather than having a
large performance-based component) (Baker, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989). Alternatively, when
outcome measurability at the individual level is low, principals may choose to tie agents’
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compensation to performance at a higher level (e.g., at the organizational level, especially
organizational performance). Performance at this higher level is easier to measure because there
are commonly accepted metrics used to quantify performance (Richard, Devinney, Yip, &
Johnson, 2009; Tosi et al., 2000). Therefore, agency theory suggests that when outcome
measurability at the individual level is low, an agent’s compensation may be more strongly tied
to performance at a different level (e.g., organizational performance). However, because agents
may not be able to directly and fully control performance at a higher level of abstraction, their
compensation is likely to include non-performance components (e.g., tenure) as well as
performance components (e.g., profit).
Agency theory in the context of for-profit executive compensation. Agency theory is
frequently used as the theoretical basis for examining the relation between organizational
performance and CEO compensation (e.g., Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000). On its face,
agency theory appears to suggest that “outcome based [i.e., performance based] compensation
contracts solve the agency problem” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 285; see also, Baker, Jensen,
& Murphy, 1988). This statement highlights how the use of incentives, particularly for
executives whose positions have low levels of task programmability, helps align the interests of
executives and owners, represented by the Board. However, this statement does not consider the
influence of outcome measurability on the feasibility of using performance-based compensation
(which, in this context, refers to using incentives to align the principals’ and agents’ goals). As
previously stated, when outcome measurability is low, it is expected that performance-based
compensation will be used less frequently (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). However, Boards may also
choose to use a performance measure, or set of measures, at a higher level of abstraction (i.e.,
organizational performance) to set CEO compensation. In the executive compensation literature,
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there are commonly accepted metrics of organizational financial performance, including net
income, profits, return on equity, return on assets, and stock price (Richard et al., 2009; Tosi et
al., 2000). Therefore, one may expect a positive association between organizational performance
and CEO compensation. Yet, it would be unlikely for organizational performance to account for
the majority of CEO compensation because the CEO does not have complete control over the
performance of the organization. If CEO compensation were to be completely determined by
organizational performance, CEOs may not see their compensation as fair and, because their
compensation is at greater risk, they may engage in undesirable behaviors (Zhang et al., 2008).
Taken together, this suggests that organizational performance is likely related to executive
compensation, but, due to risk considerations, it may not comprise most of the compensation
package.
Evidence from the executive compensation literature generally supports this. For
instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that CEO compensation was related to one measure
of organizational performance (i.e., stockholder returns), albeit weakly. Specifically, they found
that for every $1,000 in increased stockholder returns, CEO compensation grew by $3.25.
However, some more recent studies, also relying on stock market indicators, have found a
stronger relation between executive compensation and performance (Aggarwal & Samwick,
1999, 2003; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). In fact,
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) found that CEO compensation grew by $13.78 for every $1000
increase in shareholder wealth, which is more than four times greater than the amount found by
Jensen and Murphy (1990). Importantly, however, the strength of the relation between executive
compensation and performance may depend on the design (e.g., mix of stocks and stock options
provided) of the CEO’s compensation package (Zhang et al., 2008).
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Considering other measures of financial performance besides stockholder returns, a metaanalysis found that short-term return-on-equity accounted for 4.5% of the variance in CEO
compensation, whereas return-on-assets only accounted for 1.4% of the variance in CEO
compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Thus, Tosi et al. (2000) found that different measures of
performance had distinct effects on future compensation. Considering all of the measures they
included in their study, however, they found that organizational performance only accounted for
about 5% of the variance in CEO compensation. Furthermore, examining only the changes in
performance and compensation, change in performance only accounted for about 4% of the
variance in changes in CEO compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Taken together, evidence from the
executive compensation literature seems to support the notion that organizational performance
does influence executive compensation. However, the influence of performance on executive
compensation seems to be relatively minor.
Agency theory in the context of university president compensation. Considering the
predictions of agency theory and the results of empirical studies on executive compensation (e.g.,
Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000) helps one make
predictions regarding the potential association between university performance and university
president compensation. For instance, as with executives in the for-profit sector, task
programmability for university presidents is likely to be low because it is difficult to know what
the best course of action will be in any given situation. This suggests that university president
compensation will be associated with university performance. Outcome measurability for
university presidents’ individual performance is also likely to be low; therefore, Boards may
choose to use university-level performance to determine president compensation, rather than
individual-level performance. Yet, as this results in more risk for university presidents, it is
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unlikely that the majority of president compensation would be performance-based. This suggests
that university president compensation will be related to university performance, albeit weakly.
However, there are two additional considerations that are worth addressing. First,
although outcome measurability at the individual level is similarly low for university presidents
and for-profit executives, it may be easier to measure organizational performance in for-profit
settings than in university settings. Although, there are commonly accepted metrics of
organizational performance in the for-profit setting (Richard et al., 2009; Tosi et al., 2000), there
are no universally agreed-upon metrics of university performance (Langbert, 2006; Oster, 1998;
Sorokina, 2003). This is evidenced by the highly varied and inconsistent operationalizations of
performance across primary studies assessing the impact of university performance on president
compensation (see Table 3). Therefore, it may be, at least initially, more difficult to measure
performance in the context of higher education. Yet, despite this initial difficulty, once Boards
decide how they want to measure performance, it is easy to obtain the necessary data. In fact,
universities are required to report extensive amounts of data to the U. S. Department of
Education’s National Center for Education and Statistics ("Higher Education Act of 1965",
1965). Therefore, a positive association is still expected between university performance and
university president compensation.
The second consideration is related to whether moral hazard even exists in universities. It
has been suggested that the assumption of goal misalignment, which is a central tenet in agency
theory and the concept of moral hazard (Dalton et al., 2007), is unlikely to be as relevant in
nonprofit organizations (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006). For instance, Handy
and Katz (1998) proposed that presidents of nonprofit organizations are more willing to accept
lower compensation (at least by comparison to for-profit organizations) because they are
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intrinsically motivated to perform to the best of their ability due to their commitment to the goals
of the organization (see also Bai, 2014). If this is the case, the use of performance-based
compensation would be less desirable. Stated differently, if agents are intrinsically motivated,
moral hazard may not be an issue because the goals of the principals and agents are already
aligned. If one assumes that tying pay to performance undermines intrinsic motivation (Deci,
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), it would then be unwise to make compensation sensitive to
organizational performance because this would result in decreased levels of intrinsic motivation.
However, there is no robust evidence to support the claim of an undermining effect (List, Kepes,
& McDaniel, 2017).
Yet, although it may not harm intrinsic motivation, linking compensation to performance
may still be undesirable if university presidents are intrinsically motivated. In the absence of goal
misalignment, performance-based compensation unnecessarily transfers risk to the risk-averse
agent (i.e., by making the agent's compensation variable and partially outside of the agent's
control; Eisenhardt, 1989). When risk is high, individuals are more likely to engage in behaviors
to artificially increase their level of compensation (Shapiro, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Therefore,
if intrinsic motivation is high and there is no goal misalignment, using performance-based
compensation may have negative effects on long-term organizational performance. Despite this
potentiality, it is important to note that although many have suggested that executives of
nonprofit organizations, including universities, are intrinsically motivated (e.g., Bai, 2014;
Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006), there is no empirical evidence to support this claim.
Furthermore, even if these executives are intrinsically motivated, there is still likely to be
goal misalignment between principals and agents in the university context. Unlike in the context
of a for-profit corporation where the primary goal is to increase shareholder value, university
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presidents have many potential stakeholders, including members of the Board of
Visitors/Trustees/Regents, students, faculty members and other employees, alumni, the federal,
state, and local governments. (Ehrenberg et al., 2001). It is highly unlikely that members from
each group of these constituents have the same goals. Therefore, although the Board may, for all
intents and purposes, function as the principal in this relationship, what they value as high
performance may not be what other stakeholders’ value. Thus, regardless of whether university
presidents are intrinsically motivated or not, it is unlikely that their goals will perfectly align with
the goals of all members of the Board and all other stakeholders. Therefore, Boards may still
prefer the use of performance-based compensation to help align their goals with the ones of the
university president.
Taken together, the goal misalignment that is likely to exist in university contexts as well
as the low level of task programmability suggests that university performance will be positively
related to university president compensation. Considering outcome measurability, the situation is
likely to be similar to the for-profit context. Specifically, because linking compensation to
university performance results in more risk for presidents, performance-based compensation
components are unlikely to comprise the majority of the compensation package. However, a
positive association is still expected. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 1: University performance will be positively related to president
compensation.
As previously mentioned, it is possible that there are differences between public and
private universities in terms of how university performance influences university president
compensation. For instance, public and private university presidents may have, on average,
different levels of goal misalignment with their respective Boards. Although no study has
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assessed the level of intrinsic motivation among private and public universities, public university
presidents may be more intrinsically motivated than private university presidents. Public
university presidents earn, on average, $178,125 less per year than their private university
counterparts (Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Given the size of this discrepancy, one could make the
argument that public university presidents must be intrinsically motivated if they are willing to
serve as the president of a public university. If this is, in fact, the case, the goals of public
university presidents would be more aligned with their Boards than private university presidents.
Thus, moral hazard would be less of an issue for public universities, which, in turns, results in
less performance-based compensation. Based solely on this argument then, one would expect the
relation between university performance and university president compensation to be stronger in
private universities than in public ones.
However, only three studies have directly compared the effects of various measures of
performance on university president compensation by university type (Huang & Chen, 2013;
Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Two of these studies found a positive association
between university performance and university president compensation for both private and
public universities (Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014), whereas one found an association
between performance and compensation in private universities, but not public ones (Huang &
Chen, 2013). Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine if there are differences between public
and private universities based on the few number of studies that have made these direct
comparisons. Therefore, I ask,
Research question 1: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between
university performance and university president compensation in private and public
universities?
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The relation between for-profit organizational performance and executive compensation
has primarily focused on financial performance indicators (e.g., Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003;
Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Nyberg et al., 2010; Tosi et al., 2000), which makes sense because the
primary goal of for-profit organizations is to make money. However, as can be gleaned from
Table 3, there are several other non-financial indicators of performance in the nonprofit
educational context. Thus, it is possible that, even if president compensation is related to
university performance, the strength of this relation may differ across different performance
dimensions. For instance, given the risk associated with performance-based compensation,
Boards may base compensation on measures of performance that are more directly under the
control of the university president. This would suggest that performance dimensions such as
academic and research quality as well as selectivity are likely to have the strongest relation with
future president pay. Measures in these dimensions may be easier for a president to impact since
they can, for example, hire more instructors to reduce class sizes (academic and research quality)
or raise SAT score requirements (selectivity). In addition, presidents may have control over other
specific measures (e.g., fundraising). In fact, fundraising is considered a primary responsibility
and an absolutely essential part of the university president role (Cote, 1985). Thus, the relation
between fundraising performance and university president compensation may be stronger than it
is for other performance measures. In fact, a recent survey of university presidents indicated that
fundraising takes up a majority of university presidents’ time (Gagliardi, Espinosa, Turk, &
Taylor, 2018). Alternatively, Boards may also choose to focus on performance measures that are
more aligned with the mission of a university and its continued success, regardless of the
compensation risk to the university president. If this is the case, one would expect that the
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relation between performance dimensions such as financial performance and academic and
research performance would have the strongest association with future president pay.
However, despite these reasons to believe that there are differences in the strength of the
association between university performance and university president compensation depending on
the performance measure used, it is difficult to determine what those differences are from the
primary studies. Therefore, one goal of this systematic review is to determine if the various
dimensions of performance, on average, have disparate effects on university president
compensation. Furthermore, given the potential differences between public and private
universities (see Research question 1), university type may influence the relative influence of the
various performance dimensions on executive compensation as well. Stated formally, I ask:
Research question 2(a): What is the relative influence of the seven different performance
dimensions on executive compensation? (b) Is the pattern of strength of these relations
different between public universities and private universities?
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics
Operationalizations of Non-performance Institutional Characteristics. Now that I
have provided a review of organizational performance as a determinant of executive
compensation, I discuss non-performance institutional characteristics, including organizational
size and complexity. In the broader executive compensation literature, organizational size
includes measures such as number of employees, assets, or sales, whereas organizational
complexity refers to the degree of diversification in the organization, such as the number of
business lines, plants, departments, etc. (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Nagar, Nanda, &
Wysocki, 2003). Table 4 presents an overview of how these, and other measures of nonperformance institutional characteristics, have been operationalized in primary studies of
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determinants of university president compensation. The non-performance institutional
characteristics factor includes three dimensions: size, complexity, and other institutional
characteristics.
Size. Nine previously used measures were categorized into the size dimension:
enrollment, total expenditures, institutional support expenses, administration expenditures, other
expenditures, number of employees, number of administrators, total revenue, and tuition
revenue. Enrollment was used as a measure of performance in some studies (Cheng, 2014;
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014), but as an indicator of university size in others
(Banker et al., 2009; Huang & Chen, 2013; Langbert, 2006). To determine what category
enrollment may belong to, I considered the executive compensation literature where number of
sales is used as an indicator of firm size (Tosi et al., 2000). Because enrollment reflects the
number of students using the services provided by the university (i.e., taking classes), it can be
considered analogous to sales and was, therefore, categorized as a measure of size rather than
performance. Enrollment was used in several primary studies (e.g., Bai, 2014; Huang & Chen,
2013; Saunders, 2007; Tang et al., 2000).
Total revenue and tuition revenue can each be considered similar to sales and/or revenue
in the executive compensation literature. Sales and revenue are both considered indicators of size
(Tosi et al., 2000). Therefore, total revenue and tuition revenue are both indicative of university
size. These measures have been used by several researchers (e.g., Bai, 2014; Langbert, 2006;
Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016).
Complexity. A total of three previously used measures were included in the complexity
dimension: university tier, Carnegie classification, and number of degree-granting programs. All
of these measures are supposed to reflect the difficulty that the president is likely to encounter
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due to the complex nature of the university. For instance, university tier and Carnegie
classification provide information that indicates whether a university is undergraduate-focused or
if it is a doctoral-granting research institution. More research-intensive universities, including
doctoral-granting institutions, are considered more complex environments whereas baccalaureate
colleges, or universities that focus mostly on undergraduate education, are typically considered
less complex (Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). These measures were used by several researchers (see
Table 4; e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; He & Callahan, 2017; Sorokina, 2003; Tang et al.,
2000). The number of degree-granting programs was only used in one study and can be
considered a measure of complexity because fewer degree-granting programs are likely easier to
manage than many (see Table 4; Huang & Chen, 2013).
Other institutional characteristics. The last dimension contains measures that did not fit
into either of the previous dimensions. A total of 17 measures were categorized as other
institutional characteristics: percent of aliens enrolled, percent of students who receive financial
aid, percent of students who receive grant aid, average graduate tuition, ratio of administrative
staff, ratio of instructional and research staff, average graduate tuition, tuition cost, net tuition
cost, tuition discount rate, presence of business school, presence of law school, presence of
medical school, religious affiliation, member of the Council for Christian Colleges and
Universities, geographic location, size of surrounding community, and year the university was
founded. Each of these measures is a characteristic of an institution but does not fall into the size
or complexity dimensions. For instance, although the presence of a business, law, or medical
school may reflect complexity, if the school is just one of a few in the university, these measures
are not necessarily indicative of complexity. Similarly, neither religious affiliation nor whether
or not the university is a member of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities can be
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categorized as an indicator of size or complexity. Yet, it is still possible that these variables will
influence university president compensation. For instance, evidence suggests that religious
institutions provide compensation packages that are, on average, less generous than non-religious
institutions (Langbert, 2006). This is consistent with the notion that some university presidents
may be intrinsically motivated, and thus, aligning compensation with university performance
may be unnecessary (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz, 1998). Table 4 includes a list of the studies that
included these measures in their studies (e.g., Cheng, 2014; Langbert, 2006).
Overview. Both size and complexity variables have been shown to affect executive
compensation (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Tosi et al.,
2000; van Essen et al., 2015). A relation between size/complexity and executive compensation is
predicted by both the managerialist perspective (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000) and human capital theory
(e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), although the reasoning for the association between these
variables is different depending on the theory used. Therefore, the following sections will
provide an explanation of both theories/theoretical perspectives and highlight evidence provided
by the executive compensation literature on the relation between organizational size/complexity
and compensation.
Managerialism. The managerialist perspective is related to agency theory in that it
highlights many of the same issues addressed by agency theory, namely, goal misalignment and
a risk-averse agent5. However, unlike agency theory, which addresses how principals deal with
agency problems (e.g., by using incentives to align the goals of principals and agents), the
managerialist perspective addresses how agency problems create power imbalances that agents
can use to influence their compensation. For instance, executives may be able to use their power

Note that the “principal” and “agent” terminology is typically not used outside of agency theory, but I use it here
for consistency and clarity of argument.
5
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to influence the Board to base their compensation on organizational size or complexity, which is
less risky for them (i.e., results in less volatility in CEO compensation) than organizational
performance.
The key concept within managerialism is that of entrenchment (e.g., Combs & Skill,
2003). Entrenchment occurs when agents are able to use their power to pursue their own selfinterest, rather than the goals of the principals because they have power over the Board (i.e., the
de facto principals; Combs & Skill, 2003; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). There are
many reasons why an executive can become entrenched. For instance, shareholders have become
increasingly dispersed such that no individual shareholder has enough power to effectively
monitor executives (Berle & Means, 1932; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).
Furthermore, because there are so many shareholders, it is expected that individual ones will not
perceive it to be worth their effort to attempt to monitor executives (Grabke-Rundell & GomezMejia, 2002). Although agency theory suggests that Boards can account for this by monitoring
executives and using incentives, the managerialist perspective proposes that the lack of
monitoring by these dispersed shareholders allows executives to have more power than they
would have otherwise, which leads to entrenchment (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).
In addition to shareholder dispersion, executives can become entrenched when Board
members do not maintain their objectivity. Although Boards are supposed to exert their influence
over executives to ensure they are not shirking their duties, they are often closely allied with
CEOs. This occurs for a variety of reasons. For instance, CEOs are able to provide benefits to
Board members in the form of compensation, charitable contributions, continued seats on the
Board, etc. (Main, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1995; van Essen et al., 2015). Therefore, Board members
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who want to receive any of these benefits are likely to design the compensation package in a
manner which benefits the CEO (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Nguyen, 2012; van Essen et al., 2015).
Thus, the result of entrenchment, occurring for any reason (e.g., shareholder dispersion,
alignment between the CEO and the Board), is that the CEO has increased power which can be
used to influence compensation strategy and decisions. Because, like agency theory, the
managerialist perspective assumes that agents are risk averse, it is expected that entrenched
CEOs will use their power to decrease the sensitivity of their pay to organizational performance
(Tosi et al., 2000). Rather, CEOs would prefer to have their compensation tied to measures such
as organizational size and complexity (Tosi et al., 2000). Organizational size/complexity is
preferred by CEOs over organizational performance as the primary determinant of their
compensation because it is less risky for them than tying their compensation to organizational
performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Kroll et
al., 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Specifically, CEOs have substantially more direct control over the
size and complexity of their organization than they do over its performance, especially marketbased measures of performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell & GomezMejia, 2002; Kroll et al., 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Additionally, organizational size and
complexity are less variable than organizational performance, so CEO compensation is more
likely to be stable (Kostiuk, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). Taken together, this means that using
organizational size and complexity as the primary determinants of executive compensation
would result in CEO’s compensation being less risky and volatile.
Human capital theory. In addition to CEOs’ preference to base compensation on
organizational size/complexity, Boards may also prefer this because it is easy to justify a link
between compensation and organizational size/complexity because larger and more complex
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organizations arguably require higher levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962;
Combs & Skill, 2003; Fulmer, 2009). Human capital is the collection of individuals’ knowledge,
skills, and abilities that contribute to their productivity (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962; Fulmer,
2009). According to human capital theory, pay differences between individuals can be traced to
differences in their respective levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962).
Theoretically, leading a large and complex organization requires a high level of human capital.
Thus, it can be argued that the fair pay associated with leading such an organization is higher
than the one associated with leading a smaller, less complex organization (Agarwal, 1981;
Becker, 1962; Fulmer, 2009; Kostiuk, 1990). This is important because there is a theoretical link
between fairness perceptions and effort (e.g., equity theory [Adams, 1965]; and the fair wageeffort hypothesis [Akerlof & Yellen, 1990]). Specifically, it is expected that if individuals feel
that they are not receiving fair compensation for their effort, they will reduce the amount of
effort they exert in the future (Adams, 1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Stated differently, when
compensation is perceived to be too low, the opportunity cost of engaging in work-related
behaviors, rather than other desired behaviors, increases. This may result in individuals engaging
in those other behaviors rather than work-related behaviors. Therefore, it may be desirable for
Boards to make executive compensation commensurate with the size and complexity of the
organization. This should avoid any decrease in effort by the CEO in response to perceived
inequities in the level of human capital required for the position and the associated
compensation.
Managerialism and human capital theory in the context of executive compensation.
Both managerialism and human capital theory have been used extensively within the context of
executive compensation to justify a relation between organizational size/complexity and
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executive compensation (e.g., Combs & Skill, 2003; Tosi et al., 2000). Given the dispersion of
most shareholders (i.e., the lack of influence of shareholders on Board decisions due to not
voting their shares) and the closeness between the Board and the CEO in many organizations
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Nguyen, 2012; van Essen et al., 2015), it is likely that CEOs will be
able to exercise their influence to align incentives to the size and/or complexity of the
organization. Furthermore, because of the relation between perceived fairness and effort (Adams,
1965; Akerlof & Yellen, 1990), it is also likely that Boards will compensate CEOs based on the
required level of human capital for the CEO position (judged on the basis of organizational size
and complexity; Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962; Combs & Skill, 2003). The relation between
organizational size and executive compensation has been established meta-analytically. In fact,
meta-analytic research indicates that organizational size is by far the strongest predictor of
executive compensation; it accounts for about 40% of the variance in executive compensation
(Tosi et al., 2000). A positive association has also been found between organizational complexity
and executive compensation (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).
Given the difficulties associated with monitoring CEOs and measuring their performance
(as discussed in the agency theory section), it is likely that the relation between organizational
size/complexity and executive compensation is stronger than the relation between organizational
performance and executive compensation. This notion has also received support. Although
organizational size accounted for around 40% of the variance in executive compensation,
organizational performance only accounted for about 5% of the variance (Tosi et al., 2000).
Focusing on just the change in size and compensation, it was found that approximately 5% of the
variance in change in compensation was related to change in organizational size (roughly 4%
was related to change in organizational performance; Tosi et al., 2000).
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Managerialism and human capital theory in the context of university president
compensation. Considering the managerialist perspective, human capital theory, and evidence
from the broader literature of executive compensation, one may anticipate a positive association
between university size/complexity and university president compensation. Specifically, because
there are so many different constituencies that university presidents are beholden to (Ehrenberg
et al., 2001), but little direct way for these constituents to hold university presidents accountable,
it is likely that university presidents will have considerable power. This would allow them to
become entrenched and, ultimately, affect the way in which they are compensated (Bebchuk &
Fried, 2006). Because a central job of university presidents is to set the strategic vision of the
university (Cote, 1985), they have a fair amount of control over the size and complexity of their
organization. For instance, they can develop more online programs and thus, enroll more
students, which increases the size of the organization, or they can decide to expand the number
of departments and/or degree-granting programs, which results in more organizational
complexity. Therefore, it is possible that university presidents may also prefer to tie their
compensation to the size/complexity of their university. However, it is also possible that any
observed relation between university size/complexity and university president compensation is
due to the level of human capital needed to lead the university. Stated differently, rather than any
observed relation between university size/complexity and university president compensation
being wholly due to university president entrenchment, it may also be reflective of the required
level of human capital.
As none of the primary studies examining university president compensation have
attempted to assess the reasoning for any potential relation between university size/complexity
and university president compensation (i.e., entrenchment versus reflecting the amount of human
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capital needed to lead the university), it will not be possible to make this determination in this
study. However, both theories predict a positive association between university size and
complexity and university president compensation. Furthermore, just as with the executive
compensation (explained previously), I expect that university size/complexity will account for
more variance in university president compensation than university performance. Stated
formally,
Hypothesis 2(a): Non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size
and complexity will have a positive relation with university president compensation; and,
(b): university size and complexity will account for more variance in university president
compensation than university performance.
Although there is theoretical reasoning to suggest that there is a positive association
between university size and complexity and president compensation, there is no consistent
theoretical reasoning to suggest a relation between the measures in the “other” category and
president compensation. Yet, it is still possible that these measures do influence compensation.
For instance, universities with a religious affiliation tend to pay their presidents less than nonreligious universities (Langbert, 2006; Saunders, 2007). In addition, the presence of a business
school, law school, or medical school may be related to university complexity if these schools are
just one of many different schools in the university. Therefore, the presence of these schools may
lead to increased levels of compensation for university presidents. However, if the presence of
these schools does not reflect complexity, managerialism and human capital theory would not
provide an explanation as to why these characteristics would be related to president
compensation. Similarly, there is also no theoretical explanation for why many of the other
measures in this category (e.g., percentage of students who receive grant aid, year the university
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was founded) would affect university president compensation. However, because these measures
have been used in other studies, I ask,
Research question 3: Is there a relation between other non-performance institutional
characteristics and university president compensation?
Differences between private and public universities in the extent to which university
size/complexity influences president compensation may also exist. The managerialist perspective
suggests that the relation between size/complexity and compensation will be stronger when
executives are entrenched and can use their power to influence the Board (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000).
Thus, it is important to consider whether or not differences are expected between private and
public universities in the likelihood that presidents will become entrenched. Previously, I
discussed two antecedents of entrenchment, shareholder dispersion and the alignment between
the CEO and the Board.
First, considering shareholder dispersion, it is likely that public universities have greater
shareholder dispersion than private ones because there are a greater number of stakeholders for
public universities (e.g., taxpayers, state and federal governments) than there are for private ones
(Ehrenberg et al., 2001). Because dispersed shareholders are less likely to effectively monitor
presidents, presidents are able to use their power to reduce the sensitivity of their compensation
to university performance, and, instead, tie their compensation to measures that they have more
control over (e.g., university size/complexity). Based solely on this, the managerialist perspective
suggests that the association between university size/complexity and compensation will be
stronger for public universities than for private ones.
In addition to higher levels of monitoring associated with having less shareholder
dispersion, there are also more monitoring constraints for private universities. Private, nonprofit
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universities are subject to legislation that directly bans excessive compensation. Specifically, the
government can impose tax penalties on presidents and Board members of private universities if
it is determined that presidents received excessive compensation (Hyatt & Johnston, 2015). Due
to the possibility of these sanctions, private university Boards may be motivated to have a
stronger association between university performance and the compensation of their presidents
than their public university counterparts. This also supports the notion that there may be a
stronger association between university size/complexity in public universities than in private
ones.
Considering the second way that presidents may become entrenched (i.e., the degree of
alignment between the Board and the university presidents), however, suggests that university
presidents at private universities are likely to have more power than presidents at public ones. In
both private and public universities, Board members generally do not receive compensation
(Nason, 1982). Therefore, university presidents are not able to leverage their influence on Board
members’ compensation to impact Board compensation decisions. However, in public
universities, Board members are typically appointed by government agencies or officials,
whereas in private universities, Board members are typically nominated and elected by the
university or its alumni (Price, 2018). Because of this, Board members for public universities
may be more objective (i.e., less beholden to universities presidents) than Board members in
private universities. If true, this would result in university presidents at public universities having
less power over their Boards than presidents at private universities. Thus, for private universities,
the relation between university size/complexity and compensation would be stronger than the
relation between university performance and compensation.
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Taken together, based on the influence of shareholder dispersion, it is reasonable to
expect that there will be a stronger link between university president compensation and
university size/complexity in public universities. However, considering the degree of alignment
between the Board and the university president, it is also reasonable to expect that this relation
will be stronger in private universities. To address these conflicting perspectives, I ask,
Research question 4: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between nonperformance institutional characteristics (including university size and complexity) and
university president compensation among private universities and public universities?
There are also likely differences among the non-performance institutional characteristics
dimensions (see Table 4) regarding the strength of their association with president compensation.
Specifically, considering only the size and complexity dimensions6, one may reasonably expect
that university size has a stronger impact on president compensation than university complexity.
The managerialist perspective suggests that university presidents will use their power to link
their compensation to measures that they have control over and that are relatively stable (Combs
& Skill, 2003; Tosi et al., 2000). University size is arguably more easily influenced by a
university president than university complexity. It is likely easier to, for instance, hire additional
staff or admit additional students (i.e., increase size) than it is to, for example, create a new
degree program or add a new department (i.e., increase complexity). This may also explain the
relatively recent increase in administrators across universities (Greene, Kisida, & Mills, 2010).
Thus, entrenched presidents are expected to have a greater preference for tying their
compensation to university size than to university complexity. This is consistent with evidence
from the executive compensation literature that found a stronger association between

Drawing conclusions from the “other” dimension is likely to be difficult because there is no consistent theme
among these variables.
6
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organizational size and compensation than between organizational complexity and compensation
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).
Conversely, it is also possible that university complexity has a stronger impact on
compensation. Considering human capital theory, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of
university complexity on university president compensation would be greater than the impact of
university size on compensation. Complex universities require more human capital to run than
universities that are large, but not complex (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006).
Therefore, the fair level of compensation for two universities that are of equal size, but have
different levels of complexity is different, with the fair compensation being larger for the more
complex university. This would result in the relation between university complexity and
president compensation being larger than the relation between university size and president
compensation. Because each of these differing perspectives suggests a different pattern of
relations, I ask,
Research question 5(a): What is the relative influence of the university size and
complexity dimensions on president compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of these
relations different between public universities and private universities?
University President Personal Characteristics
In addition to performance and institutional characteristics, human capital and personal
characteristics are also frequently included as predictors of compensation, or as control variables.
Therefore, I also provide an overview of human capital and other personal characteristics (see
Table 5). A total of four dimensions are included in this table: demographics, professional
experience, tenure-related variables, and other personal characteristics.
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Demographics. There were four different measures categorized into the demographics
dimension: age, gender, race, and marital status. Each of these demographic measures,
particularly age and gender, are used frequently in the executive compensation literature,
typically as control variables (Hall & Liebman, 1998). These measures are also used in the
university president compensation literature (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014;
Langbert & Fox, 2013; Monks, 2007) and there is evidence indicating that they are associated
with compensation. For instance, there is some evidence to suggest that gender is related to
president compensation (Saunders, 2007; Sorokina, 2003). Age can also be used as a proxy for
length of working experience, and thus, may also be related to performance (Fulmer, 2009).
Table 5 includes an overview of these measures and the studies in which they are used.
Professional experience. A total of eight measures were categorized as measures of
professional experience: past experience as a tenured professor; past experience in educational
administration; law, business, or economics degree holder; J.D, M.D., or other professional
degree holder; field of highest degree; and, prior presidency. Each of these measures reflect the
background and level of human capital the president has, including past educational experience
and past job experience, and may, therefore, be related to compensation. These variables were
used as predictors of compensation in several studies (see Table 5; e.g., Banker et al., 2009;
Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; He & Callahan, 2017; Monks,
2007).
Tenure. Seven measures were categorized into the tenure dimension: job tenure,
university tenure, years on faculty before becoming president, number of working years, years of
experience at prior presidency, seniority, and aggregate experience. Each of these measures
provide an indication of how much experience presidents have, which may affect their
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compensation. Tenure is a common measure in the executive compensation literature (e.g.,
Devers et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Young & Buchholtz, 2002)
and is also often used in the university president compensation literature (e.g., Banker et al.,
2009; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Monks, 2007; Pati & Lee, 2016) because it reflects the amount of
working experience an individual has and thus, may influence compensation. Table 5 shows the
other measures categorized into this dimension, as well as the studies that used these measures.
Other personal characteristics. As before, some measures could not be categorized into
the previous dimensions. Therefore, a total of 10 measures were categorized as other personal
characteristics: whether the president was in their first or last year as president, if the president
was an interim president, an internal hire, hired from outside of academia, president alumni
status, if they were listed on Who’s Who, a member of the clergy, member of an external Board,
and what their performance was at their past university. These measures are personal
characteristics of the president that cannot be categorized as demographic variables, professional
experience variables, or tenure-related variables. However, it is still possible that these measures
influence compensation. For instance, clergy members are expected to have lower compensation
than non-clergy members (Ehrenberg et al., 2001), interim presidents are expected to receive less
compensation than permanent presidents (Cheng, 2014), and presidents who have appeared on
the Who’s Who list are likely to receive more compensation than those presidents who have not
been on this list (Saunders, 2007; Sorokina, 2003).
Overview. Personal characteristics of CEOs have also been examined as an antecedent to
their compensation. Using human capital theory, CEO personal characteristics are predicted to be
related to CEO compensation (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Fulmer, 2009). As mentioned previously,
human capital theory suggests that differences in pay are partly due to differences in levels of
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human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Combs & Skill, 2003). Therefore, it may be expected that CEO
compensation is related to CEO characteristics that are indicative of human capital (e.g.,
education, experience, network connections). Although there is evidence to support the notion
that human capital variables are associated with higher levels of pay in the non-executive
workforce (e.g., Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992), there is less evidence to support this notion in
samples of executives. This may be due to the fact that there is less variance in human capital
variables among executives than there is in the working population (e.g., Agarwal, 1981). That
being said, there is some evidence that certain human capital variables are related to CEO
compensation. For instance, work experience was found to be positively associated with CEO
compensation, whereas educational variables such as educational level and field of study (i.e.,
major) were not significantly associated with executive compensation (Agarwal, 1981).
Similarly, Fulmer (2009) reported that CEO age, used as a proxy for experience, was positively
related to CEO base salary; however, she also found no statistically significant relation between
CEO age and total compensation (which included bonus and other incentives). These results
were consistent with the claim that human capital variables, such as experience, are more likely
to influence base salary because they, like salary, are relatively stable (Fulmer, 2009).
Human capital in the context of university president compensation. President
personal characteristics are likely to influence university president compensation in much the
same way that they influence for-profit executive compensation. For instance, there is also likely
to be little variance in some human capital variables among university presidents. Specifically,
89% of university presidents hold a doctoral degree, 75% have only been the president at their
current institution, and 58% are 61 years of age or older (Gagliardi et al., 2018). However, there
is evidence to suggest that some personal characteristics (e.g., gender, reputation [appearance in
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Who’s Who], tenure, alumni status) are positively associated with university president
compensation (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Sorokina, 2003).
For instance, being a female was associated with receiving higher compensation among
top-tier universities (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005). This may be due to market forces. Because
there are fewer females in top positions, females, particularly those with prior experience, may
be in high demand and, therefore, receive a higher level of compensation (Bartlett & Sorokina,
2005). Similarly, appearance in issues of Who’s Who in America may indicate a university
president’s level of social capital (Sorokina, 2003). A significant portion of a president’s job is to
be the figurehead of the university and to fundraise; therefore, social capital may be an important
factor for success (Sorokina, 2003). It is reasonable then that this measure would be related to
compensation. Tenure has also been shown to be positively related to compensation (Banker et
al., 2009; Sorokina, 2003). Tenure is reflective of an individual’s level of experience, and, thus,
may indicate a president’s ability to handle his or her job duties (Banker et al., 2009; Sorokina,
2003).
In sum, although some individual measures of president personal characteristics may
have a stronger association with university president compensation, the majority of measures are
likely to lack any significant variance among university presidents. Therefore, the overall
relation between this category of variables and university president compensation is likely to be
weak, but still positive. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 3: University president personal characteristics will be positively related to
university president compensation.
In addition, although university president personal characteristics are unlikely to have a
stronger influence on university president compensation than university size/complexity does, it
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is possible that these characteristics’ impact on compensation is greater than that of university
performance. If agents’ risk aversion is higher than assumed by agency theory, Boards may be
less likely to use university performance to determine university president compensation. Instead
they may choose to use more stable characteristics (e.g., amount of experience/tenure). That
being said, it is equally as reasonable to expect that university performance will have a stronger
impact on president compensation than personal characteristics because of the dynamics
described by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, I ask,
Research question 6: How well do university president personal characteristics predict
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and
university size and complexity?
As with the previous two characteristics (i.e., performance and non-performance
institutional characteristics), I explore differences in the relation between personal characteristics
and president compensation between private and public universities. Although there are reasons
to suspect that there may be differences between private and public universities in the extent to
which university performance and/or university size/complexity are used to determine president
compensation, there is no reason to suspect that there will be differences, on average, between
the use of president personal characteristics to set compensation among these universities.
However, to be thorough, it is important to determine if any differences do exist. Thus, I ask,
Research question 7: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between
president personal characteristics among private universities and public universities?
Consistent with the executive compensation literature, differences in the predictive power
between the various dimensions of personal characteristics are likely. For instance, amount of
working experience and other tenure-related variables have been shown to be positively
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associated with executive compensation (Agarwal, 1981; Fulmer, 2009), as well as president
compensation (Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Langbert & Fox, 2013). Thus, one
would expect measures of tenure (i.e., amount of working experience) to have a fairly consistent,
and positive, association with compensation. However, measures of professional experience
(e.g., field of highest degree, professional degree holder) have generally not been found to
significantly impact compensation for executives (Agarwal, 1981) or university presidents
(Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; He & Callahan, 2017; Monks, 2007). This suggests that the
association between measures of tenure and compensation is stronger than the relation between
measures of professional experience and compensation. To explore this more thoroughly, I pose,
Research question 8(a): What is the relative influence of the four different personal
characteristics dimensions on executive compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of
these relations different between public universities and private universities?
In sum, this meta-analysis will determine the extent to which university performance is
related to university president pay. In addition, this study also examines the relations between
two other commonly recognized determinants of executive compensation (i.e., university
size/complexity, president personal characteristics). In so doing, this paper will help to address
the controversy surrounding university president compensation. Figure 1 summarizes the
proposed relations.
Method
Literature Search
A thorough search was conducted to identify both published and unpublished primary
studies that assessed the relation between university president compensation and any variables
related to university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and/or university
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president personal characteristics. Specifically, studies were identified by searching
ABI/INFORM Complete, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Education
Research Complete, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses, PsycINFO, ScienceDirect. Google
Scholar was also used to supplement this search process. The following keywords were used, in
combination, to search the abstracts of these databases: university, college, higher education,
president, compensation, salary, salaries, and pay. There were no time restrictions placed on
these searches; the search was completed in November 2018. Additional restrictions were
applied to Education Resource Complete and ABI/INFORM to limit the number of non-relevant
results returned. These restrictions, as well as the exact search string and number of results
returned from each database, are listed in Table 6.
Based on these criteria, a total of 702 records were identified through ABI/INFORM
Complete, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Complete, Education Research
Complete, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses, PsycINFO, and ScienceDirect. An additional
1.5 million results were identified through Google Scholar (of these, 11 were identified as
potentially relevant)7. After removing duplicates, 663 records were retained (including the 11
records identified through Google Scholar). The titles and abstracts for these 663 records were
reviewed for relevancy using the criteria discussed in the next section. A total of 612 of these
663 articles were excluded; 51 were retained for full-text review. After examining the full text of
these articles, 29 were excluded because they did not meet the eligibility criteria. Thus, a total of
22 studies were included in the systematic review. The search process is detailed in the PRISMA
diagram, included as Figure 4.

7

Not all 1.5 million results from Google Scholar were reviewed. Titles of the search results were screened until 10
consecutive pages of results (a total of 100 articles) appeared not relevant. This resulted in approximately 500 total
titles being screened.
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Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of articles were made based on several
criteria. For instance, study samples had to include university presidents employed at nonprofit
universities in the United States. Therefore, studies that took place outside of the U.S., focused
on faculty members’ compensation, or did not clearly define their sample were excluded. Studies
also needed to contain variables that could be categorized as measures of university performance,
non-performance institutional characteristics, or university president characteristics, as well as a
measure of university president compensation. Studies that assessed the relation between
university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, or university president
characteristics and other variables besides compensation (e.g., turnover) were excluded.
Data Extraction, Coding, and Preparation
All data extraction, coding, and data preparation was performed by the author of this
dissertation. For each identified article, the following information was extracted for the
systematic review: author, year, article title, journal, journal impact factor (if applicable), sample
type (e.g., private, public, private and public university presidents), sample size, study design
(e.g., cross-sectional, longitudinal), years included, variable names, effect size, effect size type
(e.g., correlation, beta), statistical significance of each variable examined including the p-value
(if provided), whether or not the effect size could be converted to a correlation, source of data
(e.g., Chronicle of Higher Education, U. S. Department of Education), statistical technique
utilized (e.g., OLS regression, Arellano-Bond dynamic panel modeling), theories utilized, and
whether or not hypotheses were made.
Analytical Plan
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Although I initially intended to test the proposed hypotheses and research questions using
meta-analytic techniques, a number of issues were identified during the coding process that
precluded the use of meta-analytic techniques. Specifically, meta-analysis requires consistent
effect size estimates (e.g., correlations). Correlations were only provided (or could otherwise be
derived/calculated) for nine of the 22 studies. An additional nine studies included beta weights
from regression equations. Although these beta weights were converted using the formula
provide by Peterson and Brown (2005), including these converted estimates in a meta-analysis
would be problematic as the number of additional variables in the respective regression
equations varies widely. For instance, Banker, Plehn-Dujowich, and Xian (2009) only included
eight variables in their equation, whereas Cheng (2014) included 34 variables. This means that
the converted beta weights are not comparable and, therefore, including correlations calculated
from these beta weights would likely result in a misleading/erroneous conclusion (likely
underestimate of the true relation [Roth et al., 2018]). The remaining four studies did not include
the necessary information to calculate a correlation or a beta weight.
In addition to requiring a consistent effect size, meta-analysis also assumes that effect
sizes are independent of one another. Unfortunately, many of the identified studies either do not
report the time period examined in the study or have time periods that overlap with other
identified studies (which would make the effect sizes in those studies non-independent). One
way to address this issue is to nest effect sizes within years (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, &
Rothstein, 2009). However, this is unlikely to fully address this issue. The average tenure of
presidents in my dataset is approximately nine years. Thus, even nesting effect sizes within year
does not adequately resolve the violation of the assumption independence.
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Given the aforementioned issues (inconsistent effect size estimates and independence
violations), it would be inappropriate to use meta-analytic techniques to address the proposed
hypotheses and research questions. Therefore, instead, I provided a systematic review of the
accumulated evidence from the identified studies. Taking this approach allowed me to take stock
of this literature and provide a qualitative assessment of the extent to which existing evidence
supports or fails to support the hypotheses as well as shed light on the research questions posed
in the introduction to this chapter. To aid in this process, I used a version of vote counting, which
involved counting the number of effect sizes that were positive, negative, and nil (regardless of
whether these effect sizes were statistically significant). This approach can be used when
traditional meta-analytic techniques are not appropriate (Higgins & Green, 2011).
Results
Performance
Of the 22 studies identified through the literature search, 21 included at least one variable
that could be categorized as a university performance variable. Across those 21 studies, a total of
81 university performance variables were identified (see Table 7, Panel A, Column 2)8. Two
(2%) of these variables had a nil relation with university president compensation, 57 (70%) had a
positive association with president compensation, and 22 (27%) had a negative association with
president compensation (see Table 7, Panel A, Columns 3 and 5). This provides initial support
for Hypothesis 1, which suggested that university performance is positively related to university
president compensation.

8

Tang, Tang, and Tang (1996, 2000, 2004) used many of the same variables in their studies (they also used the same
exact same compensation data in each study). Therefore, to avoid the most blatant independence violation, any
variables that were duplicated in these studies was only counted once in the analyses reported here.
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To provide a more detailed assessment of the strength of this association, effect size
estimates were examined. Of the 81 university performance variables examined, standardized
effect sizes (either correlations or beta weights) were provided for 65 of them. Although, as
previously mentioned, it is inappropriate to conduct a meta-analysis to provide a meta-analytic
effect size estimate, I did examine these effect sizes to determine the likely size of the overall
effect. Specifically, I converted the beta weights to correlations using the formula provided by
Peterson and Brown (2005). Evidence suggests that beta weights tend to underestimate the true
effect size by 12% to 70% (Roth, Le, Oh, Van Iddekinge, & Bobko, 2018); therefore, to provide
the most generous estimate, I also added 70% to each converted beta weight. I then created two
averages – the first was an average of the correlations and converted beta weights (the
conservative, likely under-estimate), the second was an average of the correlations and converted
beta weights plus 70% (the generous estimate). This allowed me to create a range in which the
effect size likely exists9. I then considered Cohen (1988) effect size benchmarks to determine the
likely magnitude of the association between the two variables. Cohen suggested that, for
correlations, a weak relation is .10, a moderate relation is .30, and a strong relation is .50. I used
this information to create ranges. Using the absolute value of the effect sizes, values of less than
.05 indicated no association between the variables (a nil effect size), values between .05 and .24
indicated weak effect sizes, values between .25 and .44 were considered moderate effect sizes,
and values of .45 or greater were considered large effect sizes. Using this approach, the results

9

One may question the decision to add 70% rather than 12% to the beta weights to calculate the range in which the
effect size likely exists; however, this decision was made for two reasons. First, because adding 70% increases the
size of the range, it provides the most generous interpretation of the results and decreases the likelihood of making a
Type I error. Second, the number of predictors included in a regression equation can reduce the size of each
individual beta weight. When converted to correlations, these beta weights are underestimates of the true correlation.
The majority of the studies examined in this systematic review included eight or more predictors. Therefore, these
beta weights are likely to be more underestimated than results from studies where only two or three predictors are
included. Thus, adding 70% to each beta weight, in addition to decreasing the chances of making a Type I error,
may also be a more accurate reflection of the true correlation than adding 12% would be.
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suggest that the relation between university performance and university president compensation
is likely to be positive, but weak.
The first research question asked if there was a difference in the relation of university
performance and university president compensation among public and private universities. Of
the 21 studies that examined the relation between university performance and university
president compensation, four included only public universities, 11 included only private
universities, and three reported their results separately for private and public universities. Across
the seven studies reporting results for public universities, a total of 30 university performancepublic university president compensation relations were examined (see Table 8, Panel A,
Column 2). Across the 14 studies reporting results for private universities, 39 university
performance-private university president compensation relations were examined (see Table 9,
Panel A, Column 2).
For public university presidents, 18 of the 30 (60%) effect sizes were positive, 10 of the
30 (30%) effect sizes were negative, and two of the effect sizes (7%) were nil (see Table 8, Panel
A, Columns 3 and 5). Considering private university presidents, 29 of the 39 (74%) effect sizes
were positive. Ten of the 39 (26%) effect sizes assessing the relation between university
performance and private university president compensation were negative. (see Table 9, Panel A,
Columns 3 and 5). Taken together, these results suggest that the relation between university
performance and university president compensation is likely to be positive in both public and
private universities. It is possible that the relation between university performance and university
president compensation is stronger in private institutions than in public ones; however, there is
not enough evidence to state this definitively. Examining the standardized effect sizes (23 for
public universities and 31 for private universities) suggests that the relation between university
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performance and university president compensation is likely to be nil to weak and positive for
public universities and weak and positive for private universities.
Research question 2 asked if there were differences in the strength of the relation between
university performance and university president compensation depending on the specific
dimension of university performance assessed. Of the 81 university performance variables
examined, there were seven variables in the academic and research performance dimension,
eight in the academic and research quality dimension, seven in the faculty quality dimension, 27
in the financial performance dimension, nine in the reputation dimension, 18 in the selectivity
dimension, and three in the other dimension. Two of the 81 variables are excluded from this
discussion because they were created using a combination of measures that spanned multiple
dimensions (e.g., the variable was described as an average between a financial performance
metric and a reputation metric). Table 7 provides a summary of the results. As can be seen from
Table 7, Panel A, Column 3, the percentage of positive effect sizes ranges from 33% (other
dimension) to 89% (reputation dimension). Considering the information in this table together, it
appears that performance metrics from the faculty quality, reputation, and selectivity dimensions
have a more consistent positive association with university president compensation than the other
four dimensions. Performance metrics from the academic and research performance metric
appear to have the least consistent positive association with university president compensation.
Considering the standardized effect sizes that were reported, it appears that variables from the
faculty quality and reputation dimensions have the strongest relation with university president
compensation, whereas variables from the academic and research performance, financial
performance, and selectivity dimensions have the weakest association with university president
compensation (with the exception of variables from the other dimension, which appear to have
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no relation with compensation). However, these results should be interpreted with caution as
there are relatively few numbers of effect sizes in each dimension.
Research question 2 also asked if there were differences in the pattern of the relations
between the performance dimensions and university president compensation between private and
public university presidents. These results are displayed in Tables 8 and 9. Although there are
only a small number of effect sizes in each dimension (between one and eight for public
universities; zero and 16 for private universities), one key difference can be observed.
Specifically, variables in the faculty quality dimension appear to have a nil or weak positive
association with public university president compensation, yet these variables appear to have a
strong positive relation with private university president compensation. However, this
determination is based on two effect sizes from public universities and four effect sizes from
private universities; therefore, it should be interpreted with caution.
Non-performance institutional characteristics
A total of 21 studies included at least one variable that could be categorized as a nonperformance institutional characteristic. Hypothesis 2(a) stated that university size and university
complexity will have a positive association with university president compensation. A total of 60
effect sizes were reported for the relation between non-performance institutional characteristics
related to university size and complexity and university president compensation (see Table 7,
Panel B, Column 2). Of these 60 effect sizes, 47 (78%) were positive, 12 (20%) were negative
(see Table 7, Panel B, Columns 3 and 5), and one (2%) was nil. This provides initial support for
Hypothesis 2(a).
To provide a more detailed assessment of the strength of this association, effect size
estimates were examined. Of the 60 non-performance institutional characteristics related to
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university size and complexity examined, standardized effect sizes (either correlations or beta
weights) were provided for 33 of them. An examination of these effect sizes suggests that the
relation between non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and
complexity and university president compensation is likely to be weak to moderate and positive
(see Table 7, Panel B, Column 7). This supports Hypothesis 2(a).
Hypothesis 2(b) proposed that non-performance institutional characteristics related to
university size and complexity would account for more variance in university president
compensation than university performance. Given the limitations of the data, the amount of
variance in university president compensation accounted for by these two sets of variables
cannot be determined. However, an examination of Table 7, Panels A and B, Column 7, indicates
that university performance seems to have a weak positive effect on university president
compensation whereas non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and
complexity appear to have a weak to moderate positive effect on university president
compensation. Thus, it is possible that non-performance institutional characteristics related to
university size and complexity do have a stronger impact on university president compensation
than university performance.
In addition to non-performance institutional characteristics related to university size and
complexity, there is one additional dimension of non-performance institutional characteristics
(i.e., the other dimension). Research question 3 asked if there was any association between
variables in this dimension and university president compensation. There were 25 variables in
this dimension, nine (36%) of which had positive effect sizes and 16 (64%) of which had
negative effect sizes. An examination of the effect sizes suggests one theme - university
presidents at religious institutions earn less than presidents at non-religious institutions, on
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average. The results for religious institutions are shown in Table 7, Panel B. Therefore, in
response to Research question 3, at least one non-performance institutional characteristics other
than university size and complexity is related to university president compensation.
Just as with university performance, it is also important to determine if there are
differences in the strength of the association of non-performance institutional characteristics and
university president compensation between public and private universities. Given that the only
result of note in the other dimension was that university presidents at religious institutions are
compensated less than university presidents at non-religious institutions and all religious
institutions are private institutions, this set of results will only focus on variables related to
university size and complexity. Of the 21 studies that examined the relation between nonperformance institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity and university
president compensation, four included only public universities, 12 included only private
universities, and three reported their results separately for private and public universities. Across
the seven studies that included results for public universities, a total of 14 non-performance
institutional characteristics related to size and complexity-public university president
compensation effects were examined (see Table 8, Panel B, Column 2). Across the 15 studies
that reported results for private universities, 36 non-performance institutional characteristics
related to size and complexity-private university president compensation effects were examined
(see Table 9, Panel B, Column 2).
Of the 15 effects from public universities, 12 (80%) were positive, two (13%) were
negative, and one (9%) was nil (see Table 8, Panel B, Columns 2, 3 and 5). Considering the 36
private universities effects, 29 (81%) were positive. There were also seven (19%) negative effect
sizes see Table 9, Panel B, Columns 2, 3 and 5).
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The patterns of these results suggest that the relation between non-performance
institutional characteristics related to size and complexity and university president compensation
is likely to be positive in both public and private universities. This is also supported by the
standardized effect sizes which suggest that the relation between non-performance institutional
characteristics related to size and complexity and university president compensation is likely to
be moderate and positive for both public and private universities. However, given the small
number of effect sizes from public universities, these results should be interpreted with caution.
Research question 5 asked if there were differences in the relative influence of variables
from the size and complexity dimensions on university president compensation and if the pattern
of differences was similar between private and public universities. Tables 7 – 9 display these
results. The results from the other dimension are also shown; however, they will not be discussed
here because, as previously stated, the only consistent theme identified among the variables in
this dimension was that religious institutions, which are private institutions, provide less
compensations to their presidents. An examination of Table 7, Panel B, shows that of the 60 nonperformance institutional characteristics variables, 34 can be categorized into the size dimension
and 25 can be categorized into the complexity dimension. One of the 60 variables could not be
categorized into either dimension because it was formed from measures that spanned multiple
dimensions. As can be seen from Table 7, Panel B, the majority of the variables from both the
size and complexity dimensions are positive and statistically significant. However, the table also
shows that effect sizes in the size dimension are more likely to be positive than those from the
complexity dimension (91% versus 60%; see Table 7, Panel B, Column 3). This suggests that the
effects of university size are likely to have a stronger impact on university president
compensation than university complexity. This is also supported by the standardized effect sizes
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– variables in the size dimension appear to have a moderate positive association with university
president compensation, whereas variables in the complexity dimension seem to have a weak
positive association.
Considering Panel B from Tables 8 and 9, the effect of variables in the size and
complexity dimensions on university president compensation becomes less clear. An examination
of the percentages in Columns 2 and 3 still suggests that the relation between university size and
university president compensation is likely to be stronger than the relation between university
complexity and university president compensation for both public and private universities.
However, the standardized effect sizes do not support this. Specifically, in public and private
universities, university size and university complexity both appear to have a moderate positive
association with university president compensation. Thus, it is difficult to determine definitively
if university size does, in fact, have a larger impact on university president compensation than
university complexity.
President personal characteristics
President personal characteristics were assessed in 14 of the 22 identified studies. Across
those 14 studies, a total of 60 personal characteristic variables were examined. However, unlike
the previous two categories of variables (i.e., university performance and non-performance
institutional characteristics), it is not appropriate to lump all the university president personal
characteristic variables together. Therefore, I will discuss specific groupings of variables. For
instance, the first dimension of university president characteristics is demographics. This
dimension included a total of 18 effect sizes that could be categorized into two themes that had at
least two associated standardized effect sizes: gender and age.
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Gender was reported 13 times across the identified studies; however, in one instance,
there was no information about how gender was coded. Therefore, this instance will be excluded
from subsequent discussion. Eight of the remaining 12 (67%) effect sizes were positive, which
suggests that male university presidents receive higher compensation (see Table 7, Panel C,
Column 2 and 3). Four of the 12 (33%) effects were negative, suggesting that females receive
higher compensation (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 5). Taken together, this suggests that males
may receive more compensation; however, the effect is likely to be weak and/or inconsistent. An
examination of the standardized effect sizes provides additional support for this notion. These
effect sizes suggest that there is a nil to weak positive relation between gender (male) and
university president compensation (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 7). This provides some
support, however, for Hypothesis 3 which suggested that there is a positive relation between
university president characteristics and university president compensation.
Research question 7 asked if there were differences in the relation between university
president personal characteristics and university president compensation between public and
private universities. Tables 8 and 9 display the results of the relation between gender and
university president compensation separately for public and private universities. These results
suggest that the relation between male gender and university president compensation in public
institutions is weak (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7); whereas in private universities, it is nil
(see Table 9, Panel C, Column 7). However, the estimate from public universities is based on
three effect sizes; therefore, it is plausible that this relation is also nil.
In addition to the effect of gender on compensation, the relation between university
president age and university president compensation has also been examined in two studies that
included only private universities. Both of these studies found a positive association between
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university president age and university president compensation (see Tables 7 and 9, Panel C).
However, both effect sizes suggest a weak positive association (see Tables 7 and 9, Panel C,
Column 7). This finding also supports Hypothesis 3 (Research question 7 cannot be addressed
since the relation between university president age and university president compensation has not
been examined in public universities).
The second dimension of university president characteristics is professional experience.
This dimension included a total of 18 effect sizes that could be categorized into one theme with
at least two associated effect sizes: prior presidency. The relation between presidential
experience at a prior university and university president compensation was examined six times
(see Table 7, Panel C, Column 2). The effect was positive in all six instances, suggesting that
there is a positive association between experience as a university president at a previous
university and compensation at one’s current university. This is supported by the standardized
effect sizes which also find a weak positive effect (see Table 7, Panel C, Column 7). This
supports Hypothesis 3. In response to Research question 7, Tables 8 and 9, Panel C, show that
this effect appears to be consistent between public and private universities.
Tenure is the third dimension of university president characteristics. Variables related to
tenure were examined 13 times across nine studies. Table 7, Panel C, displays these results. In 10
of these 13 (77%) cases, the effect was positive (see Table 7, Panel C, Columns 2 and 3). A
negative effect was observed in three (23%) instances. This suggests that the relation between
tenure-related variables and university president compensation is positive. An examination of the
standardized effect sizes suggests that the relation is either nil or weak, but positive (see Table 7,
Panel C, Column 7). This provides some support for Hypothesis 3.
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Regarding Research question 7, some differences can be seen when comparing the effects
of tenure separately for public and private universities (see Panel C of Tables 8 and 9,
respectively). For public universities, all of the effects are negative. Averaging the standardized
effect sizes results in a nil effect size (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7). In private universities,
however, all of the observed effects were positive (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 4). This
suggests that the relation between tenure and university president compensation in private
universities in likely positive. In fact, the standardized effect sizes suggest a weak positive
association between these two variables (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 7). Taken together, this
suggests that tenure has a stronger impact on university president compensation in private
universities than in public universities. However, the estimate from public universities is only
based on three effect sizes; therefore, this conclusion should be interpreted with caution.
There is also an other dimension for university president characteristics. A total of 11
variables were included in this dimension; however, only one theme could be identified that had
at least two associated standardized effect sizes: alumni status (see Table 8, Panel C, Column 2).
Two studies included this variable. One of the two (50%) effects was positive; one (50%) was
negative, which suggests that there may be a nil effect. The standardized effect sizes suggest that
the relation between alumni status and university president compensation is nil to positive (see
Table 8, Panel C, Column 7), providing some support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the
positive (weak) effect was observed in private universities (see Table 9, Panel C, Column 7),
whereas the negative (nil) effect was noted in public universities (see Table 8, Panel C, Column
7). Thus, it is possible that alumni status impact private university president compensation, but it
is not relevant in public universities. However, this is based on one effect in each setting, so it is,
at best, weak evidence of such an effect.
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In summary, Hypothesis 3 suggested that president personal characteristics would be
positively related to university president compensation. As can be seen from Table 7, Panel C,
there is some support for this notion. Specifically, gender (male), age, prior presidency, tenure,
and alumni status may all potentially have a weak positive effect on university president
compensation. Research question 6 asked how university president characteristics affected
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and nonperformance institutional characteristics. An examination of Table 8, Panels B and C, suggests
that university president characteristics are likely to have less of an influence on university
president compensation than university performance and non-performance institutional
characteristics. For instance, considering the standardized effect sizes, all of the university
president personal characteristics are estimated to have a nil or weak effect on university
president compensation, whereas the variables from the university performance and nonperformance institutional characteristics categories have nil to strong positive effects (see Table
7, Panels B and C, Column 7). Research question 7 asked if there were differences between
public and private universities in the extent to which university president personal characteristics
are related to university president compensation. Tables 8 and 9, Panel C, show that the effects
of university president personal characteristics on university president compensation are
consistent between public and private universities, with the exception of tenure-related variables
and alumni status, both of which appear to have a stronger relation with university president
compensation in private universities than in public universities.
Discussion
The controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation paid to university
presidents has led to several studies that have attempted to assess the determinants of university
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president compensation. The main goal of this systematic review was to examine the extent to
which the compensation paid to university presidents is determined by university performance.
In doing so, this review also assessed the impact of non-performance institutional characteristics,
including university size and complexity, as well as university president personal characteristics
on university president compensation. The influence of each of these sets of variables is
supported theoretically by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), managerialism (e.g., Aoki,
1984; Herman, 1981), and/or human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962).
Therefore, this review also offers insight into the efficacy of each of these theories. Next, I will
discuss the results and theoretical implications for each of the examined set of variables.
University Performance
The findings of this systematic review are supportive of predictions from agency theory.
As discussed in the theoretical overview, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests that
university performance will have a positive, but weak, association with university president
compensation. The prediction that the relation is positive is based on the low task
programmability and outcome measurability present in the job of university president which
makes it difficult to monitor and judge the appropriate individual decisions and behaviors of
university presidents. Therefore, to align the goals of the university president and the Board, it
may be necessary to make university president compensation contingent on university
performance (as opposed to relying on monitoring or tying university president compensation to
individual university president performance). The prediction that the relation between university
performance and university president compensation is relatively weak is based on the idea that,
because university performance is not directly under the control of university president
compensation, basing university president compensation on university performance transfers
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undue risk to university presidents. To compensate for this, university performance should only
have a small effect on university president compensation. The findings of this systematic review
support these predictions - there seems to be a weak positive association between university
performance and university president compensation (see Table 7, Panel A).
The conceptual review provided also suggested that the relation between university
performance and university president compensation may be weaker in public universities than in
private ones. This argument was based on the idea that, because public university presidents earn
less money, on average, than private university presidents, public universities presidents may be
more intrinsically motivated to perform, and, therefore, goal alignment is less necessary for
public university presidents than for private university presidents (Bai, 2014; Handy & Katz,
1998). An examination of Tables 8 and 9, Panel A, indicates that the relation between university
performance and university president compensation is nil to weakly positive in public
universities, but weakly positive in private universities. Thus, it seems that public university
president’s compensation is likely to be less strongly linked to university performance than the
compensation of private university presidents. If accurate, this could be due to differences in the
extent to which public and private university Boards feel they need to incentivize performance.
However, given that this review did not allow an exact effect size to be calculated, it is possible
that there is no actual difference between public and private universities in terms of the strength
of the relation between university president compensation and university performance. Thus, this
is still an open question.
I also proposed, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), that various
dimensions of university performance may have differential effects on university president
compensation. Specifically, to mitigate the risk to university president’s compensation, Boards
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may choose to link aspects of university performance to university president compensation that
are more directly under university presidents’ control, such as academic and research quality
selectivity, and fundraising. Alternatively, Boards may choose to incentivize performance in
dimensions that are most aligned with the mission of the university and its long-term success,
such as financial performance and academic and research performance. Interestingly, this review
found that university reputation has the strongest and most consistent impact on university
president compensation, while the other dimensions have weak and/or inconsistent relations with
university president compensation (see Tables 7 through 9, Panel A). One potential reason for
the effect of university reputation is that it is typically measured through the use of university
rankings (He & Callahan, 2017; Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007). These rankings take into
account metrics from several different performance dimensions, including alumni giving
(financial performance dimension) and graduation rate (academic and research performance
dimension), as well as SAT scores (selectivity dimension), class size (academic and research
quality dimension), and faculty salary (faculty quality dimension) (Morse, 2017). Thus, aligning
university president compensation to university reputation, as measured by university ranking,
may be considered by university Boards to be the easiest and most straightforward way to judge
overall university performance. Given that many Board members tend to lack expertise in the
field of higher education (Price, 2018), it is logical to assume that they would prefer to use a
metric that is easy to obtain (i.e., they are published every year by various organizations, The
Princeton Review, 2018; U. S. News & World Report, 2019) and understand. It is also possible
that these rankings are normatively accepted just as stock price/market value is in the for-profit
context.
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In sum, the main predictions of agency theory appear to be somewhat supported by this
systematic review. The overall relation between university president compensation and
university performance tends to be weak, but positive. Furthermore, specific dimensions (e.g.,
reputation) do appear to have a moderate to strong positive association (using the cutoffs
discussed in the Method section) with university president compensation. If these dimensions
(e.g., reputation) include metrics (e.g., ranking) that university Boards would like to see most
improved, it is possible that these results provide strong support for agency theory. However, the
accuracy of secondary predictions based on agency theory concepts are unclear (in the case of
the differences between public and private universities), or unsupported (in the case of the
various dimensions of university performance having a greater or weaker effect).
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics
In addition to the relation between university president compensation and university
performance, this systematic review also examined the extent to which other non-performance
institutional characteristics influence university president compensation. In particular,
managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981) and human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981;
Becker, 1962), support a relation between university size as well as complexity and university
president compensation. Managerialist arguments state that university presidents may become
entrenched and can use their power to strengthen the impact that university size has on their
compensation while weakening the extent to which the Board ties their compensation to
university performance. This is desirable for university presidents because university size and
complexity may be more directly under their control than university performance. The argument
from human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggests that larger and more
complex universities require more human capital to lead, and, therefore, the fair pay for
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presidents of these universities is higher. The results of this systematic review support the
general predictions of both theories.
As indicated in Tables 7 through 9 (Panel B), the relation between non-performance
institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity appear to have a weak to
moderate positive association with university president compensation. Furthermore, the overall
pattern of results related to university performance and non-performance institutional
characteristics related to university size and complexity suggests that the latter set of variables
have a stronger influence on university president compensation than does university performance
(Table 7, Panels A and B), which is consistent with the findings from the executive
compensation literature (Tosi et al., 2000).
The theoretical overview also highlighted competing theoretical arguments for why the
relation between university size and complexity and university president compensation may be
different for public and private universities. Specifically, one argument suggests that private
universities have less shareholder dispersion and thus less powerful university presidents than
would be expected in public universities. If true, this first argument would result in the
association between university size and complexity and university president compensation being
weaker in private universities than in public ones. Conversely, public university Boards are
typically appointed by the state’s governor (Price, 2018), which may result in public university
presidents having less power over their Boards compared to private university presidents. In this
second argument, the relation between university size and complexity and university president
compensation would be weaker in public universities than in private universities. However,
empirical evidence does not indicate substantive differences between public and private
universities in terms of the strength of the association between university president compensation
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and university size and complexity. This suggests that either (a) neither of the competing
arguments presented are valid, or (b) both are valid and the effects of one balance out the effects
of the other.
The closest test of the efficacy of managerialism versus human capital theory that can be
gleaned from this systematic review is gained by examining whether university size or university
complexity has the greater relation with university president compensation. This assessment can
provide insight into which of these two theories may be more relevant because university size is
likely more easily manipulated than university complexity (managerialism), yet leading a
complex university arguably requires more human capital than leading a large, but simple
university (human capital theory). Table 7, Panel B shows that university size seems to have a
larger association with university president compensation than does university complexity.
Therefore, one can infer that the managerialist arguments are more relevant than the arguments
grounded in human capital theory. Stated differently, these findings suggest that university
president compensation is related to non-performance institutional characteristics because
university presidents tend to be entrenched and exert their power over Boards to ensure that their
compensation is based on metrics that are more directly under their control. However, it is
important to note that once the results are broken out separately by public and private
universities (Tables 8 and 9), no substantive differences are noted between the effect of
university size and university complexity on university president compensation.
In sum, the main predictions of managerialism and human capital theory are supported;
however, it is difficult to say definitively whether the reason for the finding that nonperformance institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity is due to
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university president entrenchment and power (managerialism) or because the fair wage for a job
that requires high-levels of human capital is high (human capital theory).
University President Personal Characteristics
This systematic review also aimed to determine if university president personal
characteristics influence their compensation. Human capital theory suggests that differences in
pay are due to differences in levels of human capital (Agarwal, 1981; Combs & Skill, 2003).
Therefore, university president compensation may be related to president personal characteristics
that are indicative of human capital. However, for positions high in the organizational hierarchy,
including university presidents, variance in human capital is likely to be low (e.g., Agarwal,
1981; Gagliardi et al., 2018); therefore, any observed relation should be relatively weak. Tables 7
through 9, Panel C, indicate that each personal characteristic variable of interest has a nil or weak
association with university president compensation, supporting this notion.
Of the examined human capital variables, university president’s experience at a prior
university had the most consistent effect – it was weak, but positive. Therefore, it seems as if
Boards tend to pay a premium for university presidents with prior experience as president,
especially since only about 25% of presidents have prior experience as a university president
(Gagliardi et al., 2018). Thus, these presidents may be offered a higher initial compensation than
university presidents without experience at a previous university. This suggests that university
presidents are, in part, compensated for their level of human capital, consistent with human
capital theory.
Summary of Theoretical Implications
Taken together, the findings from the systematic review are somewhat consistent with the
theories discussed. Specifically, university performance was found to be positively, albeit
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weakly, associated with university president compensation. This provides some support for
agency theory. In fact, some dimensions of university performance appear to have a moderate or
strong impact (using the cutoffs discussed in the Method section) on university president
compensation which provides strong support for agency theory. University size and complexity
also appear to impact university president compensation, supporting managerialism and human
capital theories. Even some university president personal characteristics seem to have a weak,
but positive effect on university president compensation, lending support to human capital
theory. Thus, each theory discussed in this paper received at least some level of support.
Results of this review are also somewhat consistent with evidence from the broader
executive compensation literature, which found that organizational size has a greater influence
on CEO compensation than organizational performance does (Tosi et al., 2000). Specifically, the
overall pattern of results (see Table 7) indicates that non-performance institutional characteristics
related to university size and complexity have the strongest association with university president
compensation, followed by university performance. University president personal characteristics
have the weakest association with university president compensation. However, a more nuanced
examination of the university performance results finds that some university performance
dimensions have a similar or stronger impact on university president compensation than does
university size and complexity. This is in contrast with findings from the executive compensation
literature, which suggest that organizational size has a significantly stronger effect than
organizational performance on executive compensation. Therefore, it is possible that
performance is emphasized more heavily in the nonprofit educational context than in the forprofit context, which would provide even stronger support for agency theory predictions in the
nonprofit educational context.
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Limitations and Future Research
Although this systematic review offered a comprehensive picture of the current state of
the evidence regarding the determinants of university president compensation, including
university performance, university size and complexity, and university president characteristics,
there are several limitations. First, the initial intent was to conduct a meta-analysis to provide a
better understanding of the correlation between university president compensation and various
metrics, yet, that was not possible, primarily because the available primary studies did not report
the necessary data. Therefore, even though Tables 7 through 9 do provide information about the
likelihood that an effect is positive or negative and the approximate magnitude of the effect, they
do not include a specific effect size that would be able to quantify how much additional
compensation a university president receives for increased university performance, university
size and complexity, or greater accumulation of human capital. This information is necessary in
order to fully understand the practical implications of these findings. For instance, although it is
useful to know that university president compensation and university performance are related, it
is possible that, for example, for every $1 increase in financial performance (e.g., endowment), a
university president is compensated an extra $50,000. Under such a situation, one may
reasonably argue that the benefit provided by a $1 increase in endowment is not worth an extra
$50,000 paid to the president. Utility analysis would be helpful in this regard, however, because
an effect size could not be calculated, it was not possible to conduct one for this study.
Furthermore, although exploring how changes in university performance lead to changes in
university president compensation could have provided additional information about the
justification of university president compensation, only three studies (i.e., Cheng, 2014; Parsons
& Reitenga, 2014; Sorokina, 2003) included in this review examined change in university
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performance and compensation levels rather than just the levels themselves. Given the small
number of studies, it was not possible to make a distinction between change and level. Therefore,
this systematic review only provides an answer to the question of whether university
performance and university president compensation are related, not whether the actual levels of
university president compensation is justified. To best address the issue of justification, it is
necessary to look at how relations evolve over time using longitudinal data and regression-based
data analytic methods.
Second, it is also possible that the results of the systematic review are affected by factors
not considered in this study. For instance, it is possible that results from primary studies using
different methodologies (e.g., cross-sectional v. panel designs; different data analytic techniques)
are different. These differences may be due to, for instance, statistical power (i.e., panel designs
may have a larger total N and thus more statistical power) or the specific characteristics of the
data analyses conducted (e.g., are fixed and/or random effects accounted for; what assumptions
are made regarding causality). Unfortunately, only eight of the 22 studies included in the
systematic review used panel data; furthermore, only six studies employed a method other than
OLS regression and the methods used by these six studies also differed. Therefore, creating
subgroups based on these characteristics would result in small ks, which could produce
misleading results. However, given that substantive differences may exist, future systematic
reviews that occur after more studies have been conducted should take these factors into
consideration.
A third limitation present in this study was that no distinction could be made between
private religious institutions and private non-religious institutions. It is possible that the relation
between university performance and university president compensation is different in religious
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schools than in non-religious schools, as individuals working at religious institutions may be
more intrinsically motivated than those working at non-religious schools. This argument is based
on the fact that university presidents from religious schools receive significantly less
compensation than individuals at non-religious schools (Langbert, 2006). However, only one
study (Saunders, 2007) provided results separately for religious and non-religious institutions. In
all other studies including private universities, if the religious orientation of the university was
considered, it was as a predictor or control variable. However, future research should consider
examining differences between not only public and private universities, but also religious and
non-religious universities.
In addition to these first three issues, it is also important to note that systematic reviews
(and meta-analyses) are limited by the quality of the studies included in them (Borenstein et al.,
2009). If the data included in the individual studies is outdated, or the quality of these studies is
poor, then the results reported in Tables 7 through 9 may not accurately reflect the underlying
effect. Unfortunately, there were several issues present in the primary studies which may impact
the confidence that one can have in these results. For instance, many of the primary studies did
not clearly report important details such as variable definitions (e.g., Langbert & Fox, 2013;
Saunders, 2007; Tang, Tang, & Tang, 1996), sample size (i.e., Huang & Chen, 2013; Tang et al.,
1996), years included (e.g., Pati & Lee, 2016; Tang et al., 2000), or the effect size metric (i.e.,
O'Connell, 2005). This lack of clarity makes it difficult to be sure that the results of this
systematic review are an accurate depiction of the actual relations of interest. Furthermore, many
of the studies included data that was more than 10 years old (e.g., Ehrenberg et al., 2001;
Langbert, 2006; Sorokina, 2003). It is possible that the strength of the relations of interest have
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changed over time. Thus, future studies should be sure to clearly and accurately report their
methodology and results as well as use more up-to-date data.
Potentially the most problematic limitation of this systematic review is that it could not
shed light on questions about which there was limited or no data. For example, this study only
examined the relation between university president compensation and university performance,
non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president personal characteristics.
Yet, it is possible that the relation between university performance and university president
compensation is different depending on the component of compensation (e.g., merit increases,
bonuses, deferred compensation) examined. It was also not possible to determine if university
president compensation affects these variables (i.e., university president compensation and
university performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president
personal characteristics) in the future. Only three of the studies included in the review (Hunt et
al., 2019; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004) included university president
compensation as a predictor and, besides university president compensation, these studies
contained only one overlapping variable – university size. To have a good understanding of the
justification of the high compensation paid to university presidents, it is also useful to know if
high rates of compensation lead to future performance increases, not just whether they are based
on prior performance. Therefore, future studies should explore these additional open questions to
continue to shed light on this controversy.
Conclusion
The goal of Study 1 of this dissertation was to conduct a systematic review of primary
studies that have explored variables related to university president compensation. Such a review
should help to shed light on the applicability of three major theories from the for-profit executive
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compensation literature – agency theory, managerialism, and human capital theory – to the
nonprofit educational context. A total of 22 studies were identified through the literature search.
A synthesis of the results of these studies indicated that some of the predictions of agency theory,
managerialism, and human capital theory are applicable and supported. Specifically, university
performance, non-performance institutional characteristics, and university president personal
characteristics were each related to university president compensation. An analysis of the
dimensions of each of these variables suggests that university reputation had a larger impact on
university president compensation than the other university performance metrics; university size
had the strongest and most consistent relation with university president compensation compared
to other non-performance institutional characteristics; and, whether or not the president has prior
experience as a president at another institution had a more consistent relation with university
president compensation than other president personal characteristics. However, there are still
several open questions that could not be addressed by this review. Study 2 of this dissertation
attempts to examine a subset of these open questions, as well as address methodological
limitations encountered in the systematic review.
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CHAPTER 3
A Nuanced Examination of the Relation between University Performance and University
President Compensation
University president compensation has become an increasingly controversial topic over
the past several years (Dillon, 2004; Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011; Svluga, 2018).
In fact, despite the increasing costs of attending university and the rising levels of student loan
debt, university president compensation has continued to rise steadily (Svluga, 2018). In 2015,
there were 58 university presidents paid over $1 million, 19 more than the previous year
(Bauman, Davis, & O'Leary, 2018; Sonnenberg, 2017; Svluga, 2018). Although there continue to
be questions surrounding whether or not university presidents should receive such high levels of
compensation when costs for students continues to increase, many suggest that these high levels
of compensation are necessary to attract the best candidates and justifiable because of the
extensive requirements of the job and to incentivize future performance (e.g., Cotton, 2012;
Roediger, 2005). To explore these arguments, several researchers have examined variables that
are theoretically related to university president compensation (Bai, 2014; Hunt et al., 2019;
Parsons & Reitenga, 2014).
In the previous chapter (Chapter 2), I briefly reviewed both the university president
compensation literature and the broader executive compensation literature (see Tables 1 and 2).
The review indicated that university performance, university size and complexity, and university
president personal characteristics have all been examined as determinants of university president
compensation. Therefore, the goal of Study 1 (discussed in Chapter 2) was to conduct a
systematic review to determine what relation, if any, these three sets of variables have with
university president compensation. In doing so, I also reviewed the theories relevant to each of
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these sets of relations. Specifically, I reviewed agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) to address the theoretical association between university performance and
university president compensation. I also discussed managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman,
1981) and human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) in order to examine why
university size and complexity may influence president compensation. Lastly, I reviewed the
predictions of human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) regarding the
association between university president characteristics and president compensation.
Based on my review of the literature on university president compensation, the broader
executive compensation literature, and the aforementioned theories, I proposed several
hypotheses and research questions to answer in the systematic review. However, although the
review shed light on the current state of the literature, the examination was not without
limitations. For instance, the quality and accuracy of a systematic review is limited by the
individual studies included in it (Borenstein et al., 2009). If the data included in the individual
studies is outdated, or their quality is poor, the results from a systematic review may not
accurately reflect the underlying effect. Therefore, the first part of the two-part study discussed
in this chapter (Chapter 3) will review the hypotheses and research questions from Chapter 2 and
attempt to replicate the findings with more current data.
An additional limitation of systematic reviews is that they can only answer questions for
which sufficient primary study data exists. For example, if the primary studies only examined
relations between university performance and university president total compensation, it would
not be possible to examine the relation between university performance and the various
components of total compensation (e.g., merit increases, bonuses, deferred compensation).
Likewise, if primary studies only examined the relation between university performance and
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future university president compensation, a systematic review would not be able to shed light on
the relation between president compensation and future university performance. In my review of
the university president compensation literature, I identified several gaps (including the two
examples mentioned above [components of compensation, relation between compensation and
future performance]) that have not been explored in a sufficient number of primary studies, and
thus, could not be addressed in the systematic review. Therefore, the second part of this two-part
study will review these gaps and attempt to fill them.
Part I: Replication
Part I of this chapter provides a replication of Study 1 (Chapter 2). Therefore, Part I
addresses one of the research questions posed in the problem statement (see Chapter 1):
Research question 1: What impact, if any, does university performance have on
university president compensation?
Part II: Addressing Identified Gaps
Part II of this chapter discusses and addresses gaps I identified in the university president
compensation literature, as well as in the broader executive compensation literature. Thus, results
of this study will answer the following research questions posed in the problem statement (see
Chapter 1):
Research question 2a: Does the relation between university performance and university
president compensation differ depending upon which component of compensation is
measured?
Research question 2b: Is there a reciprocal relation between university president
compensation and university performance?
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Research question 2c: How does the link between university performance and university
president compensation change over time?
Research question 2d: Is the relationship between university performance and university
president compensation linear?
In addressing these questions, this study contributes to both the university president
compensation literature and the broader executive compensation literature in general.
Specifically, this study provides a more nuanced examination of the relation between university
performance and university president compensation by breaking compensation into its various
components (e.g., merit increase, bonus, deferred compensation) as well as examining reciprocal
and nonlinear relations. This study may, therefore, help to provide evidence to address the
ongoing controversy surrounding the increasing levels of compensation among university
presidents and provide guidance to those who set, and regulate, university president
compensation.
Part I: Replication
As discussed above, Part I of this study is a replication of Study 1 (from Chapter 2). As
such, the theoretical framework to set up the following hypotheses and research questions is only
briefly reviewed below. Please see Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive explanation of the
hypotheses and research questions. The hypotheses and research questions are organized below
by the specific determinant that they address (i.e., university performance, non-performance
institutional characteristics, university president personal characteristics).
University Performance
Organizational performance has been identified as a key determinant of executive
compensation in the private sector (Tosi et al., 2000). Several studies, reviewed in Chapter 2
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(e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Cheng, 2014; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014;
Saunders, 2007), have also examined the relation between university performance and university
president compensation; however, the findings have been mixed. Many of the currently existing
studies on this relation in university settings have been atheoretical (e.g., Ehrenberg et al., 2001;
Monks, 2007). That being said, the majority of those that have relied on theory have invoked
agency theory in their theoretical grounding (e.g., Cheng, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Langbert,
2006; Pati & Lee, 2016), which supposes a positive effect of performance on subsequent
compensation. To attempt the replicate the findings in Chapter 2, I test the following,
Hypothesis 1: University performance will be positively related to president
compensation.
In my review of the current literature on the relation between university performance and
university president compensation, I also noted research questions. First, although agency theory
suggests that there may be differences between public and private universities, only three studies
have provided a direct comparison of the relation between university performance and president
compensation in public versus private universities (Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007; Parsons
& Reitenga, 2014). Therefore, I examine the following,
Research question 1: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between private
universities and public universities?
In addition, although there are reasons to believe that different measures of performance
are more strongly or weakly tied to university president compensation, based on the general state
of the literature, it is difficult to determine where these differences are. Therefore, I also aimed to
explore in Chapter 2 the relative influence of various performance dimensions on president
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compensation, as well as if these findings are stable across both public and private universities.
Stated formally,
Research question 2(a): What is the relative influence of the seven different performance
dimensions on executive compensation? (b) Is the pattern of strength of these relations
different between public universities and private universities?
University Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics
Chapter 2 also reviewed the relation between various non-performance institutional
characteristics (including university size and complexity) and university president compensation.
As discussed, the managerialist perspective (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981), human capital
theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962), and evidence from the broader literature of executive
compensation (Tosi et al., 2000), suggest a positive association between university
size/complexity and university president compensation. In addition, evidence from the broader
executive compensation literature suggests that size and complexity have a greater influence on
executive compensation than does organizational performance (Tosi et al., 2000). To attempt to
replicate the findings in Chapter 2, I test the following,
Hypothesis 2(a): Non-performance institutional characteristics related to university
size/complexity will have a positive relation with university president compensation; and,
(b): university size and complexity will account for more variance in university president
compensation than university performance.
Although the managerialist perspective (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981) and human
capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggest that there is a positive association
between university size as well as complexity and president compensation, there is no consistent
theoretical reasoning to suggest a relation between other non-performance institutional
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characteristics (e.g., religious affiliation, geographic location) and president compensation.
However, it is possible that these characteristics influence compensation. Therefore, I examine
the following research question,
Research question 3: Is there a relation between other non-performance institutional
characteristics and university president compensation?
In addition, as previously mentioned, there may be differences between public and
private universities; however, only three studies have provided a direct comparison of the
relation between university performance and president compensation in public versus private
universities (Huang & Chen, 2013; Monks, 2007; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014). Thus, it is difficult
to determine what differences may exist between public and private universities. Therefore, I
ask,
Research question 4: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between nonperformance institutional characteristic dimensions (including university size/complexity)
among private universities and public universities?
Although evidence suggests that organizational size and complexity have a strong
association with executive compensation, it is not currently known which of these characteristics
has the greater impact on university president compensation, or whether there is a difference
between public and private universities.
Research question 5(a): What is the relative influence of the university size and
complexity dimensions on president compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of these
relations different between public universities and private universities?
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University President Personal Characteristics
Human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Becker, 1962) suggests a relation between
some personal characteristics (e.g., tenure) and compensation. In the context of universities,
there is some evidence to support this idea. Specifically, positive associations between personal
characteristics, including gender, reputation, tenure, and alumni status, and university president
compensation have been observed in primary studies (e.g., Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Sorokina,
2003). However, these effects were not found in every primary study (e.g., Banker et al., 2009;
Cheng, 2014). To replicate findings from Chapter 2, I test,
Hypothesis 3: University president personal characteristics will be positively related to
university president compensation.
In addition to this hypothesis, several research questions related to the personal
characteristics of university presidents were posed in Chapter 2. First, there is evidence from the
broader executive compensation literature (Tosi et al., 2000) that size is the strongest predictor of
executive compensation and that organizational performance only accounts for about 5% of the
variance in executive compensation. However, though it is unlikely that personal characteristics
account for more variance than university size/complexity, it is possible that these characteristics
have a greater effect on university compensation than university performance. Therefore, I
examine the following,
Research question 6: How well do university president personal characteristics predict
university president compensation in comparison to university performance and
university size and complexity?
Second, as with university performance and non-performance characteristics, potential
differences in the strength of the association between university president personal
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characteristics and university president compensation were also examined in Chapter 2. In an
attempt to replicate the findings from Chapter 2, I address the following,
Research question 7: Are there differences in the strength of the relation between
president personal characteristics and university president compensation among private
universities and public universities?
Third, though university president personal characteristics may be related to university
president compensation, there are multiple dimensions of personal characteristics (i.e.,
demographics, professional experience, tenure/length of experience, other [see Table 5]). There
may be differences in the relative influence of each of these dimensions on compensation.
Further, the relative influence of each of these dimensions on university president may be
different in public and private universities. Therefore, I examine the following question,
Research question 8(a): What is the relative influence of the four different personal
characteristics dimensions on executive compensation? (b): Is the pattern of strength of
these relations different between public universities and private universities?
Part II: Addressing Identified Gaps
Although the results from the systematic review and the replication in Part I of this study
can inform our understanding of how university president compensation is determined (e.g.,
through university performance, university non-performance institutional characteristics, and
president personal characteristics), there are several questions that these results cannot answer.
As previously mentioned, one limitation of the review provided in Chapter 2 is that when there is
insufficient number of primary studies that have addressed a particular relation of interest, that
relation cannot be evaluated. My review of the university president compensation literature
highlighted that there are several open questions that could not be examined in a systematic
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review. Therefore, in this part of the study, I will review a subset of these identified gaps (i.e.,
gaps pertaining to the relation between university performance and university president
compensation), review several theories that may help to shed light on these open questions, and
empirically test several hypotheses pertaining to these gaps.
Identified Gaps
First, although there are several different components of university president (and
executive) compensation (e.g., base salary, bonus, deferred compensation, benefits), the majority
of primary studies on the topic of university president compensation focused on salary or total
compensation (e.g., Cheng, 2014; Galle & Walker, 2014; He & Callahan, 2017; Huang & Chen,
2013). Thus, despite important and well-established theoretical differences between the
components of compensation, we have no knowledge of how the relations between the
aforementioned predictors and the individual components of compensation may differ. This is
also the case in the broader executive compensation literature. For instance, only total
compensation, total cash compensation, or salary (which are all highly correlated) were included
in the meta-analysis that assessed the relation between organizational size, organizational
performance, and executive compensation (Tosi et al., 2000). Thus, even in the broader
executive compensation literature, we know little about the differences in the relation between
performance and the various aspects of performance.
Second, existing primary studies have failed to integrate findings and theories across
literature areas examining the relations between pay and performance as well as performance and
pay. Specifically, only three of the studies on university president compensation included in the
systematic review provided an assessment of the influence of university president on university
performance (Hunt et al., 2019; Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004). Consequently,
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although theory supports both sets of relations (i.e., performance has an impact on compensation;
compensation influences performance), little is known about the potential reciprocal effects. The
most recent narrative review of the executive compensation literature highlighted that this gap
also exists in the broader executive compensation literature (Devers et al., 2007).
Third, the studies examining the relation between university president compensation and
university performance have lacked nuance in their assumptions about the potential nature of this
relation. For instance, all of the existing studies have assumed that the relation between
university performance and university president compensation is linear. However, there is theory
to support nonlinear relations between these variables. In fact, there is some evidence from the
executive compensation literature that supports this view (e.g., Kuo, Lin, Lien, Wang, & Yeh,
2014). Thus, it is important to explore the possibility of nonlinear relations in the nonprofit
educational context.
Lastly, none of the existing primary studies proposed and tested how the relation between
university performance and university president compensation changes over time. Yet,
depending on the theory utilized, the magnitude of these relations may vary over time. For
example, agency theory suggests that the relation between university performance and university
president compensation should remain stable over time (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The
managerialist perspective, however, suggests that the relation between performance and
compensation may weaken over time (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981).
Each of these gaps highlights that even if we have a consistent estimate of the linear
relation between compensation and performance, there are many nuances about the relation that
are not yet understood. This is problematic for several reasons. First, without a complete
understanding of the nature of the relation between these two variables, we cannot be confident
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that our assessment of the link between university performance and university president
compensation, including the different components of compensation, is accurate (e.g.,
performance may appear to be weakly linked to total compensation, but may have a strong
relation to bonuses). If this is the case, we may make suggestions about compensation policy that
could be misleading.
Second, if university president compensation seems to have no relation with subsequent
university performance, then it could be argued that tying performance to compensation is not an
effective way to continually align interests and thus also incentivize future performance. Agency
theory suggests that using incentives will help to align the interests of the university president to
those of the Board, which should ultimately benefit university performance. If providing
monetary incentives has no effect on future performance, however, this practice would result in
wasted financial resources. Third, if the relation between university performance and subsequent
university president compensation are not linear, it may be beneficial to know the inflection
point(s). Fourth, understanding if and how the relation between these two variables changes over
time may be valuable. For example, if the relation between university performance and
university president compensation tends to weaken over time, Boards, and those individuals who
appoint Board members, can take steps to prevent this from occurring. Because compensation is
an essential part of an organization’s overall human resource management strategy (Kepes,
Delery, & Gupta, 2009), it is important to have a solid understanding of the potentially complex
nature of the relation between performance and compensation.
Gap 1: The Effect of University Performance on the Various Components of Compensation
The majority of studies that explored the relation between organizational performance
and executive compensation operationalized compensation as either total compensation, total
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cash compensation or salary (Tosi et al., 2000). In the context of universities, compensation is
typically defined as either salary, salary and benefits, total cash compensation, or total
compensation. In fact, Table 10 shows that, of the 22 studies reviewed in the previous chapter,
10 operationalized compensation as president’s salary, four studies as salary plus benefits, five as
total cash compensation, and nine as total compensation.
Although two studies that operationalized compensation as salary and benefits also
measured salary individually (i.e., Banker et al., 2009; O'Connell, 2005) and two studies
separated total cash compensation from benefits (i.e., Tang et al., 2000, 2004), none of these
studies made a distinction between salary and bonuses. Furthermore, only two studies specified
that long-term, or deferred compensation, was included as a component of total cash
compensation or total compensation (i.e., Parsons & Reitenga, 2014; Pati & Lee, 2016) and
neither of these studies directly compared the effects of salary, bonuses, and deferred
compensation. This is problematic as it presupposes that there are no meaningful differences
between the distinct components of compensation. However, there likely are important
differences. It is possible or even likely that performance is more or less related to each
individual component of compensation.
The components of compensation. Prior to discussing the potential explanations for why
performance may be differentially tied to the various components of compensation, it is
necessary to define each component and highlight its particular characteristics. Base pay is a
form of fixed compensation that is usually set based on a combination of human capital
considerations (e.g., knowledge, experience) and benchmarking (Murphy, 1999). Changes in
base pay can occur for a variety of reasons, one of which is the previous year’s performance. The
portion of the change in base salary that is due to performance is typically termed a merit
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increase, or merit pay (e.g., Park & Sturman, 2016). Merit raises are usually provided in the form
of percentages of base salary (Murphy, 1999). Such raises have features of both fixed and
variable compensation in that they must be re-earned every year, but once they are earned, they
are added into the permanent base salary10 (Park & Sturman, 2016). Because these increases
become permanent (i.e., incorporated into base pay), they result in permanently higher total labor
costs for the organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, 2016). For
instance, a 5% raise awarded on a base pay of $80,000 is $4,000, resulting in a new base pay of
$84,000. If the individual receives another 5% raise the following year, the raise would be
$4,200, and the new base pay would be $88,200. The subsequent year, with the same 5% raise,
base compensation would be $92,610. Thus, in just these three years, the costs of compensating
this one employee increased by $12,610. One can easily see how quickly these costs can add up
over time, especially if the employee stops performing at a high enough level to justify the new
high base pay. Thus, from the organization’s perspective, merit increases are not necessarily a
desirable form of compensation. This explains why merit raises (at least in the U. S.) are only
about 3%, on average (Miller, 2018).
Bonuses are similar to merit increases in that they are typically awarded because of
performance; however, unlike merit increases, bonuses are not added into permanent base salary
(Park & Sturman, 2016; Sturman & Short, 2000). Therefore, bonuses do not permanently
increase the organization’s total cost of compensating labor (Kahn & Sherer, 1990). Consider the
aforementioned example of the 5% merit raises. If over the course of the three years described,
5% bonuses were awarded instead of 5% merit raises, the organization would save $12,810
($264,810 minus $252,000) in labor costs just from that one employee. However, because

10

This explains why it is more appropriate to measure the effect of performance on base pay by examining changes
in base pay.
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bonuses must be re-earned every year, they are strictly a form of variable compensation (Park &
Sturman, 2016), and thus, are riskier than merit increases for employees, including university
presidents and other executives.
Deferred compensation may also be considered a form of variable compensation;
however, unlike bonuses, deferred compensation is not awarded immediately (Park & Sturman,
2016)11. Rather, receiving deferred compensation requires university presidents not only to
perform well, but also to remain with the university for a specified amount of time (Eaton &
Rosen, 1983; Park & Sturman, 2016). Stated differently, when deferred compensation is
awarded, it is added into a pool of compensation that can be received at a later date, based on the
agreed upon terms (e.g., after a specified number of years, after leaving the position). Therefore,
similar to bonuses, this type of compensation is also risky for university presidents. Base pay
(including the proportion of base pay resulting from merit increases), bonuses, and deferred
compensation are all components of total cash compensation.
Benefits are not a form of cash compensation. Instead, benefits include health insurance,
retirement contributions, housing, vehicles, etc. (Bai, 2014; Murphy, 1999). Benefits are
typically associated with a particular position, irrespective of performance. This may explain
why many of the primary studies that assessed the relation between university performance and
university president compensation separated benefits from other forms of compensation (e.g.,
Bai, 2014; Banker et al., 2009; Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005; Ehrenberg et al., 2001; Tang et al.,
2000). The sum of cash compensation and benefits is termed total compensation. To understand
why each of these specific components of compensation may be differentially related to

Merit increases are also not awarded immediately as they are spread across a year’s paycheck. However, once
awarded, individuals do start receiving rewards immediately. Thus, deferred compensation is still unique in regards
to the timeframe associated with actually receiving the award after it is granted.
11
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performance, it is first helpful to consider why any component of compensation would be
performance-related. A thorough review of agency theory is provided in Chapter 2; however, I
provide a brief review here to remind the reader.
Agency theory. Agency theory is the most frequently cited theory to explain the relation
between performance and compensation in the context of executive compensation and is also
frequently cited in studies assessing the relation between performance and compensation in
academic settings (e.g., Banker et al., 2009; Devers et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2000; Tosi et al.,
2000). Agency theory is relevant in organizations where the individuals in charge of running the
organization are not the owners of the organization, as is the case in universities (Eisenhardt,
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, although university presidents are charged with
running universities, they are not inherently accountable for all decisions they make. Stated
differently, the decisions presidents make may affect the university’s financial situation,
university employees’ salaries, student outcomes, etc., but, in the absence of any monitoring,
control, or reward system, their decisions do not necessarily directly impact the financial
situation of the university presidents themselves. Therefore, university presidents may be less
motivated to exert effort toward ensuring the long-term success of the university. This represents
the classic agency problem that occurs because principals (owners or key stakeholders) and
agents (those to whom work has been delegated) may have conflicting goals resulting from the
desire to maximize ones’ outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Another
defining feature of the agency problem is the existence of information asymmetry between the
principals and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). Meaning, agents have access to information that the
principals do not have access to, and thus, principals cannot verify what agents are doing or the
effects of these actions. In the case of universities, university presidents have more access to
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information (e.g., university performance metrics, financial situation, progress on strategic
initiatives) than Boards do by the very nature of their position as the president.
There are two general ways to manage the agency problem – monitoring and incentives
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Although monitoring can be an effective way to manage the agency problem,
it is unlikely to be effective in the university context. As discussed in Chapter 2, task
programmability for university presidents is low as the proper actions are not always known.
This makes monitoring less effective because Boards will not know what actions and behaviors
to monitor. In addition, Board members generally do not have a background in higher education.
Thus, they may not have the necessary expertise to effectively monitor university presidents.
Therefore, incentives are theoretically more appropriate in university settings. Using incentives
allows principals to bring the goals of the agents into alignment with their own goals (Dalton et
al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, by choosing appropriate
incentives, principals may bring agents’ goals in-line with their own goals (i.e., the high
performance of the university; Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
This, then, should encourage agents to act in the best interest of the organization, rather than just
in their own interest. Stated differently, by tying university president compensation to university
performance, Boards are hoping that university presidents will exert more effort in the service of
the university to, ultimately, increase university performance.
There is one additional consideration from agency theory relevant to this discussion- the
concept of financial risk. Agency theory predicts that principals and agents may be comfortable
with different levels of risk, and therefore, may prefer that president compensation be more, or
less strongly, tied to performance (Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Shapiro, 2005). The general assumption is that agents are risk-averse (i.e., they prefer their
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compensation to be less strongly tied to performance and thus more stable) because they are not
able to spread out their risk as they are only working for one organization (Dalton et al., 2007;
Eisenhardt, 1989). Stated differently, because agents theoretically only have one major source of
income, they prefer that income to be stable, rather than variable. This suggests that university
presidents will prefer compensation that is less risky. This is important for Boards to consider
because presidents may engage in undesirable behaviors to mitigate the increased risk resulting
from tying compensation to performance (Shapiro, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Thus, Boards are
likely to use both fixed and variable forms of compensation to balance the amount of financial
risk that university presidents may incur.
Taken together, agency theory suggests that because university presidents do not directly
benefit from, and, conversely, are not directly harmed by, the performance of the university, they
may make decisions that are not in the best interest of the university and its stakeholders (e.g.,
students and faculty; Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shapiro,
2005). According to agency theory, making compensation dependent on the performance of the
university may help to alleviate this problem and encourage university presidents to act in the
best interest of the university and its stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, if enhancing
university performance is the ultimate goal of this practice (i.e., tying university president
compensation to university performance), Boards must also consider other potential
consequences of this practice that may not have a positive effect on university performance
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Zhang et al., 2008). Specifically, Boards must balance the desire to motivate
university presidents with the potential negative effects of making presidents’ compensation
riskier and increasing labors costs to the university such that its financial performance is
ultimately harmed.
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Differential relations between university performance and the components of
compensation. As previously mentioned, benefits include health insurance, housing, vehicles,
etc. (Bai, 2014; Murphy, 1999). These are typically considered to be fixed forms of
compensation (Murphy, 1999). In fact, employers are required by law to provide some benefits
(i.e., health insurance; "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act", 2010). Thus, it is unlikely
that university performance is related to changes in benefits. Although previous research found
that university performance is related to president benefits (e.g., Tang et al., 2000), this study
used cross-sectional data, and thus, did not test if changes in performance are tied to changes in
benefits. Rather, Tang et al. (2000) found that benefits were related to variables such as
expenditures, whether the university was a research or doctoral school, the university’s
reputation, and the cost of tuition. It makes sense that larger, more complex universities, with
good reputations would have more resources, and thus would be able to offer their presidents
better benefits packages (e.g., better life insurance plans); yet, according to theory, it is still
unlikely that university performance is tied to university president benefits12.
Agency theory suggests that components of cash compensation (i.e., merit pay, bonuses,
and deferred compensation) will be tied to university performance (Eisenhardt, 1989), but it is
possible that this occurs to differing degrees. For instance, university performance is expected to
have a positive, but modest effect on merit pay. As previously mentioned, the defining feature of
merit pay is that raises from one year are added automatically into base pay (Nyberg et al.,
2016). Therefore, although new raises can be earned each year, it is not necessary for university
presidents to maintain high levels of university performance to continue reaping rewards

12

Note that no formal hypothesis is made because the data necessary to test this idea (i.e., the cost of benefits
provided to the president at each university) is not available to the author. Due to the unavailability of this data, and
because a nil effect is predicted, benefits will not be included in further discussions in this paper.
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resulting from one year’s performance in subsequent years; thus, this practice would not
effectively align the interests of university presidents and Boards over time. Furthermore,
because any pay raises are added to base pay, merit pay results in higher total expenditures for
the university over the long-term, which may harm overall university financial performance
(Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Nyberg et al., 2016). Given that Boards “bear ultimate legal
responsibility for … monitoring the institution’s fiscal welfare” (Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2015, p. 3), providing large merit increases, which can
ultimately harm the financial performance of the university, is unlikely to be desirable. This
suggests that performance is unlikely to be a strong predictor of merit pay, as this practice would
not effectively and efficiently mitigate agency problems.
Bonuses, however, unlike merit pay, do not result in permanent increases to base pay
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016). Rather, bonuses are paid in lump sums and must be
re-earned each year. Therefore, using bonuses requires that performance be high every year
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016). Thus, bonuses more effectively align the interests
of university presidents and university Boards than does merit pay. Furthermore, because
bonuses do not get added to base pay, providing bonuses is a more cost-effective practice than
using merit pay (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Park & Sturman, 2016; Sturman & Short, 2000).
Therefore, bonuses are also an efficient way to mitigate agency problems. This suggests that
performance will have a stronger effect on subsequent bonuses than on other forms of
compensation.
It is difficult to determine whether deferred compensation will be more effective at
aligning the interests of university presidents and Boards than either merit pay or bonuses.
Although being awarded deferred compensation only requires high performance in one year,
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actually receiving the awarded deferred compensation requires some degree of continued
alignment of the interests of university presidents and Boards for a number of subsequent years
to prevent termination and thus the loss of the deferred compensation (Park & Sturman, 2016).
Stated differently, if receiving the deferred compensation is contingent upon staying with the
university for a specified number of years, a university president may only be motivated to
expend enough effort to not be fired, resulting in minimal interest alignment. Yet, even if
alignment is minimal, deferred compensation is still expected to be awarded based on university
performance, as Boards are unlikely to encourage poorly performing university presidents to
remain with the university. Furthermore, providing deferred compensation may be more
desirable from the Board’s perspective because, as it is not paid out immediately and is not
added into a president’s base salary. Therefore, it may be more cost-effective over the long-term
than providing merit increases.
Taken together, the preceding arguments can be used to make two formal hypotheses and
pose one research question,
Hypothesis 1: University performance will have a positive effect on future (a) merit pay,
(b) bonuses, and (c) deferred compensation.
Hypothesis 2: University performance will have a greater effect on future bonuses than it
does on merit pay.
Research question 1: How does the effect of university performance on deferred
compensation compare to its effect on bonuses and merit pay?
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Gap 2: The Reciprocal Relation Between University Performance and University President
Compensation
The relation between compensation and subsequent performance. The previous
section (and all of Chapter 2) focused on the relation between university performance and
subsequent university president compensation as this is the most commonly studied ordering of
these variables in the executive compensation literature, including the university president
compensation literature. However, there is also theory (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom, 1964) to
support a relation between compensation and subsequent university performance. Stated
differently, depending on the theory utilized (i.e., agency or expectancy theory), the causal
ordering of these variables is different. Despite this, the relation between compensation and
subsequent performance is rarely tested, particularly in the context of university president
compensation.
For instance, concerning the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, only three included an
examination of the influence of compensation on future performance (Hunt et al., 2019; Parsons
& Reitenga, 2014; Tang et al., 2004). Hunt et al. (2019) only examined the effect of university
president compensation on one aspect of future performance – financial performance
(specifically, fundraising) and this effect was not statistically significant. Although Parsons and
Reitenga (2014) did find statistically significant relations between compensation and some
performance measures (e.g., university reputation and resources), they measured compensation
as the residual in the equation using university selectivity (defined as average SAT scores) and
complexity (defined as enrollment and Carnegie classification) as predictors of compensation
rather than examining distinct effects of each component of compensation on future
performance. As discussed in the previous section, there are differences among these
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components of compensation, and thus, differing effects of each component on subsequent
university performance should be expected. Furthermore, Parsons and Reitenga (2014) did not
compare the strength of the impact of compensation on future performance to that of
performance on future compensation. Therefore, not only is there still insufficient evidence that
compensation influences future performance in the context of universities, we also do not
understand the potential reciprocal effects that exist between these two variables in the context of
universities.
The most recent narrative review of the executive compensation literature (i.e., Devers et
al., 2007) pointed out that these issues also exist in the broader executive compensation
literature. Specifically, Devers et al. (2007, p. 1024) note, “little attention has been paid to the
complexities inherent in determining the nonrecursive effects that are likely to occur in the payperformance-pay arena […] Furthermore, work comparing and contrasting the effects of variable
ordering is virtually nonexistent”. The authors suggest that this lack of integration exists because
the theories used to support each relation (i.e., the executive compensation–organizational
performance relation and the organizational performance–executive compensation relation) are
incompatible. However, this is not necessarily accurate.
Agency theory suggests that university president compensation should be tied to
university performance to reduce the likelihood that the presidents will shirk their duties or
pursue goals that are not aligned with the goals of the university Board (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). The implicit assumption is that this practice will lead to future high
performance. If this were not the case, there would be no reason to tie compensation to
performance. Yet, agency theory does not describe exactly how or why this would occur. To
understand why aligning compensation with performance may be an effective practice, one can
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turn to more traditional motivational theories (e.g., expectancy theory; Vroom, 1964) that are
typically used to support a relation between compensation and subsequent performance.
Combining these two theories is in line with the work of other compensation researchers (Banks,
Woznyj, Kepes, Batchelor, & McDaniel, 2018; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).
Expectancy theory. Expectancy theory was developed to explain how individuals make
choices about which behaviors to engage in based upon the anticipated outcome of each behavior
(Chiang & Jang, 2008; Vroom, 1964). Thus, it is compatible with agency theory because, at its
core, agency theory is concerned with getting agents to engage in behaviors that principals want
them to engage in, rather than behaviors that the agent wants to engage in (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Expectancy theory provides a description of the conditions that
influence the choices that agents make (Vroom, 1964). Therefore, principals can rely on
expectancy theory to inform policies aimed at increasing the likelihood that agents engaged in
behaviors desired by principals. Stated differently, whereas agency theory explains why a
performance-based pay policy may be necessary, expectancy theory explains how such a policy
should be implemented to be effective.
In expectancy theory, Vroom (1964) proposed that each potential task an individual may
engage in is associated with a motivational force equal to the product of three distinct
perceptions (i.e., expectancy, instrumentality, and valence). Expectancy perceptions refer to the
extent to which individuals feel that their effort can lead to performance. Instrumentality
perceptions denote the extent to which individuals believe that performance can lead to outcomes
(e.g., rewards). Lastly, the value that individuals place upon these outcomes is termed valence
(Bartol & Locke, 2000; Vroom, 1964). Because these perceptions are theorized to combine in a
multiplicative manner, if any one is weak, the motivational force associated with the given task
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will also be weak. It is not likely that an individual will choose to engage in the task with a weak
motivational force; instead the individual is likely to engage in some other task that is associated
with a stronger motivational force. In the context of a university, this means that if, for example,
the motivational force associated with playing golf is stronger than the motivational force
associated with contacting potential financial donors, a university president is more likely to play
golf.
The practice of compensating a university president for university performance affects
instrumentality and valence perceptions. Specifically, if a president’s employment contract states
that rewards will be provided if performance reaches a particular threshold, that president is
likely to believe that if he or she reaches the specified performance threshold, the associated
rewards will be provided. Similarly, if a president discerns a past pattern of the Board providing
a reward for a particular level of performance, that president is also likely to believe that similar
high performance will yield similar rewards in the future. Stated differently, the university
president will have high instrumentality perceptions. Thus, over time, the practice of rewarding
high levels of performance should strengthen university presidents’ instrumentality perceptions.
Furthermore, if the rewards are large enough, they will be perceived as valuable (i.e., have a
strong valence). The combination of strong instrumentality and valence perceptions should,
theoretically, result in a strong motivational force. Therefore, the motivational force to exert
effort and display behaviors aimed at improving university performance should be stronger than
that of behaviors that are unlikely to result in higher university performance (as they are not
being rewarded). This will lead university presidents to engage in these performance-related
behaviors more frequently, which, ultimately, should have a positive effect on subsequent
university performance. Stated formally,
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Hypothesis 3: University president compensation will have a positive effect on future
university performance.
Differential relations between components of compensation and subsequent
performance. To determine how effectively each component of university president
compensation may motivate individuals to increase future performance, one must consider how
each component may differentially affect valence perceptions. All else constant, one may expect
merit pay to have greater valence than the valence associated with any other component of
compensation (Nyberg et al., 2016). As demonstrated previously, over time, one year’s merit pay
represents a larger sum of money than a bonus or deferred compensation of the same amount
because each new merit increase becomes permanent. From this perspective, a $4,000 merit
increase should lead to a larger increase in subsequent performance than a $4,000 bonus or
$4,000 in deferred compensation. Furthermore, considering that part of the attraction of deferred
compensation is that at least a portion of this pay can be realized when the awarded individual is
in a lower tax bracket (Eaton & Rosen, 1983), $4,000 in deferred compensation is likely be end
up being a larger reward than a $4,000 bonus awarded immediately because taxes are deducted
from it at a lower rate. Taken together, these considerations suggest that changes to base pay will
result in the highest levels of future performance, followed by deferred compensation, and then
bonuses. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 4a: Merit pay will have the largest effect on future performance.
Hypothesis 4b: Deferred compensation will have a moderate effect on future
performance (as compared to merit pay and bonuses).
Hypothesis 4c. Bonuses will have the weakest effect on future performance.
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However, Nyberg et al. (2016) highlighted that factors besides the amount of money that
merit pay represents over time should be considered when making predictions regarding the
effect of various components of compensation on subsequent performance. For instance,
individuals’ choices are affected by various psychological factors (e.g., Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In addition to the objective amount of a financial reward, valence
is also affected by the reward’s salience. From this perspective, one would expect bonuses to
have the largest valence, and thus, the strongest relation with future performance (Nyberg et al.,
2016). Whereas a $4,000 bonus would be received in one lump sum payment, changes to base
pay are spread out over every paycheck. Thus, a $4,000 increase to base pay would only translate
to a raise of $153.85 per paycheck (assuming payments are issued bi-weekly). Further,
considering that deferred compensation is by its very nature not received immediately, presidents
would not actually receive any of the awarded deferred compensation until a later date.
Therefore, considering psychological factors, such as a reward’s salience, suggests that bonuses
will have the strongest effect on future performance, followed by changes to base pay, and then
changes in deferred compensation (Nyberg et al., 2016).
This is consistent with predictions based on the concept of net present value (Gallo,
2014). Specifically, to determine the value of a reward, one must consider not only the objective
financial value of the reward, but also what an individual may do with the reward once it is
received. If an individual invests the received reward, the value of that reward should also take
into account the potential return on that investment. From this perspective, bonuses are expected
to have a stronger valence than both merit pay and deferred compensation, as an individual
receiving a bonus can invest it immediately.
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This consideration yields different hypotheses than the rationale that assumes individuals
act in an economically rational manner. To determine which rationale is more accurate, I propose
the following competing hypotheses. Note that this approach is consistent with the strong
inference approach devised by (Platt, 1964).
Hypothesis 5a: Bonuses will have the largest effect on future performance.
Hypothesis 5b: Merit pay will have a moderate effect on future performance (as
compared to bonuses and deferred compensation).
Hypothesis 5c. Deferred compensation will have the weakest effect on future
performance.
Reciprocal relations between university performance and university president
compensation over time. Given that agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests a
relation between university performance and university president compensation, and expectancy
theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests a relation between university president compensation and
university performance, it is important to consider the reciprocal nature of these variables. In
order to do this, one must examine how the relations between these two variables evolve over
time.
Research question 2: Does the strength of the relations between university president
compensation and university performance change over time? If so, do they become
weaker over time or stronger?
Gap 3: Curvilinear Relations Between University Performance and University President
Compensation
The majority of studies that assess the relation between organizational performance and
future executive compensation assume that the relation between these two variables is linear. For
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instance, the largest meta-analysis on executive compensation that is frequently cited as evidence
that organizational size has a stronger effect on executive compensation than organizational
performance makes no mention of potential nonlinearities (Tosi et al., 2000). Furthermore,
Devers et al. (2007) only discuss linear relations between organizational performance and future
executive compensation. The situation is similar in the context of universities. Specifically, all 22
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 (see Table 7 for a list of these studies) restricted their analyses of
the association between university performance and university president compensation to linear
relations. If only linear associations are examined, the relation between organizational
performance and executive compensation (or university performance and university president
compensation) may be underestimated if it is, in fact, nonlinear.
There are several reasons to believe that the relation between organizational performance
and organizational president compensation is nonlinear. For instance, agency theory highlights
that agents are risk averse (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This risk aversion
should be taken into account when devising incentive plans, as agents may engage in undesirable
behaviors to mitigate their risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zhang et al., 2008).
In the context of universities, one potential way to do this is to provide some compensation
increase regardless of the level of university performance (e.g., by providing cost of living
adjustments, seniority-based pay raises).
Besides decreasing the risk exposure of presidents, there are other reasons to believe that
at least some increase in compensation will be provided regardless of the level of performance.
For instance, considering that university performance is not completely under the control of a
university president, presidents may view receiving a small or no raise as inequitable. This would
be particularly problematic because equity theory suggests that compensating a university
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president in an inequitable manner will lead these presidents to withdraw effort in the future,
which would ultimately harm university performance (Adams, 1965). Given that agency theory
suggests making compensation commensurate with performance to encourage agents to engage
in desirable behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it would be
counterproductive to provide compensation commensurate with poor performance (i.e., little or
no compensation increase) as this would cause presidents to reduce effort in the future.
Therefore, considering the risk involved in providing no compensation increase, it can be
expected that, even when performance is below the desired goal or target, at least some baseline
compensation increase will still be provided. Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of this. Below
the performance threshold, a non-zero reward is still provided; however, this reward is not
reflective of university performance. Therefore, until the performance threshold is met, the
reward is stable (i.e., is does not increase as poor performance becomes slightly less poor).
Stated differently, before the performance threshold, the correlation between performance and
compensation rewards is predicted to be zero.
Once performance rises above the threshold, however, agency theory suggests that the
best way to align the interests of the university president and the Board is to tie compensation to
actual university performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is represented
by the first inflection point in Figure 2. This first bend represents the point at which
compensation (i.e., merit increases, bonuses, deferred compensation) is provided to reward
performance, and therefore, incentivize future performance. The area between this first inflection
point and the second inflection point (discussed next) is termed the “incentive zone” (Murphy,
1999, p. 11, see also Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002). This is the area in which incremental
improvements in performance are rewarded with incremental increases in rewards (i.e., merit
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increases, bonuses, deferred compensation; Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999). Thus, in
the incentive zone, the correlation between university performance and compensation rewards is
predicted to be non-zero.
It is also reasonable to assume that at very high levels of performance, the link between
university performance and compensation will decrease in strength. This is due to the fact that it
would not be as cost efficient to continue to compensate university presidents at increasingly
high levels, even if performance is high (Brown, Sturman, & Simmering, 2003). Here, it is also
useful to consider the relation between pay and future performance. Specifically, although this
relation is not frequently examined in the executive compensation literature, there is evidence
from the employee (non-executive) compensation literature that suggests that the incentive effect
of compensation diminishes at high levels of compensation. For instance, both cardinal utility
theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
suggest that exceedingly high levels of pay will have “decreasing marginal returns” (Mitra,
Jenkins, Gupta, & Shaw, 2015, p. 154). This means that, at very high levels of compensation, the
compensation–performance relation is likely to be weaker than at moderate levels of
compensation. For instance, a 5% increase in compensation may be expected to result in a 5%
increase in future performance. However, a 100% increase in compensation is likely to result in a
less than 100% increase in future performance. Based on this reasoning, universities may set a
maximum reward at a point where the anticipated effect on future performance is not expected to
be high enough to warrant additional investment in the form of higher rewards. This is
represented by the second inflection point in Figure 2. Specifically, this second bend shows that,
after a certain performance threshold, the maximum reward (i.e., merit increase, bonus, deferred
compensation) will be provided. Above this level of performance, no additional rewards will be
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awarded. Stated differently, once the maximum financial reward is provided, the relation
between university performance and compensation rewards is predicted to be zero.
Taken together, agency theory can be used to suggest that the relation between
organizational performance and executive compensation would look more similar to the solid
line with the two inflection points depicted in Figure 2 than to the dashed line that most studies
assume. It is informative to note that the solid line in Figure 2 is similar to the line in the figure
depicting target “incentive zones” provided and discussed by Murphy (1999) and adapted by
Indjejikian and Nanda (2002). An adapted version of these figures (i.e. with transposed axes) is
displayed as Figure 3. This figure was developed based on survey results that indicated that
organizations’ executive bonus plans do not award performance bonuses below a certain
performance threshold (Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999). Above this performance
threshold, bonuses are based on performance until a pre-determined cap is reached. Thus, above
a certain level of performance bonuses compensation will not continue to increase in size
(Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002; Murphy, 1999).
Although neither of these articles discussed why this may occur theoretically, they
provided initial empirical evidence that such a relation may exist, at least for bonuses. However,
there is no reason to believe that this type of relation would not apply to other components of
compensation as well. Specifically, changes in base pay and deferred compensation may also be
used to align the interests of university presidents and Boards; thus, the same theoretical should
arguments are likely to apply. Taken together, based on the empirical evidence and the
theoretical arguments discussed above, I propose that the relation between university
performance and university president compensation is nonlinear. Stated formally,
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Hypothesis 6: The relation between university performance and future university
president compensation (as measured using merit pay, bonuses, and deferred
compensation) is nonlinear.
Method
Sample
The sample of public and private nonprofit university presidents used in this study was
derived from the executive compensation database populated by the Chronicle of Higher
Education (CHE) (Bauman et al., 2018; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b).
Individuals who served as a university president for the same university across the 2013 – 2015
years were included in this study. A total of 438 university presidents fit this criterion. Of these
438, 25 individuals were the heads of university systems (e.g., Texas State University System,
Montana State University System). University performance data are not provided at the system
level; therefore, these 25 individuals were removed from the dataset. Individuals who were
presidents of specific universities within these systems were included in the dataset assuming
they held that position between 2013 and 2015. An additional 10 individuals were removed from
the sample because they received zero total compensation in either 2013, 2014, and/or 2015.
This resulted in a total of 403 university presidents. Of the 403 university presidents in the
analysis, 290 (72%) were from private universities, whereas 113 (28%) were from public
universities.
Measures
Because the goal of Part I of this study was to replicate the results in Study 1, it includes
more measures, and different specific operationalizations of these measures, than Part II.
Therefore, the measures used in in each part will be described separately. However, all measures
used in either Part I or Part II of this study are defined in Table 11.
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Part I.
University president compensation. In Part I of this study, university president
compensation was operationalized as total compensation, which includes all compensation
received by the university president in a given year. As deferred compensation, set aside, and
employer retirement contributions are not received by a president at the time they are awarded,
these types of compensation were not included in total compensation (Bauman et al., 2018). All
data pertaining to the compensation of the university presidents in this sample were obtained
through the CHE (Bauman et al., 2018; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b). The
CHE gathers compensation data from private colleges and universities using the Internal
Revenue Service’s Form 990 (Bauman et al., 2018). This form is required by the IRS for most
nonprofit institutions, including most nonprofit private universities. Public universities are not
required to file the IRS’ form 990, therefore, the CHE gathers compensation data via surveys
(Bauman et al., 2018).
University performance. University performance was defined in nine different ways,
with at least one operationalization per university performance dimension. The specific metrics
were informed by theory, research, and the results of Study 1. Endowment and fundraisingrelated variables were the most frequently examined variables in the studies included in the
systematic review; therefore, the two university financial performance metrics used in this study
are endowment per full-time equivalent (FTE) student and fundraising. Fundraising was defined
as a university’s reported gifts.
Graduation rate, although only measured in three of the studies included in the systematic
review, appeared to have a larger impact on university president compensation than the other
operationalizations of academic and research performance. Therefore, graduation rate, defined
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as the percentage of a cohort that graduates within 150% of the normal time (Ginder, Kelly-Reid,
& Mann, 2018), was used as one measure of academic and research performance. The
percentage of students in a cohort that default on certain Federal loans within three years of
entering repayment, termed three-year cohort default rate (U. S. Department of Education, 2018)
was also used as a metric of academic and research performance. This measure has not been
examined in prior studies; however, given that part of the controversy surrounding university
president compensation is that it continues to rise despite increasing student loan debt, it is
possible that university Boards are beginning to take students’ ability to repay their loans into
account when determining university president compensation. Three-year default rate can be
considered a measure of academic and research performance because students’ ability to repay
their loans is likely, in part, tied to the value of their education and degree. This metric was
reversed scored in the analyses.
Of the various academic and research quality measures used in previous studies, studentto-faculty ratio, defined as total FTE students divided by total FTE faculty (Ginder et al., 2018),
seemed to have the largest impact on university president compensation. Therefore, student-tofaculty ratio was used as the measure of academic and research quality in this study. Regarding
the faculty quality dimensions, each of the measures used in previous studies involved faculty
salary, therefore, in this study, average full-time faculty salary is used. University ranking was
the most common measure of university reputation used in prior studies and is, therefore, used in
this study as well. University ranking was coded as 0 = unranked, 1 = ranked.
Regarding the selectivity dimension, two metrics, acceptance rate and average SAT
score, were used as these were the two mostly commonly used measures of selectivity in prior
studies. Acceptance rate is defined as the number of admitted students divided by the number of
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applicants (Ginder et al., 2018). Because lower acceptance rates are indicative of higher
selectivity, this variable was reverse scored. Average SAT score was measured using the average
SAT equivalent score (i.e., it includes converted ACT scores as well as SAT scores) for all
students admitted to a university (Ginder et al., 2018).
The data for endowment per FTE, graduation rate, student-to-faculty ratio, and
acceptance rate were obtained through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018). The IPEDS database is maintained by
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which is part of the Institute of Education
Sciences (IES) and the U. S. Department of Education (Ginder et al., 2018). All colleges and
universities that apply for, or receive, federal funding under Title IV of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 are required to complete to the IPEDS surveys ("Higher Education Amendments Act of
1992", 1992). The three-year cohort default rate, average faculty salary, and average SAT score
were acquired through the College Scorecard database (U. S. Department of Education, 2018).
This database is maintained by the U. S. Department of Education and includes data collected
through IPEDS as well as data from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) and the
U.S. Department of Treasury. Lastly, university ranking data was obtained from U. S. News and
World Report (USNWR; Morse, 2017) via The Washington Post (Anderson, 2015), which
publishes university rankings over time as determined by USNWR.
Non-performance institutional characteristics. There were a total of four nonperformance institutional characteristics used in this study. Enrollment, defined as the
university’s FTE enrolled students, was used as it was the most frequently used metric of
university size in previous studies. Carnegie classification was a commonly used measure of
university complexity in prior studies and is a normatively accepted way to categorize
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universities based on the types of degrees they issue and the amount of research they produce
(The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, n.d.) and was, therefore, used
to measure university complexity. A university’s Carnegie classification was coded as 0 =
Baccalaureate/Associate’s universities or Associate’s colleges, 1 = Baccalaureate university, 2 =
Master’s university, 3 = Doctoral/Professional university, 4 = Doctoral university – High
research activity, and 5 = Doctoral university – Very high research activity. It was also important
to include a measure of institutional ownership (coded as private = 1; public = 0) and whether the
university was religiously oriented (religious = 1, non-religious = 0) as there is evidence that
both of these variables have a significant impact on university president compensation. Data
pertaining to enrollment, Carnegie classification, and religious orientation was collected through
the IPEDS database (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018), whereas data necessary for
the public/private university variable was obtained through the CHE’s executive compensation
database (Bauman et al., 2017; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b).
University president personal characteristics. Four university president personal
characteristics were used in this study. Gender was the most frequently examined demographic
variable in previous studies. In this study, gender was coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. A
university president’s tenure in their current position (measured in months) was used to assess
the impact of tenure-related variables on university president compensation. Two professional
experience variables were used – a dummy code indicating if the university president has a Ph.D.
or equivalent degree (Ph.D. holder = 1, no Ph.D. = 0) and a dummy code indicating if a
university president had prior presidential experience at another university (prior presidency = 1,
no prior presidency = 0). Prior presidential experience was included because it was identified in
the systematic review as a consistent predictor of university president compensation. Although

124
only one prior study included a measure of whether or not the university president held a Ph.D.,
this variable could be related to university president compensation, as a Ph.D. is the highest
degree that one can earn.
Data on the tenure of university presidents was obtained through the CHE’s executive
compensation dataset (Bauman et al., 2017; The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2018a, 2018b)
and, when the information was unavailable from the CHE, though web searches (e.g., university
websites, university presidents’ LinkedIn profiles). The remaining data (i.e., gender, Ph.D.
holder, prior presidency) was obtained through web searches.
Control variables. Two additional variables were used as control variables. The noncompete enforceability index of the state in which a university resides was obtained and updated
using methodology from Garmaise (2011)13. This variable captures how legally enforceable a
non-compete agreement is by state. Non-compete agreements reduce the likelihood that an
individual will leave an organization (Garmaise, 2011). In this context, highly enforceable noncompete agreements make it less likely that university presidents will leave their current
organization and go to another university than non-compete agreements that are not as easily
enforceable. This could be related to university president compensation in one of two ways. On
the one hand, it is possible that Boards will pay university presidents less when they reside in a
state where non-compete agreements are highly enforceable because the Board is less worried
that the president will leave. This notion has received support from the for-profit literature
(Garmaise, 2011). On the other hand, because highly enforceable non-compete agreements add
significant risk to a university president (i.e., he/she has less of an opportunity to move to
another university), a university Board may feel inclined to pay their president more highly in

13

Special thanks to Dr. Joseph Coombs for providing the non-compete enforceability index data.

125
exchange for the president’s willingness to sign the non-compete. This would be supported by
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Given how this variable
could relate to university president compensation, it is important to account for its potential
influence.
A measure of university density was also included as a control variable. This variable is a
count of how many colleges and universities are in a university’s metropolitan statistical area
(MSA). The number of universities in a university’s MSA may be related to university president
compensation for two reasons. First, if there are a large number of universities in a given area,
there are many potential job opportunities for potential university presidents; therefore, to attract
high performing university presidents and incentivize them to stay with their current university,
Boards may pay presidents more. This notion has been supported in the for-profit literature
(Wheaton & Lewis, 2002). A large number of universities in a university’s MSA may also be a
general indicator of how populous an area is, which could reflect the cost of living in an area and
how many other non-university employment opportunities exist, both of which could influence
the level of compensation paid to university presidents.
Part II.
University president compensation. In Part II of this study, the following dimensions and
forms of university president compensation were measured, and separately assessed, depending
on the specific hypothesis: change in total compensation, merit pay, bonus pay, or deferred
compensation, set aside. Each of the respective measures were obtained through the CHE or
derived using information provided by the CHE. Specifically, change in total compensation was
defined as the difference between current year’s total compensation and previous year’s total
compensation. Merit pay was operationalized as the difference between current year’s base
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salary and previous year’s base salary14. Bonus pay included all bonuses and incentives received
by a university president in a given year. Lastly, deferred compensation, set aside was all
compensation that was set aside in a given year to be paid out to university presidents in a future
year.
To calculate change in total compensation and merit pay, it was necessary to obtain
compensation data from the CHE for 2012 in addition to the data from 2013 to 2015. Because
this study included individuals who were present at their university from 2013 to 2015, there
were some instances where change in total compensation and merit pay for 2012 to 2013 could
not be calculated. Information about these individuals’ change in total compensation and merit
pay for the 2013 to 2014 time period was still included in the analysis.
Change in total compensation, merit pay, bonus pay, and deferred compensation were
each operationalized as their respective raw numbers (e.g., merit increase of $4,000) and relative
numbers compared to base pay (e.g., merit increase of 5% of base pay) or, in the case of total
compensation, to prior total compensation (e.g., 5% increase in total compensation compared to
prior year’s total compensation). There is evidence to suggest that the relative increases in
compensation may have a stronger impact on performance outcomes than absolute increases
(Mitra, Tenhiälä, & Shaw, 2016). For instance, a $4,000 merit increase on a base pay of $60,000
represents a 6.66% raise; whereas a $4,000 merit increase on a base pay of $100,000 only
represents a 4.00% raise. Research regarding the smallest noticeable pay increases conducted by
Mitra et al. (2016) found that individuals’ behavioral intentions (to, for example, increase
performance) are not positively impacted until raises rise above a certain threshold (4.2% for
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It is important to note that base salary is not necessarily comparable between public and private universities. Base
salary for public universities includes compensation provided by private university foundations; base salary for
private universities includes sick pay and employee contributions to 401(k) and/or 403(b) plans (Bauman et al.,
2018).
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U. S. samples). Thus, whereas a $4,000 merit increase should motivate individuals with a base
pay of $60,000 to increase their level of performance, the same result would not be expected for
individuals that receive a $4,000 merit increase and have a base pay of $100,000. Stated
differently, the same absolute raise can have differing effects on performance outcomes
depending on how that raise compares to current base pay.
University performance. For Part II of this study, university performance was defined as
change in endowment. Change in endowment was chosen for several reasons. Boards cite that
the three most significant challenges faced by universities are their financial stability, the net
tuition for students, and the decrease in state and federal funding (Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges & Gallup, 2018). Having large endowments can help with
each of these issues. In fact, large endowments allow universities to subsidize the education of
students directly by providing financial aid using endowment funds and indirectly by relying less
on tuition revenue and more on endowment funds to cover university expenses (Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2019; Baum & Lee, 2018). Therefore,
endowments are a very important metric of university performance. In addition, university
presidents, as the primary fundraisers and financial managers of universities (Cote, 1985), can
have a substantial impact on the size of a university’s endowments. Taken together, it is
reasonable to expect that Boards would emphasize university endowments when considering the
compensation of university presidents and that university presidents would likewise emphasize
increasing the size of university endowments.
To calculate change in endowment, it was necessary to obtain data from 2012 and 2016
as well as from 2013 to 2015. Because of this study focused on individuals who were at the same
university from 2013 to 2015, it is possible that some university presidents were not employed

128
by their respective university in 2012 or 2016. However, it is likely that any performance
increases from 2012 to 2013 would factor into future compensation decisions. It is also likely
that any policies, initiatives, or changes university presidents make will still have an effect on the
university’s performance one year after that president leaves the university. This is discussed
more in the analytical approach section.
Control variables. Based on the results of Part I, five control variables were chosen to be
included in all analyses relevant to Part II of this study. Specifically, change in FTE enrollment,
non-compete enforceability, university density, and dummy codes indicating whether the
university was private or public and religious or non-religious were used in Part II. These
measures were defined and coded the same was as in Part I, except that change in FTE
enrollment was used rather than total FTE enrollment.
Analytical Approach
Part I. Past studies on the relation between university performance and university
president compensation have used a variety of different statistical methods including ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression (e.g., He & Callahan, 2017; Langbert & Fox, 2013; Monks, 2007;
Pati & Lee, 2016), random-effects regression (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005), fixed-effects
regression (Bai, 2014), and the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model (Cheng, 2014). Although
OLS regression without cluster-robust standard errors has been used most frequently and is
easiest to specify, its use in longitudinal studies is problematic, as several important assumptions
would be violated. However, because most of the previous studies did use OLS regression
without cluster-robust standard errors, the hypotheses from Part I of this study, which focuses on
replication, were tested twice – once using the OLS framework without cluster-robust standard
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errors and once using random coefficient modeling (RCM), which accounts for clustering and
both fixed and random effects15.
For the OLS analyses, total compensation at Time 2 was regressed on all university
performance measures, non-performance institutional characteristics, university president
personal characteristics, and control variables measured at Time 1. To determine which set of
variables accounts for the most variance in total compensation, three separate analyses were
conducted where each category of variables was entered into the analysis in the second step. This
allows one to compare each category’s relative R2 change when accounting for the remaining
variables. Outliers were identified by considering z-scores and Mahalanobis distances.
Observations with z-scores over 3.0 or statistically significant Mahalanobis distances were
considered outliers for purposes of these analyses. All analyses were conducted including and
excluding outliers. Because differences between public and private universities are of interest in
this study, all analyses, including the outlier analyses, were performed using the full sample, only
public universities, and only private universities. Furthermore, all of these analyses were
replicated using Time 3 compensation regressed on all of the university performance measures,
non-performance institutional characteristics, university president personal characteristics, and
control variables measured at Time 2. If these results are similar to the previous time-period’s,
then one can have more confidence in the initial results. Conversely, if the Time 1 to Time 2
results are not replicated at Time 2 to Time 3, then one should be more skeptical that the initial
observations are reflective of true underlying effects. All OLS analyses were conducted in SPSS
v.25 (IBM Corp., Released 2017).

15

Alternatively, rather than using RCM, one could also calculate cluster-robust standard errors for the OLS analyses
to address the non-independence problems associated with combining data across years (Wooldridge, 2013).
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Using the RCM approach, total compensation at Time 2 was regressed on the relevant
Time 1 variables and total compensation at Time 3 was regressed on the relevant Time 2
variables simultaneously. All RCM analyses were conducted using R version 3.5.0 and R Studio
version 1.2.1335 (R Studio, 2019) with the multilevel and nlme packages (Bliese, 2016; Pinheiro,
Bates, DebRoy, Sakar, & R Core Team, 2019). To determine which set of variables accounts for
the most variance in total compensation, the marginal R-square and 95% confidence intervals for
each variable were calculated using the r2glmm package (Jaegar, 2017; Johnson, 2014;
Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Outliers were identified as cases for which the normalized
residuals were greater than two standard deviations outside of the normal distribution (Pinheiro
et al., 2019). All analyses were conducted separately for public and private universities and
including and excluding outliers.
Part II. All analyses for Part II were conducted using RCM. For Hypotheses 1, 2, and
Research questions 1 and 2, there was a one-year lag between university performance and future
university president compensation. For Hypotheses 3, 4, 5, 6 and Research question 2, there was
a two-year lag between university president compensation and future university performance.
This longer lag was used to allow for some time for any changes made by a university president
to take effect. Outliers were identified in the same manner as in Part I. All analyses were
conducted with and without outliers; however, as differences between public and private
universities were not the primary interest in Part II, analyses were only conducted using the full
sample of universities, rather than separately for public and private universities. Also, because
the relative impact of each predictor was not the primary interest for Part II, R2 values and
confidence intervals are not shown.
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Results
Part I: Replication
Sample descriptives. As previously mentioned, there were a total of 403 university
presidents included in the sample - 290 (72.0%) from private universities and 113 (28.0%) from
public universities. The majority of the university presidents were males (325, 80.6%) and 232
(71.4%) of these men worked at private universities. There were also 78 female university
presidents (19.4% of the total sample), most of whom worked for private universities (58;
74.4%). As anticipated, roughly three-quarters (304; 75.4%) of the university presidents held a
Ph.D., or equivalent degree (212 [69.7%] at private universities and 92 [30.3%] at public
universities). Only 58 (14.4%) of the university presidents had been president at another college
or university prior to their current position. Of the 290 private university presidents, 43 (14.8%)
had a prior presidency; 15 (13.3%) of the 113 public university presidents had a prior presidency.
The mean tenure at Time 1 was 88.38 months (SD = 72.57). Only university presidents
who were president at their university for all three timepoints of interest were included in the
dataset, therefore, the mean tenure at Time 2 was 12 months more than at Time 1, and the mean
tenure at Time 3 was 12 months after that. Presidents from private universities had significantly
longer tenure (M = 96.07, SD = 77.01) than presidents from public universities [(M = 68.64, SD
= 55.26), t(283) = 3.982, p < .001]. Levene’s test indicated unequal variance (F = 10.28, p =
.001), so the degrees of freedom were adjusted from 401 to 283.
The mean total compensation for university presidents in 2013 was $488,590.04 (SD =
$374,624.88). The mean compensation increased in 2014 (M = $527,082.24, SD = 470,629.13)
and again in 2015 (M = $569,813.67, SD = $472,982.11). In 2013, private university presidents
received significantly more total compensation (M = $516,790.14, SD = $427,791.13) than
public university presidents [(M = $416,218.10, SD = $155,471.89), t(400) = 3.46, p = 001].
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Levene’s test indicated unequal variance (F = 14.21, p < .001), so the degrees of freedom were
adjusted from 401 to 400. This difference between public and private universities persisted in
2014 and 2015. Total compensation across all three years was highly skewed; thus, the natural
log of the variable was used in all subsequent analyses.
University performance.
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicted that university performance would be positively
related to university president compensation. Table 12 presents the correlation matrix for the full
sample of universities. An examination of this table provides initial support for this hypothesis.
Specifically, almost all the university performance variables included in the analyses had a
positive and statistically significant relation with university performance across all timepoints.
There was, however, one exception. Student-to-faculty ratio had a negative association with
university president compensation that was statistically significant considering student-to-faculty
ratio at Time 1 to university president compensation at Time 2 (r = -.108, p < .05), but was not
statistically significant between student-to-faculty ratio at Time 2 and university president
compensation at Time 3 (r = .077, ns). It is important to note though that, generally, lower
student-to-faculty ratios are desirable and, thus, indicative of higher performance. Stated
differently, the statistically significant negative correlation between student-to-faculty ratio
(Time 1) and university president compensation (Time 2) provides evidence for a positive
relation between university performance and university president compensation. Taken together,
the correlational evidence suggests that Hypothesis 1 is supported.
As mentioned in the Method section, this hypothesis was also tested using two
regression-based approaches - OLS and RCM. The benefit of these approaches over just
examining the correlations is that they can determine if the effect of university performance on
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compensation is positive and significant when accounting for the effects of other variables of
interest. Considering the OLS approach first, Table 13, Panel A provides the standardized
regression coefficients (beta weights) for the model that includes all predictors in this study (i.e.,
university performance, non-performance university characteristics, university president personal
characteristics, and control variables) in one step. The relevant beta weights for full sample from
Time 1 to Time 2 are shown in Column 2, whereas the beta weights for the Time 2 to Time 3
predictions are shown in Column 5. Looking first at Column 2, one can see that only three
university performance variables had a statistically significant effect on university president
compensation – graduation rate (β = -.238, p = .032), average faculty salary (β = .196, p = .044),
and average SAT score (β = .252, p = .021). Interestingly, graduation rate had a negative effect
on university president compensation, suggesting that universities where students are less likely
to graduate have more highly paid presidents. These results indicate that, when controlling for
the other variables of interest, there is little evidence that university performance positively
affects university president compensation, which is in contrast with the correlational results.
Turning to Column 5, it can be seen that the results from Time 2 to Time 3 are not consistent
with the results from Time 1 to Time 2. Specifically, in Column 5, only endowment per FTE has
a statistically significant impact on university compensation (β = .186, p = .028). Graduation
rate, average faculty salary, and average SAT score are not statistically significant in Column 5
and endowment per FTE is not statistically significant in Column 2. This further suggests that
university performance has little, if any, consistent influence on university president
compensation. While these results indicate that Hypothesis 1 may be largely unsupported, it is
possible that they were influenced by the presence of outliers.
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Table 13, Panel B displays the standardized regression coefficients for the model that
includes all predictors in this study in one step, excluding outliers. The results in Table 13, Panel
B, Column 2 are fairly consistent with the results in Table 13, Panel A, Column 2. Graduation
rate (β = -.256, p = .008), average faculty salary (β = .218, p = .007), and average SAT score (β =
.364, p < .001) each remained statistically significant predictors of university president
compensation once outliers were removed. In addition, after the removal of outliers, university
ranking also became statistically significant (β = .147, p = .032). The results of the Time 2 to
Time 3 analysis with outliers removed, shown in Table 13, Panel B, Column 5, are inconsistent
with those shown in Table 13, Panel A, Column 5. Specifically, once outliers were removed,
endowment per FTE was not statistically significant (β = .132, p = .080), but average faculty
salary (β = .194, p = .014) and average SAT score (β = .195, p = .029) were.
Taken together, these results suggest that average faculty salary and average SAT score
are the only two university performance variables that have a consistent, statistically significant,
positive impact on university president compensation. The remaining university performance
variables have inconsistent or insignificant effects on university president compensation. The
impact of average faculty salary and average SAT score as compared to the other university
performance variables is also supported by the correlational findings as average faculty salary
and average SAT score had the two strongest sets of relations with university president
compensation. Thus, these analyses suggest limited support for Hypothesis 1.
The RCM results both before and after outlier removal are shown in Table 14, Panels A
and B, Columns 2 and 3. As can be seen, these results do not completely replicate the results
from the OLS analyses. Specifically, before outlier removal, only one university performance
variable had a statistically significant effect on university president compensation – endowment
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per FTE (b = .116, SE = .034, p < .01). After outlier removal, endowment per FTE (b = .134, SE
= .031, p < .01) and average faculty salary (b < .001, SE < .001, p < .05) both have a statistically
significant impact on university president compensation; however, the estimate for average
faculty salary is virtually zero (i.e., < .001). Thus, from a practical standpoint, it does not appear
to impact compensation. Taken together, these results do suggest a reliable effect of endowment
per FTE on compensation, yet the remaining university performance variables do not appear to
have any significant relation with future compensation. Therefore, although the specific variables
that are shown to influence compensation are not consistent between the OLS and RCM
analyses, the conclusion that Hypothesis 1 has limited support is consistent.
Research question 1. Research question 1 asked if there are differences in the strength of
the relation between university performance and university president compensation between
public and private universities. Table 15 displays the correlation matrix, as well as the means and
standard deviations, for public and private universities separately. The correlations for private
universities are below the diagonal and the ones for public universities are above the diagonal.
Considering private universities first, the results appear to be fairly consistent with the results for
the full sample. Specifically, all the university performance variables, except student-to-faculty
ratio, had a positive and statistically significant relation with university president compensation.
As previously stated, the negative association between student-to-faculty ratio and university
president compensation was expected. The results for public universities are similar, except that
none of the correlations between student-to-faculty ratio and university president compensation
were statistically significant. These correlational results suggest that the pattern of relations
between university performance and university president compensation are similar.
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Table 13, Panel A, Column 3 shows the standardized regression coefficients for private
universities for the Time 1 to Time 2 analysis, whereas Column 6 displays the results from the
Time 2 to Time 3 analysis. Considering the results in Column 3, there were two variables that
had a statistically significant effect on university president compensation – graduation rate (β = .247, p = .050) and university rank (β = .235, p = .043). However, the results in Column 6
indicate that only one variable, endowment per FTE (β = .252, p = .042), had a statistically
significant effect on university president compensation.
The results of the Time 1 to Time 2 and Time 2 to Time 3 analyses for private
universities after outlier removal are shown in Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6, respectively.
In the Time 1 to Time 2 analysis, graduation rate (β = -.285, p = .004), average faculty salary (β
= .278, p = .029), university rank (β = .195, p = .029), and average SAT score (β = .195, p =
.029) all had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation. The results
of the Time 2 to Time 3 analysis (Table 14, Column 6) indicated that endowment per FTE (β =
.195, p = .037) and university ranking (β = .249, p = .004) were the only two statistically
significant variables. Considering the results in Table 13, Panels A and B, suggests that
university rank has the strongest and most consistent effect on private university president
compensation.
The results of the analyses for public universities are displayed in Tables 13, Panel A and
B, Columns 4 and 7. Table 13, Panel A, Column 4 shows that only three-year default rate had a
statistically significant impact on university president compensation (β = -.270, p = .050) from
Time 1 to Time 2. This result was consistent even after outliers were removed (β = -.358, p =
.014; see Table 13, Panel B, Column 4). The Time 2 to Time 3 results, both including outliers
(see Table 13, Panel A, Column 7) and excluding identified outliers (see Table 13, Panel B,
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Column 7) indicated that none of the university performance variables have a statistically
significant impact on university president compensation.
Taken together, the results in Table 13, Panels A and B, for only private universities
(Columns 3 and 6), and only public universities (Columns 4 and 7) show that the majority of
university performance variables across all of the analyses do not have a positive, statistically
significant impact on university president compensation. However, it appears that university
performance has a stronger influence on university president compensation in private universities
than in public universities. That being said, it is important to note that there are only 98 public
university presidents including in the analyses; therefore, it is possible that statistically
significant effects were not observed due to low statistical power.
The relevant RCM analyses are displayed in Table 14, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 5
(private universities) and Columns 6 and 7 (public universities). These results also suggested that
the relation between university performance and university president compensation is stronger in
private universities than in public universities. Although endowment per FTE had a statistically
significant effect on compensation in private universities (before outlier removal: b = .172, SE =
.057, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .196, SE = .048, p < .01), no university performance
variables appeared to have an effect on public university president compensation.
Research question 2. Research question 2 asked how the different performance
dimensions varied in their prediction of university president compensation, and if these results
were consistent between private and public universities. The results from the full sample
indicated that average faculty salary (a measure of faculty quality) and average SAT score (a
measure of university selectivity) had the strongest effect on university president compensation
(see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5). However, there was another measure of
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selectivity, acceptance rate, that had little impact on university president compensation.
Therefore, to get a sense of how the various dimensions as a whole predicted university president
compensation, the average beta weight for each dimension was compared. The results were fairly
consistent across timepoints and considering the analyses with and without outliers. Specifically,
faculty quality had the strongest impact on university president compensation, followed by
selectivity, reputation, and academic and research performance (each with similar average beta
weights). Financial performance and academic and research quality had the weakest impact on
university president compensation. All effects were consistently positive, except for the effect of
academic and research performance, measured by graduation rate and three-year default rate,
which had a negative influence on university president compensation. According to this result,
universities where students are less likely to graduate and more likely to default on their student
loans compensate their presidents more highly.
For private universities, the strongest predictor was university ranking, which is a
measure of reputation (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns, 3 and 6). The results across
timepoints and with and without outliers were fairly consistent. Reputation had the strongest
effect on university president compensation, followed by faculty quality, then financial
performance. Academic and research performance, academic and research quality, and
selectivity had relatively weak effects on university president compensation.
Three-year default rate (a measure of academic and research performance) had the
strongest and most consistent impact on university president compensation for public universities
(albeit only for the Time 1 to Time 2 results; see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 7).
However, graduation rate, the other measure of academic and research performance had a small,
and statistically insignificant influence on compensation. Therefore, when averaging these
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effects, the influence of the academic and research performance dimension was diminished. In
fact, the dimension with the highest average beta weight was faculty quality; yet, the measure of
faculty quality, average faculty salary, did not have a statistically significant effect on university
president compensation in any of the analyses. Furthermore, considering the average beta
weights after outlier removal (see Table 13, Panel B, Columns 4 and 7), only faculty quality,
which was not statistically significant, is above .100, the remaining average beta weights range
from .081 (selectivity) to .006 (financial performance). This suggests that none of the university
performance dimensions have much of an effect on university president compensation. However,
as previously mentioned, this observation may be due to low statistical power.
Taken together, an examination of the average beta weights for the various dimensions of
university performance suggests that the different dimensions may have differing impacts on
university president compensation depending on the sample characteristics.
The RCM results for the full sample suggested that endowment per FTE, a financial
performance metric, was the only university performance variable with a statistically significant
effect on university president compensation. However, the other financial performance metric,
fundraising, was not statistically significant. That being said, even averaging their respective R2
values (see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 3), the financial performance dimension still
accounts for more variance in university president compensation than the remaining university
performance dimensions. This finding is consistent for private universities (see Table 14, Panels
A and B, Column 5). For public universities, none of the university performance variables in any
dimension had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation (see Table
14, Panels A and B, Column 7). Therefore, the relative impact of the dimensions is a moot point.
University non-performance institutional characteristics.
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Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that non-performance institutional characteristics
related to university size and complexity will have a positive relation with university president
compensation. Considering the correlations in Table 12, it appears that both university size
(measured by FTE enrollment) and university complexity (measured by Carnegie classification)
had a positive association with university president compensation, with rs ranging from .309 to
.338 (all p < .001). This provides initial support for the idea that university size and complexity
have a positive relation with university president compensation. Turning to the regression results
presented in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, it appears that university size had a
consistent, positive, and statistically significant impact on university president compensation,
whereas university complexity had no statistically significant impact on compensation. It is
possible that these results are due to the strong correlation between university size (FTE
enrollment) and university complexity (Carnegie classification), which ranges from r = .835 (p <
.001) to r = .838 (p < .001). Yet, the statistically significant effect of university size on university
president compensation suggests support for Hypothesis 2.
The RCM analyses shown in Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2 and 3, were consistent
with the OLS analyses. Specifically, FTE enrollment appeared to have a positive and statistically
significant effect on university president compensation (before outlier removal: b = .305, SE =
.066, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .298, SE = .061, p < .01). Thus, one can have more
confidence in the OLS results and the conclusion that there is a positive relation between
university size and complexity and university president performance.
Hypothesis 2 also stated that university size and complexity would account for more
variance in university president compensation than did university performance. The correlational
results were mixed in their support of this notion. Specifically, acceptance rate, average SAT
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score, average faculty salary, and graduation rate all had mean correlations with university
president compensation that were stronger than those of FTE enrollment and Carnegie
classification, whereas, student-to-faculty ratio, three-year default rate, fundraising, and
endowment per FTE had weaker mean correlations.
Table 16 presents the results of the R2 change when each category of variables was
entered into the model at step 2 (i.e., after all of the other predictors were entered in step 1). An
examination of these results (Table 15, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5) indicates that
university performance consistently accounts for more unique variance in university president
compensation than does university size and complexity, which suggests that this part of
Hypothesis 2 is not supported. However, it is important to note that the R2 change between
university performance and university size and complexity may not be comparable as university
performance includes nine variables whereas university size and complexity includes only two.
Therefore, the beta weights were also examined. Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2
and 5, suggest that university size has a stronger influence on university president compensation
than does university performance. Specifically, the beta weights for university size ranged from
.442 (p < .001) to .604 (p < .001), whereas the largest beta weight across all university
performance variables for either timepoint, including or excluding outliers, was -.256 (p = .008)
(see Table 13, Panel B, Column 2). This provides evidence in support of the second part of
Hypothesis 2; however, considering the R2 change and average beta weights together suggests
that there is inconclusive evidence to say that this portion of the hypothesis was supported (i.e.,
that non-performance institutional characteristics related to size and complexity would account
for more variance in university president compensation than does university performance).
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The RCM analyses, however, do suggest strong support for this notion. In fact, the R2
value for FTE enrollment (.045 both before and after outlier removal; see Table 14, Panels A and
B, Column 3) was higher than the largest R2 value for any of the university performance
variables. Furthermore, even the sum of all of the R2 values for university performance (a total of
nine variables) was less than the R2 value for FTE enrollment (one variable). Therefore, the RCM
results support Hypothesis 2.
Research question 3. Research question 3 asked if there was a relation between other
non-performance institutional characteristics and university president compensation. There were
two variables included in the analysis that could fit this description – institutional ownership and
religious orientation. Table 12 shows that there was no statistically significant relation between
ownership (private or public) and university president compensation. However, the standardized
regression coefficients in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, indicate that whether the
university is public or private had a significant impact on university president compensation with
βs ranging from .390 (p < .001) to .774 (p < .001). This is not surprising given that, as previously
reported in the sample descriptives section, private university presidents receive significantly
higher compensation than public university presidents. Turning to whether or not the institution
was religious, the correlations in Table 12 suggest that university presidents at religious
universities earn significantly less money than presidents at non-religious universities. This was
also supported by the beta weights in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2 and 5, which ranged
from β = -.170 (p < .001) to β = -.205 (p < .001).
The RCM results were consistent with the ones from the OLS analyses. The results in
Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 1 show that both institutional ownership and religious
orientation had a statistically significant impact on university president compensation. The effect
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on institutional ownership was positive, meaning that private university presidents received
higher compensation than public university presidents (before outlier removal: b = .579, SE =
.127, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = .402, SE = .123, p < .01). Religious orientation, as
anticipated, had a negative effect, such that university presidents at religious institutions received
lower compensation than their counterparts at non-religious institutions (before outlier removal:
b = -.263, SE = .075, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = -.262, SE = .074, p < .01).
Research question 4. Research question 4 asked if the relation between non-performance
institutional characteristics and university president compensation is different among private and
public universities. The correlational results followed a similar pattern in for private and public
universities. Both university size and complexity had statistically significant correlations with
university president compensation in private and public samples (see Table 15). This was also
supported by the regression coefficients in Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 3 and 6 as well as
4 and 7. Although there were some instances where the beta weights associated with these
variables were not statistically significant, these variables did generally appear to influence
university president compensation. In addition, religious orientation was examined in the private
university sub-sample; however, as public universities cannot be religiously oriented, the effects
of religious orientation were very similar to those of the full sample.
Results of the RCM analyses were consistent with the results of the OLS analyses. Nonperformance institutional characteristics did appear to have a significant influence on university
president compensation in both private and public institutions. Religious orientation also had a
negative, statistically significant impact on private university president compensation (see Table
14, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 6). Therefore, it appears that non-performance institutional
characteristics affect private and public universities in much the same way.
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Research question 5. Research question 5 was aimed at determining whether university
size or university complexity has a stronger influence on university president compensation, and
if this effect was the same across public and private universities. As previously stated, in the full
sample, university size had a statistically significant impact on university president
compensation, whereas university complexity did not (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2
and 5). However, this observation could have been due to the high degree of multicollinearity
between these two variables. In private universities, the effect of university size was positive and
statistically significant across all timepoints, both including and excluding outliers; however, the
effect of complexity was negative and only statistically significant at Time 1 after the removal of
outliers (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 3 and 6). This suggests that university size has a
greater influence on compensation than does complexity. However, an examination of the
correlations in Table 15 indicates that multicollinearity was also a problem in this sub-sample (rs
ranging from .784 to .785, ps < .001). Thus, no definitive conclusion can be drawn about the
relative influence of these variables. Interestingly, in public universities, where there was less
multicollinearity (although still potentially a problematic amount [rs from .592 to .617, ps <
.001]), the beta weights for university size and complexity are very similar (university size: βs
from .292, p = .028, to .387, p = .003; university complexity: βs from .320, p = .016, to .374, p =
.006). Therefore, it is possible that these two variables have a similar impact on university
president compensation and that this effect is consistent across private and public universities.
Results from the RCM analyses were similar to those from the OLS analyses (see Table
14, Panels A and B). Specifically, for the full sample and the private university sub-sample,
where multicollinearity was high, university size appeared to have a stronger impact on
university president compensation than did university complexity. The estimates ranged from
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.298 to .399, ps < .01 for university size and from -.132 to -.02, ns for university complexity (see
Table 14, Columns 2 – 5, Panels A and B). For the public university sub-sample, which had less
multicollinearity, the estimates for university size were similar to but higher than those for
university complexity (university size bs: .145 [before outlier removal] and .136 [after outlier
removal], ps < .05; university complexity: .126, p < .01 [before outlier removal] and .100, p <
.05 [after outlier removal]). Interestingly, for public universities, the R2 values for university
complexity were actually higher than those for university size (see Table 14, Columns 7, Panels
A and B). This suggests that, accounting for the other variables in the model, university
complexity explains more unique variance than does university size.
Taken together, these results suggest that more research is needed to disentangle the
differential effects of university size and university complexity on university president
compensation.
University president personal characteristics.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that university president personal characteristics would
be related to university president compensation. There were four such variables examined in this
study – tenure, whether or not the president held a Ph.D., gender, and prior presidential
experience. The results in Table 12 do not support Hypothesis 3. In fact, none of these variables
had a statistically significant association with university president compensation. The regression
results also provided little support for this hypothesis – statistically significant beta weights were
only noted at Time 1 after the removal of outliers (tenure: β = .116, p = .003; Ph.D. holder: β =
.073, p = .048; prior presidency: β = .080, p = .029; see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 2
and 5). Given that these effects were not noted at Time 2, it is likely that Hypothesis 3 is
unsupported.
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The RCM results were similar. Specifically, the only university president personal
characteristic that was statistically significant was tenure after outlier removal (b = .001, SE <
.001, p < .05; see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2). However, given that this estimate was
so small, it is unlikely that tenure has any practically significant effect on university president
compensation. The results of the OLS and RCM analyses, taken together, fail to support
Hypothesis 3.
Research question 6. Research question 6 asked how well university president personal
characteristics predicted university president compensation in comparison to non-performance
institutional characteristics related to university size and complexity. Given that there was
evidence to suggest that university performance and non-performance institutional characteristics
did have a significant positive effect on university president compensation, but there was no
evidence that personal characteristics had such an influence, one can conclude that university
president personal characteristics are poorer predictors than these other variables. This is given
further support by the results noted in Table 16, which show that university president personal
characteristics only account for a statistically significant amount of unique variance in one
instance – Time 1 to Time 2, excluding outliers, for private universities.
The RCM analyses also supported this notion (see Table 14, Panels A and B, Column 2
and 3). Although the R2 values for president personal characteristics were higher than many of
those of university performance combined, they were still less than the R2 values for endowment
per FTE. Therefore, one can conclude that university performance and non-performance
university institutional characteristics have a greater effect on university president compensation
than do university president personal characteristics.
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Research question 7. Research question 7 was aimed at determining if there were
differences in the relation between university president personal characteristics and university
president compensation for private and public universities. For both private and public
universities, the correlational results were largely similar to those of the full sample. Only one
variable – prior presidential experience – had a statistically significant relation with university
president compensation, and only for public universities (see Table 15). However, the regression
results were more mixed. In private universities, after the removal of outliers, tenure (β = .166, p
< .001) and whether or not the president held a Ph.D. (β = .084, p = .027) were both statistically
significant at Time 1 and Time 2 (see Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6). No statistically
significant effects of university president personal characteristics were observed for public
universities (see Table 13, Panels A and B, Columns 4 and 7). Taken together, this suggests that
university president personal characteristics may have some limited influence on university
president compensation in private universities, but not in public universities. However, as
previously noted, this may be due to lack of statistical power for public ones.
The RCM results, however, do not agree with the OLS results for private universities.
Specifically, they suggest that university president personal characteristics have no significant
effect on university president compensation for either private or public universities (see Table
14, Columns 4 – 7, Panels A and B).
Research question 8. Research question 8 was interested in differences between the
various dimensions of university president personal characteristics in their effect on university
president compensation. There was no evidence to support a relation between any of these
characteristics in the full sample or in public universities; therefore, any differences are likely to
be inconsequential. In private universities, there was evidence to suggest that tenure and whether
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or not the university president held a Ph.D. has an influence on their compensation. The variable
tenure falls into the tenure-related variables dimension, whereas educational degree (i.e., Ph.D.
holder) is included in the professional experience dimension. Therefore, these results suggest that
these two dimensions have a greater influence on compensation than variables in the
demographics dimension, such as gender, appear to have. That being said, prior presidential
experience was also included in the professional experience dimension and, in this study, it
appeared to have no significant effect on compensation. Taking this into account, as well as the
results in Table 13, Panel B, Columns 3 and 6, which show that tenure had a larger beta weight
than the Ph.D. holder dummy code, suggests that tenure-related variables likely have the
strongest impact on compensation, followed by professional experience and that demographics
are unlikely to play any significant role in the determination of compensation.
As previously mentioned, the RCM analyses found no evidence of any statistically and
practically significant effects of any of the university president personal characteristics examined
in either the full sample, private university sub-sample, or public university sub-sample.
Therefore, the RCM analyses suggest that any differences between the dimensions in terms of
their relative impact are likely to be inconsequential.
Summary.
University performance. The results of Part I indicate that there is little evidence that
overall university performance influences university president compensation. However, there is
evidence to suggest that specific metrics of university performance are linked to future university
president compensation. The specific metrics affecting private university president compensation
are different, however, when one considers the OLS results versus the RCM results.
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The OLS results suggest that average faculty salary and average SAT score have the
largest influence on university president compensation in the full sample of universities, that
university rank has the largest effect when only considering private universities, and that none of
the performance variables affect public university president compensation. Although the
conclusions drawn from the RCM results are comparable with the conclusions of the OLS
analyses for public universities, they contrast with the OLS results for private universities and for
the full sample. Specifically, the RCM results suggest that endowment per FTE influences
university president compensation in the full sample and in private universities, whereas the
remaining university performance metrics do not.
To make sense of these findings, one must consider the differences between the OLS
analyses and the RCM analyses. For instance, in this study, the OLS analyses were conducted
separately by timepoint. The RCM analyses, however, pooled data across years. Therefore, the
RCM analyses had a larger overall sample size, leading to decreased sampling error and more
statistical power. From a practical standpoint, this means because of the way the OLS and RCM
analyses were implemented in this study, the results from the RCM analyses are more likely to
be robust and reflective of the true underlying effect than the results from the OLS analyses.
Considering this, the main takeaway from this study regarding the relation between
university performance and subsequent university president compensation is that there is
evidence to suggest that endowment per FTE affects private university president compensation,
but there is little evidence to say that any university performance metric affects public university
president compensation.
Non-performance institutional characteristics. Results from the OLS and RCM analyses
largely agreed regarding the effect of non-performance institutional characteristics on university
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president compensation. University size, as measured by FTE enrollment, had a positive effect
on university president compensation at both private and public universities. Furthermore, this
variable accounted for more variance in university president compensation than all the university
performance variables combined. In addition, university complexity, as measured by a
university’s Carnegie classification, appeared to have a positive effect on university president
compensation at public universities. Regarding the other non-performance institutional
characteristics, institutional ownership was a significant predictor of university president
compensation in the full sample (i.e., private university presidents, on average, receive higher
compensation than public university presidents). Religious orientation of the university was also
a significant predictor of university president compensation in the full sample and in private
universities, with university presidents from religious institutions receiving less compensation,
on average, than those presidents from non-religious institutions.
President personal characteristics. For university president personal characteristics, the
OLS analyses and RCM analyses showed different results. The OLS analyses suggested that,
after outlier removal, university tenure and whether or not the president had a Ph.D. influenced
compensation for private university presidents; however, the RCM analyses showed that these
variables, and the remaining university president personal characteristics variables, had no effect
on university president compensation at either public or private universities. Given the larger
sample size for the RCM analyses, one can thus draw the conclusion that none of the university
president personal characteristics measured in this study have a significant effect on university
president compensation.
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Part II: Identified Gaps
Sample descriptives. Of the 403 university presidents included in the Part I analyses,
compensation component data were available for 395 (98%). Across the three timepoints
relevant in this study, the mean increase in total compensation was $34,495.18 (Mdn =
$12,974.00; SD = $386,095.71)16 and the mean relative increase in compensation was
43,503.78% (Mdn = 3.18%, SD = 1,061,219.42%). The average merit pay (i.e., increase from
prior year’s base salary) was $21,237.84 (Mdn = $10,327.00; SD = $51,202.56). In terms of the
percentage change from prior year’s base salary, the mean increase was 208,519.74% (Mdn =
2.85%; SD = 2,360,850.84%). The mean bonus across the three timepoints was $34,745.12 (Mdn
= $00.00; SD = $119,857.63), which, as a percentage of base salary, translates to a 21,887.98%
increase on average (Mdn = 00.00%; SD = 753,248.39%). Lastly, the average deferred
compensation, set aside (from here on, the term “deferred compensation” will refer to deferred
compensation, set aside) was $56,374.74 (Mdn = $25,500.00; SD = $94,069.78). As a percentage
of base salary, this corresponds to a mean of 17,142.02% (Mdn = 7.17%; SD = 567,502.94%).
The correlation matrix, depicted as Table 17, includes the mean and standard deviation for each
of the variables included in the analyses for Part II separated by timepoint.
Gap 1: The effect of university performance on the components of compensation.
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 suggested that university performance would have a positive
effect on each component of future compensation. In Part II, university performance was defined
as the change in university endowment per FTE. University president compensation was
measured as the change in total compensation. In addition, three specific components of total

16

The means and standard deviations provided throughout this section are very large. These numbers were
influenced by 14 individuals who received, in at least one time period, a compensation increase of over $1 million.
Therefore, the medians provided may be more informative of the typical compensation provided.
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compensation were examined – merit pay, bonus, and deferred compensation. All compensation
variables were also measured as a percentage of total compensation (for change in total
compensation) or a percentage of base salary (for merit pay, bonus, and deferred compensation).
An examination of the correlations in Table 17 shows that there were no statistically significant
correlations between change in endowment and any measure of compensation. This initial
evidence suggests that performance is unlikely to have an effect on compensation.
The RCM results for the effect of the change in endowment on each compensation
measure are presented in Tables 18 through 25. Model 1 in these tables includes only the control
variables used in the Part II analyses, whereas Model 2 includes the control variables as well as
change in endowment. Considering the change in total compensation first, the results indicated
that change in endowment had a positive and statistically significant effect on the change in total
compensation prior to the removal of outliers (b = .134, SE = .032, p < .01, see Table 18, Model
2, Panel A); however this effect disappeared after outliers were removed (b = .007, SE = .003,
ns, see Table 18, Model 2, Panel B). No statistically significant effects were noted for the relative
change in total compensation measure (see Table 19, Model 2, Panels A and B). This suggests
mixed support for the notion that university performance affects university president
compensation. However, it is possible that university performance has clearer effects on the
specific components of compensation.
Considering the raw metric of the compensation components first (see Tables 20, 22, and
24, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B), the results indicated that change in endowment had a
statistically significant and positive effect on merit pay prior to (b = .091, SE = .027, p < .01;
Table 20, Model 2, Panel A), and after (b = .053, SE = .006, p < .01; Table 20, Model 2, Panel
B), outlier removal. Thus, it seems that university performance does have an effect on the raw
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metric of merit pay. In addition, Table 24, Model 2, Panel B, indicates that change in endowment
had a positive and statistically significant effect on deferred compensation after the deletion of
outliers (b = .044, SE = .016, p < .01). However, there was no evidence to suggest that change in
endowment influences bonuses (see Table 22, Model 2, Panels A and B).
The results of the effect of change in endowment on the relative measures of the
compensation components are shown in Tables 21, 23, and 25, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B.
An examination of these tables shows that that there was no evidence that change in endowment
had an effect on any of these relative compensation component measures.
Taken together, it appears that Hypothesis 1 was supported for merit pay, received mixed
support for change in total compensation and deferred compensation, and was unsupported for
bonuses, the relative measure of total compensation, and the relative measures of all
compensation components.
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that university performance would have a greater
effect on bonuses than on merit pay. However, although a statistically significant effect of
university performance on the raw metric of merit pay was noted, no similar effect was noted for
bonuses. University performance also appeared to have no effect on the relative metrics of either
merit pay or bonuses. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was unsupported.
Research question 1. Research question 1 asked how the effect of change in endowment
on deferred compensation compared to its effect on merit pay and bonuses. An initial review of
the results in Tables 20, 22, and 24, Model 2, Panels A and B, suggests that the effect of change
in endowment on deferred compensation is likely to be weaker than that of merit pay, but
stronger than that of bonuses. To investigate this further, the respective R2 values for change in
endowment on merit pay, deferred compensation, and bonuses were examined. The R2 values for
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the effect of change in endowment on merit pay (before outlier removal: R2 = .014; after outlier
removal: R2 = .095), were larger than those for deferred compensation and bonuses (before
outlier removal: R2 = .001; after outlier removal: R2 < .001 for both deferred compensation and
bonuses). This, together with the results of Hypothesis 1, suggests that change in endowment
affects merit pay, but not the other components of compensation.
Gap 2: Reciprocal relations between university performance and university
president compensation.
Relation between compensation and subsequent university performance.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that university president compensation has a positive
effect on future university performance. An examination of the correlations in Table 17 indicates
that change in total compensation and relative change in total compensation had no statistically
significant effects on change in endowment. There were also no statistically significant relations
between the components of compensation (for both raw and relative metrics) and change in
endowment, with one exception. Time 1 and Time 2 deferred compensation values had a
statistically significant effect on change in endowment at Time 3 and Time 4, respectively.
However, these effects were inconsistent. The effect from Time 1 to Time 3 was negative (r = .159, p < .01), whereas the effect from Time 2 to Time 4 was positive (r = .109, p < .01). This
provides mixed support for Hypothesis 3 for the deferred compensation component of total
compensation and no support for the remaining compensation variables.
The RCM results are shown in Tables 26 through 33, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B.
As with the previous set of results, Model 1 in these tables includes only the control variables.
Model 2 includes the control variables and the relevant compensation variable. Considering
change in total compensation first, there was support for a statistically significant effect of
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change in total compensation on change in endowment both before and after outlier removal;
however the effect was in the opposite direction then was expected (before outlier removal: b = .187, SE = .032, p < .01; after outlier removal: b = -1.036, SE = .022, p < .01, see Table 26,
Model 2, Panels A and B). This suggests that increases in total compensation led to future
decreases in endowment. There was no evidence that relative change in total compensation
impacts changes in endowment (see Table 27, Model 2, Panels A and B).
Turning to the components of compensation, there was also no evidence to suggest that
any of these compensation components, either in their raw or relative form, had a statistically
significant effect on change in endowment (see Tables 28 – 33, Model 2, Panels A and B).
Considering these results along with the negative effects observed for changes in total
compensation suggests that Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Hypotheses 4 and 5. Hypotheses 4 and 5 made predictions about how the relations
between the components of compensation and change in endowment would vary in strength.
Because no statistically significant effects were noted for any of these components (see Tables
26 through 33, Models 1 and 2, Panels A and B), Hypotheses 4 and 5 are not supported and will
not be discussed further.
Changes in the relationship between performance and compensation over time.
Research question 2. Research question 2 asked if the strength of the relation between
university president compensation and university performance changes over time. To examine
this question a series of time by performance and time by compensation interactions were
examined. Statistically significant interactions would suggest that the relation between university
president compensation and university performance depended on the time period examined. The
results of these interactions are depicted in Model 3, Panels A and B of Tables 18 through 33.
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Across these 16 tables, only one statistically significant interaction was observed. Specifically,
there was a statistically significant, negative interaction between time and change in endowment
in the prediction of bonuses (before outlier removal: b = -1.066, SE = .396, p < .01; after outlier
removal: b = -.965, SE = .198, p < .01). This interaction was plotted and is displayed in Figure 5,
Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier removal). Figure 5 shows that changes in
endowment at Time 1 lead to larger bonuses at Time 2, but that this effect weakens for the
subsequent timepoint (change in endowment at Time 2 affecting bonuses at Time 3). However,
most university presidents did not receive a bonus (72% and 68% of the sample did not receive a
bonus at Time 2 and Time 3, respectively). With so few individuals receiving bonuses, it is
difficult to determine if the observed interaction is actually reflective of the true underlying
effects. Therefore, caution is warranted regarding the interpretation of the interaction. Taken
together, there is little conclusive evidence provided by this study that the relations between
university performance and university president compensation change over time.
Gap 3: Curvilinear relations between university performance and university
president compensation.
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 suggested that there would be a curvilinear relation between
university performance and future university president compensation. To evaluate this, two
additional models were examined. Model 4 in Tables 18 through 25, Panels A and B, included a
quadratic effect for university performance, while Model 5 in these tables included quadratic and
cubic terms. Considering change in total compensation first, one can see that although the
quadratic term was not statistically significant in Model 4 and Model 4 as a whole offered no
significant improvement over the linear model (shown in Model 2), Model 5, which included the
cubic term, did appear to be a more accurate depiction of the underlying effect. Specifically, the
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cubic term for change in endowment was statistically significant both before (b = -.007, SE =
.002, p < .01) and after (b = -.007, SE < .001, p < .01) outlier removal (see Table 18, Model 5,
Panels A and B). The plot of the cubic relation is shown in Figure 6, Panels A (before outlier
removal) and B (after outlier removal). This finding suggests that, at least for the raw metric of
change in total compensation, curvilinear relations may exist. No effects were found for relative
change in total compensation (see Table 19, Columns 4 and 5, Panels A and B).
Turning to the components of compensation, two additional observed effects were
noteworthy. Results indicated that changes in endowment had a statistically significant cubic
effect on merit pay before (b = -.006, SE = .002, p < .01) and after (b = -.023, SE = .002, p < .01)
outlier removal (see Table 20, Model 5, Panels A and B). This effect is depicted in Figure 7,
Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier removal). There was also a statistically
significant quadratic effect of changes in endowment on bonuses (before outlier removal: b = .069, SE = .033, p < .05; after outlier removal: b = -.067, SE = .016, p < .01); see Table 22,
Model 4, Panels A and B). Figure 8, Panels A (before outlier removal) and B (after outlier
removal) display a plot of this effect.
Although the observed curvilinear effects suggest some support for Hypothesis 6, an
examination of the figures for each of these three effects indicates that the results did not take the
expected form (which is depicted in Figure 2). Furthermore, no nonlinear effects were observed
for deferred compensation or any of the relative measures of the components of compensation
(see Tables 19, 21, 23 – 25, Models 4 and 5, Panels A and B). Taken together, these results
suggest that even though some nonlinear relations were observed, Hypothesis 6 was not
supported.
Summary.
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Effect of university performance on compensation components. In Part II of this study,
RCM results indicated that change in endowment did have a linear effect on merit pay (i.e.,
change in base salary) both before and after outlier removal. Results for the linear effect of
change in endowment on the remaining components of compensation were either inconsistent
(i.e., only observed before or after the removal of outliers – change in total compensation,
deferred compensation) or non-existent (bonuses, all relative measures of compensation).
Effect of compensation components on university performance. Results of the RCM
analyses suggested that none of the compensation variables, in either their raw or relative form,
had a statistically significant and positive effect on change in endowment. However, contrary to
expectations, there was evidence to suggest that increases in total compensation led to future
decreases in endowment.
Changes in the relation between university performance and university president
compensation over time. The results of the interaction analyses showed that time was a
significant moderator of the relation between change in endowment and bonuses. Specifically,
findings indicated that, at Time 1, changes in endowment had a positive effect on bonuses;
however, this effect was not observed at Time 2. However, the majority of university presidents
did not receive a bonus at either Time 1 or Time 2, which could have impacted the results. Thus,
overall, there was little conclusive evidence to suggest the relations between university
performance and university president compensation changed over time.
Curvilinear effects of university performance on compensation components. Consistent
(i.e., both before and after outlier removal) nonlinear effects of changes in endowment were
noted for three compensation variables. Specifically, a cubic effect was noted for changes in total
compensation and merit pay. A quadratic effect of changes in endowment was observed for
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bonuses. This is particularly interesting given that changes in endowment did not have consistent
linear effects on changes in total compensation or bonuses. However, these nonlinear effects did
not follow the expected pattern. Furthermore, there was no evidence of nonlinear effects of
changes in endowment on deferred compensation or on any of the compensation variables in
their relative form.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was two-fold. First, the goal of Part I was to conduct a
replication of previous research regarding the effect of university performance (and other
relevant variables) on university president compensation. Second, the goal of Part II was to
provide insight on several gaps that exist within the current literature on university president
compensation. In doing so, the hope was that this study would shed light on our current
understanding of the dynamics surroundings the various relations between university
performance and university president compensation. This, in turn, would add to our
understanding of how predictions based on theories typically used in the for-profit executive
compensation literature generalize to the nonprofit educational context. In particular, this study
explored predictions derived from agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
managerialism (e.g., Aoki, 1984; Herman, 1981), human capital theory (e.g., Agarwal, 1981;
Becker, 1962), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cardinal utility theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993), and
equity theory (Adams, 1965). In addition to the theoretical insight this study aimed to provide, it
also intended to address the ongoing controversy related to the high pay of university presidents
(see Dillon, 2004; Sonnenberg, 2017; Stripling & Fuller, 2011; Svluga, 2018) and provide
guidance to Boards and lawmakers.
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In the following sections, I will first review how the results of Part I compared to those
from the systematic review. Theoretical and practical implications of the results from Parts I and
II will then be discussed. Limitations and ideas for future research directions will be addressed
after the implications section. Lastly, a summary of the overall conclusions from this study will
be provided. Summaries of the results were provided on pages 148 – 150 (Part I results) and 157
– 158 (Part II).
Part I Results – Comparison to the Systematic Review
Results from Part I did somewhat correspond to those from the systematic review.
Specifically, both the systematic review and this study found that university performance had a
positive, but somewhat weak effect on university president compensation for the full sample and
for public universities. Both studies also suggested that the effect of university performance on
university president compensation is stronger in private universities than in public ones. Also, in
both studies, non-performance institutional characteristics related to size had a positive effect on
university president compensation at both private and public universities. Furthermore, the
results from the review and this study indicated that non-performance institutional
characteristics, especially university size, had a stronger effect on university president
compensation than either university performance or university president personal characteristics.
However, despite the general agreement on these findings, the effect of specific variables
that were shown to affect university president compensation differed. For instance, in the
systematic review, reputation and faculty quality were identified as the dimensions that had the
strongest relation with compensation; however, in this study, the RCM results indicated that
endowment per FTE (a measure of financial performance) was the university performance metric
with the largest effect, at least for the full sample and for private universities. Additionally, for
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private universities, size and complexity dimensions of the non-performance institutional
characteristics were both found to have a moderate effect on university president compensation
in the systematic review, yet, in Part I of this study, only university size had a significant effect.
There are a few potential explanations for these discrepancies. First, the results from the
systematic review and Part I of this study are not directly comparable. Conclusions from the
systematic review were drawn using correlations or other types of effect sizes (e.g., beta weights)
converted to correlation coefficients, whereas conclusions from Part I of this study were based
on regression coefficients from either OLS or RCM analyses. Indeed, if one were to ignore both
the OLS results and the RCM results, the correlations do suggest that university rank (a measure
of reputation) and average faculty salary (a measure of faculty quality) were more strongly
associated with university president compensation than was endowment.
Second, no exact estimates or determinations of statistical significance were made in the
systematic review. This also makes it difficult to compare those results to the ones in this study.
For instance, in the full sample, the approximate magnitude of the effect of reputation was
determined by nine effects and the magnitude of the effect of faculty quality was determined by
seven effects. With such small ks (and ns), it is possible that, had exact estimates and confidence
intervals been calculated, the results would have been statistically insignificant due to large
amounts of sampling error. Similarly, it is possible that the magnitude of the effect of the
financial performance dimension (which contained 27 effects), although smaller than that of
reputation and faculty quality, could have been statistically significant due to the estimate being
more precise and thus having a narrower confidence interval. If this were the case, the results of
the systematic review may have been more similar to the results of this study. In fact, although
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endowment did have a consistent effect, it was relatively weak, only uniquely accounting for, at
most, 3.5% of the variance in university president compensation.
Implications
The results from Part I and Part II of this study have several implications for research and
practice. Each of these implications will be detailed below, starting with those implications
related to research.
Research. The findings in Part I provide support for agency theory in the nonprofit
educational context. Board members have stated that they are concerned about financial stability,
the net tuition for students, and the decrease in state and federal funding (Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges & Gallup, 2018); large endowments can help
alleviate these concerns. Furthermore, university presidents are the financial managers and
primary fundraisers for universities (Cote, 1985); therefore, endowments may be more directly
under their control than metrics such as university ranking. Thus, it makes sense from an agency
theory perspective that endowments have stronger effects on university president compensation
than other performance metrics. However, endowment funds are also typically invested and, as
such, are subject to market forces (Association of Governing Boards of Universities and
Colleges, 2019). Therefore, they are not completely under the control of university presidents.
Considering this, the somewhat weak effect observed also makes sense in an agency theory
framework.
It is difficult to determine, however, if the results from Part II support predictions from
agency theory or not. For instance, there was limited evidence that change in endowments led to
changes in total compensation (i.e., an effect was detected prior to outlier removal, but was not
observed after outliers were removed). If compensation is based on performance, one would
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expect that this effect would be observed when focusing on the changes in these two variables.
However, as noted in Part I, the effect of performance on university president compensation was
only observed for private universities; therefore, it is possible that change in endowment does
have a consistent effect on change in total compensation in private universities, but that the
inclusion of public universities in this sample clouded the results.
When examining the effect that changes in endowment had on the specific components of
compensation, findings indicated that endowments had a consistent effect on merit pay, but not
on the other components of compensation. This was also not expected. Merit pay results in
permanent increases in base pay (Nyberg et al., 2016), and thus does not require continued
commitment to reaching goals to reap the benefits of the increase. It was anticipated that changes
in endowment would have a stronger effect on bonuses, as bonuses must be re-earned each year
(Nyberg et al., 2016; Park & Sturman, 2016) and are, therefore, more likely to be effective at
aligning the goals of university presidents to those of Board members. Yet, this effect was not
observed, which would seem to contrast with expectations based on the concepts of goal
alignment in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One potential explanation for this
finding is that most university presidents did not receive a bonus (72% and 68% of the sample
did not receive a bonus at Time 2 and Time 3, respectively). It is possible that those Boards
providing bonuses did award them based on performance, but that this effect was not detected
due to the overall lack of variance.
Both Parts I and II of this study are clear, however, in their support of the notion that nonperformance institutional characteristics related to university size/complexity influence
university president compensation. Furthermore, these variables have a stronger and more
consistent effect on total compensation and merit pay than does university performance. These
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findings suggest support for predictions based on the managerialist view (e.g., Aoki, 1984;
Herman, 1981). Recall that managerialism states that agency problems allow executives (in this
case, university presidents) to be more entrenched (i.e., powerful) (Combs & Skill, 2003). These
university presidents can use their power to influence the Board to base their compensation on
university size or complexity, which are less risky (i.e., result in less volatility in compensation)
than performance measures would be. Thus, based on this view, one would expect measures of
size and complexity to have a stronger association with university president compensation than
does university performance. Parts I and II of this study both found this to be the case, at least for
university size, as measured by FTE enrollment.
Taken together, these results regarding the relations between university performance and
university president compensation, as well as university size/complexity and university president
compensation are consistent with findings from the for-profit executive compensation literature.
The for-profit literature has also found that both organizational performance and organizational
size/complexity affect CEO compensation and that variables related to size, in particular, have a
greater effect on compensation than do university performance variables (Tosi et al., 2000).
Thus, it does appear that at least some theories and findings from the for-profit literature can
provide insight in nonprofit settings.
Part II of this study also has some specific implications related to its findings, or lack
thereof. Specifically, contrary to predictions based on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), no
positive effect of university president compensation on future university performance was
observed. In fact, the only observed statistically significant effect of university president
compensation on university performance was negative, suggesting that increases in total
compensation have a negative effect on future university performance. Although expectancy
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theory was used as the basis for the hypothesis, it can also lend insight to why the hypothesis
may not have been supported. Specifically, expectancy theory involves three perceptions which
make up the potential motivating force of a behavior. These perceptions are expectancy,
instrumentality, and valence (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Vroom, 1964). It is possible that these
perceptions are generally weak for university presidents. First, even though fundraising enhances
endowments and may be somewhat under the control of university presidents, they may feel that
they, themselves, are not ultimately able to affect the value of endowments (as endowments are
typically invested and thus subject to market forces; Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges, 2019), leading to weak expectancy perceptions. Second, university
presidents may not be aware of the effect that endowments have on their compensation, which
would result in weak instrumentality perceptions. Third, the association between endowments
and university president compensation may not be strong enough to incentivize engagement in
behaviors that would result in increases in endowments (e.g., more fundraising), resulting in
weak valence perceptions.
Of course, it may be that expectancy theory, which is typically drawn upon to explain
motivation and performance at the non-executive level, is not applicable for the executive
context. Indeed, given that endowments are not completely under the control of university
presidents, it may be unreasonable to think that expectancy perceptions could ever be strong.
Yet, if aligning performance to compensation does not result in future performance increases,
and, in fact leads to future declines in performance, it becomes difficult to justify performancebased compensation at the executive level and calls a main prediction of agency theory into
question.
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Part II also explored if the effects of university performance on university president
compensation and university president compensation on performance changed over time.
Agency theory suggests that the university performance to university president compensation
effect should remain stable over time, as it is necessary to continually ensure that the principal’s
and agent’s goals are aligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If this effect does remain stable,
expectancy theory would suggest that the compensation to performance effect should either
remain stable or increase over time because instrumentality perceptions would strengthen,
resulting in stronger motivation (Vroom, 1964). Managerialism, however, suggests that as
university presidents gain more power and become more entrenched, the effect of performance
on compensation should decrease (Aoki, 1984; Combs & Skill, 2003; Herman, 1981). This
would ultimately decrease instrumentality and valence perceptions and thus lead to weaker
compensation to performance relations in the future. This would occur because the motivational
force of engaging in performance-related behaviors would decrease as instrumentality and
valence perceptions became weaker (Vroom, 1964).
Only one statistically significant interaction between the relevant predictor and time was
observed (out of 16; 6%). Specifically, the performance to bonus compensation effect did
decrease at Time 2 as compared to Time 1. This finding could suggest support for managerialism
(i.e., first year bonus was based on performance, second it was based on some other factor
preferred by the presidents). However, as previously mentioned, most individuals did not receive
bonuses, therefore, it is possible that these results are not really reflective of an underlying
interaction. Thus, caution is warranted regarding this interpretation.
The remaining non-statistically significant interactions could suggest support for agency
theory. However, it is difficult to draw this conclusion as the lack of interaction effects may have
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also been due to low statistical power. Furthermore, given that only one variable – merit pay –
was determined to be affected by performance, non-statistically significant interactions for total
compensation and deferred compensation, while not providing support for managerialism, can
also not provide support for agency theory.
Part II also explored the potential for nonlinear effects of university performance on
university president compensation. Specifically, a cubic relation was expected with inflection
points representing minimum and maximum rewards. Minimum rewards were predicted due to
risk considerations from agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and
fairness considerations from equity theory (Adams, 1965). Maximum rewards were expected
based on predictions from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and cardinal utility
theory (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Larrick, 1993) as well as empirical evidence (Mitra et al., 2015).
In fact, prior research has found support for such a cubic relation for executive bonuses
(Indjejikian & Nanda, 2002). However, the results in this study did not take the expected form.
For instance, there did appear to be a quadratic effect of university performance on bonuses.
However, this finding is likely due to most university presidents not receiving bonuses. The two
cubic effects observed (on changes in total compensation and merit pay) also do not provide
support for the expected effects. The plots do appear to show clusters around 14.6 and 15.4 for
changes in total compensation, and 12.6 and 13.2 for merit pay, which could suggest a minimum
and maximum award as predicted and displayed in Figure 2. However, it is important to
remember that these numbers reflect the natural log transformation of changes in total
compensation and merit pay. Thus, the plots show much less variance around these numbers than
is observed in the non-transformed variables. The untransformed numbers are less likely to show
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such clear minimum and maximum clusters. Taken together, these results suggest that, for this
study, there was no support for the idea of minimum or maximum rewards.
Across both Parts I and II of this study, perhaps the most important implication is that
still very little is known about the dynamics surrounding the relation between university
performance and university president compensation. For instance, in Part I, endowment per FTE
and FTE enrollment accounted for, at most, 8% of the variance in university president
compensation. This means, that at least 92% of the variance in university presidents’
compensation remains unexplained. Furthermore, the lack of expected findings in Part II
suggests that more nuanced explanations of the relation between university performance and
university president compensation are no better at explaining the high levels of compensation
received by university presidents than basic linear predictions. Taken together, this suggests that
our current theories, or at least our empirical evaluations of them, are limited and thus inadequate
at explaining the high levels of university president compensation; therefore, more research is
needed. This will be addressed further in the limitations and future directions section.
Practical. From a practical standpoint, the most important findings were that increases in
university president compensation appeared to have a nil or negative effect on university
performance (as measured by endowments) and that none of the variables in either Parts I or II of
this study did a particularly good job explaining the high levels of university president
compensation. These findings have important implications for Boards and lawmakers.
First, Boards should consider that the high compensation awarded to university presidents
does not appear to be commensurate with the performance of these presidents. This is
problematic as it feeds the continued controversy surrounding the high levels of compensation
received by university presidents. It may also explain why university president compensation
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does not lead to future positive effects on performance – the portion of compensation that is
based upon performance is not large enough to be motivating. To combat these issues, Boards
should develop compensation policies that increase the degree to which compensation is
dependent upon reaching performance goals. Further, attaining these performance goals should
be as much under the control of universities presidents as possible. For instance, fundraising may
be more directly under the control of university presidents than endowments as endowments are
subject to market forces and used to fund ongoing university projects and initiatives (Association
of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 2019). Boards should also consider making
the process of university president performance evaluation and compensation determination
more transparent. This may not only help to quell the controversy surrounding the high levels of
pay received by university presidents, it may also provide clearer guidance to interested
researchers and the public about how compensation decisions are made. These suggestions are
particularly important for Boards of public universities in which compensation did not appear to
be determined by university performance.
Second, the results of this study suggest that laws limiting the amount of a public
university president’s compensation that can come from public funds (e.g., Fla. Stat., 2017) may
be justified. For public universities, university performance did not appear to influence university
president compensation and no positive effects of compensation were observed on future
university performance. Thus, it seems difficult to justify why large amounts of public funding
would go to compensating university presidents, rather than to programs that would better serve
students. Therefore, lawmakers in states without such regulations should consider adopting them.
This suggestion is not directly applicable for private universities; however, it may still be useful
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for decision makers at private universities to consider setting reasonable ranges in which
university presidents can be compensated.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with all studies, this study had limitations. Limitations affecting the obtained results,
as well as the interpretation of those results will be discussed in the following sections.
Suggestions for how these results could be addressed in future research will also be provided.
Four main sets of limitations may have influenced the obtained results – lack of statistical
power, multicollinearity as well as practical and conceptual overlap in Part I, the specific
operationalizations of variables used in the study, and the analytical approach utilized. Although
power analyses indicated that there was enough power to detect the expected effects in the full
sample of universities, the subsamples, particularly the public university subsample, may not
have had a large enough sample size to detect the expected effects in Part I. This was likely to a
be a greater issue for the OLS analyses, however, as the RCM analyses had double the amount of
observations. That being said, in Part II, although the analyses were not separated by group and
there were fewer predictors included in the models, there may still not have been enough
statistical power to detect interaction effects. Therefore, future studies could expand the number
of university presidents included in the sample. A large enough sample size would also allow
private universities to be broken down into religious and non-religious private institutions, as
suggested in the limitations and future research section of Study 1.
Multicollinearity and conceptual overlap among university performance variables also
represent potential limitations for Part I of this study. Although the vast majority of correlations
between the university performance variables were below .80 (Field, 2012) and variance
inflation factors (VIF) were all below 10 (Myers, 1990), all VIFs were also greater than 1

171
(Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990). This suggests that multicollinearity was present in Part I of this
study. Furthermore, some of the variables also practically and conceptually overlapped with
other included variables. For instance, although the correlations between fundraising and
endowment only ranged from .392 to .421, these two variables may, in practice, overlap quite a
bit. Increases in endowment are largely gained through fundraising and investment performance.
As university presidents have little control over the investment performance of endowment
funds, Boards are likely to tie university president more closely to endowment gains due to
fundraising. Therefore, although not all of the money gained through fundraising may become
part of a university’s endowment (e.g., it may be spent immediately, provided to a specific
department), increases in endowment due to fundraising are likely completely captured by the
fundraising variable. These issues are problematic as they can inflate standard errors, which
affects statistical significance tests (Field, 2012). Furthermore, multicollinearity as well as
practical and conceptual overlap can make it difficult to determine the relative importance of
each predictor (Field, 2012). Therefore, to better determine the importance of each predictor of
university president compensation, future research could employ relative weights analysis, which
can better determine predictor importance for correlated variables (Tonidandel & LeBreton,
2011). Future research could also leave out variables that are empirically, practically, or
conceptually redundant. To attempt to address these problems present in Part I, Part II only
included one university performance variable, thereby reducing these concerns.
It is also possible that the specific operationalizations of university performance in this
study did not include important measures of university performance that are used by Boards to
determine compensation. As noted in Chapter 2, there have been many different
operationalizations of university performance used in previous studies and there are additional
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operationalizations, such as the diversity of the student body and post-graduation earnings, that
Boards may consider. However, as there were already potential issues with multicollinearity, it
was not plausible to evaluate more predictors in this study. Related to this issue is the possibility
that universities do not make compensation dependent on the same university performance
metrics, which would make it appear as though there was no effect of university performance
when one does, in fact, exist. To attempt to mitigate the effects of this issue, the university
performance metrics used in this study, particularly in Part II, were metrics that Boards claim to
consider important. However, future research could address both of these limitations by
considering other operationalizations of university performance and creating a weighted
performance index based on what each university board claims to emphasize. This information is
not easily available but can sometimes be derived from information in Board meeting minutes
and other university sources.
The data analytic techniques and approaches used in this study also have limits. For
instance, RCM, just like OLS, assumes strict exogeneity. This assumption is violated (i.e.,
endogeneity is present) when one or more predictors is correlated with the error term at any time
period. There are several reasons why this may occur. For instance, omitted variables can cause
predictors to be correlated with the error term. This can lead to substantial bias in coefficient
estimates and, thus, also in statistical significance tests (Greene, 2003; McNeish & Kelley, 2019;
Woolridge, 2016). This bias makes it difficult to determine if the obtained results are actually
reflective of the underlying effect. One potentially important variable that was omitted from
many of the RCM analyses was a dummy code referring the specific timepoint. Although this
variable was included in the interaction analyses in Part II (see Model 3 of Tables 18 to 33), it
was not included in Models 1 or 2, or in any of the Part I analyses. Yet, this variable is likely to
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be correlated with one or more of the predictors and the dependent variable, especially as some
variables (e.g., endowment, compensation) tend to increase over time. In fact, when included as a
predictor, the time variable was statistically significant in the majority of instances (i.e.,
endowment and many of the compensation components increased over time; see Model 3 in
Tables 18, 20, and 26 – 33). Therefore, it is likely that its inclusion in Models 1 and 2 (as well as
Models 4 and 5 and the Part I analyses) would have impacted the obtained results. Therefore, to
attempt to address the omitted variable bias, future research should explicitly model this variable
(i.e., the dummy code for timepoint) to determine the extent to which it influences the coefficient
estimates of the other variables.
Another source of endogeneity in this study has to do with the dynamics of the relation
between university president compensation and university performance. To avoid violations of
strict exogeneity, predictors cannot be influenced by prior levels of an examined outcome
variables (Woolridge, 2016). In this study, however, that is exactly the type of dynamic
expected. This study proposed that university performance affects subsequent university
president compensation and that university president compensation affects subsequent university
performance. Stated differently, it was expected that changes in performance would affect
changes in compensation, that these changes in compensation would lead to changes in
performance, and so on. Thus, clearly, predictors in either equation (i.e., performance,
compensation) are influenced by prior levels of the relevant outcome (i.e., compensation,
performance). This causes the error term in one equation (e.g., the prediction of university
performance) to be correlated with future predictors in that equation (i.e., compensation).
Ultimately, this has the same effect that the omitted variable problem does - coefficient estimates
and statistical significance tests may be substantially biased (Woolridge, 2016). To address this
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issue, future research could consider using instrument variables and two-stage least squares
regression, which is a common technique to address exogeneity violations (e.g., Floyd, 2013;
Woolridge, 2013).
The specific approach to testing the hypotheses also has limitations. For instance, in Part
I, several of the research questions involved determining if there were differences between public
and private universities. To make these determinations, I looked to the statistical significance of
the various predictors included in the analyses. This approach did suggest differences between
public and private universities, however, comparing results of statistical significance tests can be
misleading, especially when sample sizes are not equal. Therefore, to better assess if differences
exist between public and private universities, future research should either examine whether
institutional ownership (public or private) interacts with each independent variable to predict
university president compensation. Such a test is termed a Chow test (Chow, 1960; Woolridge,
2012).
It is also possible that the specific lags that I used did not adequately reflect the
complexity of the underlying relations. For instance, I examined the effect of university president
compensation on university performance with a two-year lag (e.g., university president
compensation at Time 1, university performance at Time 3). This two-year lag was used to allow
time for policies a university president may have put into effect the year of their compensation
increase to have an effect. However, it is possible that these effects take longer to go into effect,
which would mean that a longer lag is necessary. Stated differently, university performance at
Time 2 may be affected by university president compensation (and other variables) that occurred
more than two years prior if the effects of compensation take longer than two years to be fully
realized. To address this issue, future research should consider using more years of data as well
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as analytical approaches that include lagged values of the dependent variable as predictors (e.g.,
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model).
In addition, in this study, the university performance to university president
compensation and university president compensation to university performance effects were
examined separately. Thus, the causal inferences that can be made about any observed effects are
limited. Given that few effects were actually observed in Part II, this may be a moot point;
however, future research could use Bayesian estimation to better test the cross-lagged effect that
was hypothesized and allow causal inferences (Schuurman, Ferrer, De Boer-Sonnenschein, &
Hamaker, 2016).
It is also possible that the findings that were obtained in this study were not due to the
theoretical explanation provided. Some could argue that the weak effect of university
performance could be expected due to the intrinsic motivation of the university presidents (Bai,
2014; Handy & Katz, 1998; Jobome, 2006). Recall that this argument states that nonprofit
university presidents choose to work in a nonprofit setting and, thus, to receive lower
compensation, because they are intrinsically motivated. If accurate, then it may not be necessary
to incentivize performance because these presidents need no incentive. On its face, this argument
may explain why there was no effect of university performance on university president
compensation observed for public universities. However, one could also make the argument then
that, if these presidents are intrinsically motivated, there is really no need to provide such high
compensation and that this money would be better allocated toward student programs.
Potentially more reasonable explanations for the lack of effect noted for public universities are
low statistical power (discussed above) or that compensation is provided with no performance
justification (at least not considering the variables used in this study). To explore these issues
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further though, future researchers could survey university presidents at public and private
universities to determine if there are substantive differences in the levels of intrinsic motivation.
If the data could be obtained, it would also be interesting to determine if there are differences in
intrinsic motivation between private university presidents at religious and non-religious
institutions.
Regarding the noted effect of non-performance institutional characteristics related to
university size and complexity, one cannot be sure, based on the analyses in this study, if the
relation between university size and university president compensation is due to entrenchment as
predicted by managerialism (Aoki, 1984; Combs & Skill, 2003; Herman, 1981) or due to some
other factor. To provide a better test of this, future research should examine how the relation
between these variables and university president compensation evolves over time (and include
more time periods than the two utilized in this study). If the relation increases over time, the
entrenchment hypothesis would receive greater support.
Conclusion
Part I of this study attempted to replicate the results of the systematic review. Part II
examined additional hypotheses and research questions aimed at filling gaps that exist in the
nonprofit educational context (as well as the for-profit context). Limitations notwithstanding, the
results of this study do provide some insight on the dynamics of the relation between university
performance and university president compensation. In fact, three overarching conclusions can
be drawn. First, the effect of university performance on university president compensation
appears to be weak (for private universities) or non-existent (for public universities). Second,
university president compensation appears to have a negative effect, if any, on future university
performance. Third, overall, the results indicated that current theories and empirical evaluations
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cannot adequately explain how university president compensation is determined. Therefore, it
appears that the continued controversy surrounding university president compensation is
justified.
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Table 1
Predictors Examined in the Executive Compensation Literature
Predictor
Example
Theories/perspectives
operationalizations
utilized
Performance
Accounting performance
Agency theory
(e.g., return on equity,
return on assets), market
performance (e.g., stock
performance, dividends)
CEO behavior

Size and complexity

CEO Personal
characteristics
CEO role characteristics
Governance
influences/failures
Labor market influences

Research and development
intensity, invention
resonance, science
harvesting
Number of employees,
total assets, sales

Agency theory

Level of education, firm
tenure, job tenure
Hierarchical rank in
organization
CEO duality, tenure, Board
size, Board independence

Human capital theory

Industry pay level, ratio of
external hires
Equity considerations
Compensation of
individuals on
compensation committee
* Denotes that the study is a meta-analysis.

Managerialism, human capital
theory

Tournament theory, social
norms
Agency theory, Managerial
power theory
Neoclassical labor economic
theory
Social comparison theory

Example studies
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003),
Boschen, Duru, Gordon, and Smith
(2003), Garen (1994), Hartzell Jay and
Starks Laura (2003), Leone, Wu, and
Zimmerman (2006), Nyberg et al.
(2010), Tosi et al. (2000)*
Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia (2006)

Boyd (1994), David, Kochhar, and
Levitas (1998), Gerhart and Milkovich
(1990), Gray and Cannella (1997),
Ingham and Thompson (1995), Tosi et
al. (2000)*
Agarwal (1981), Combs and Skill
(2003), Gerhart and Milkovich (1990)
Lazear and Rosen (1981)
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton
(1998), Deutsch (2005)*, van Essen et
al. (2015)*
Fulmer (2009)
O'Reilly et al. (1988)
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Table 2
Predictors Examined in the University President Compensation Literature
Predictor
Example
Theories/perspectives
operationalizations
utilized
University performance
Endowment, alumni giving Agency theory, organizational
rate, graduation rate,
control theory,
student/faculty ratio,
faculty salaries, ranking,
acceptance rate
University size and
Enrollment, expenditures,
Managerial power theory,
complexity
revenue, Carnegie
theory of managerial
classification
capitalism, segmented labor
market theory, functional
theory of compensation
University president
Gender, age, tenure,
Human capital theory, supplypersonal characteristics
highest degree, area of
side theory of wage
study
determination, labor theory

Example studies
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009),
O’Connell (2005), Pati and Lee
(2016), Tang et al. (2000)

Galle and Walker (2014), Gordon and
Fischer (2014), Huang and Chen
(2013), Pfeffer and Ross (1988)

Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett and
Sorokina (2005), Huang and Chen
(2013), Sorokina (2003)
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Table 3
Performance Dimensions and Measures
Performance (and dimensions)
• Financial Performance
• Alumni giving rate
•
•
•

Moody’s bond rating
Cost efficiency
Endowment

•
•
•

Equity ratio17
Fundraising/gifts
Government grants

•
•
•
•
•

Grants received
Gross margin18
Investment revenues/returns
Operating surplus
Other revenues (not from tuition, grants,
private contributions, or investments)
• Risk
• Short-term financial risk
• Total assets
• Total liability
• Academic and Research Performance
• Graduation rate

17
18

Defined as net assets divided by total assets (Cheng, 2014)
Defined as revenue minus expenses (Langbert, 2006).

Sample Studies
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013),
Sorokina (2003)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005)
Pati & Lee (2016)
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014),
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006),
Pati & Lee (2016), Saunders (2007)
Cheng (2014)
Bai (2014), Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Galle & Walker (2014), Pati &
Lee (2016)
Galle & Walker (2014)
Bai (2014)
Langbert (2006)
Bai (2014), Galle & Walker (2014)
Cheng (2014)
Bai (2014)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005)
Galle & Walker (2014), Gordon & Fischer (2014)
Galle & Walker (2014)
Gordon & Fischer (2014), (Langbert (2006), Pati & Lee (2016)
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•

Performance (and dimensions)
Retention rate

Sample Studies
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Langbert (2006),
Langbert & Fox (2013), Sorokina (2003)

•

Academic and Research Quality
• Academic support expenses
• Faculty resource rank
• Instructional and research expenses
• Research and development expenditures
• Student/faculty ratio
• Proportion of classes with < 20 students
• Proportion of classes with > 50 students
• Faculty Quality
• Faculty salaries
•

•

Reputation
• Number of applicants
• Peer assessment score
• Princeton review’s best colleges
• Ranking
Selectivity
• Acceptance rate
•
•
•
•

Admission rating
Freshman in top of high school class
Percentage of students who graduated in the
top 10% of their high school class
SAT scores (including average SAT scores,
25th percentile SAT, 75th percentile SAT,
25th percentile SAT Math, 75th percentile

Cheng (2014)
Langbert (2006)
Cheng (2014), Gordon & Fischer (2014)
Ehrenberg et al. (2001)
Langbert (2006), He & Callahan (2017)
Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013)
Langbert (2006)
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et al.
(2001), Galle & Walker (2014), Monks (2004), O’Connell (2005),
(Pati & Lee (2016), Saunders (2007)
Cheng (2014)
Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013)
He & Callahan (2017)
Bai (2014), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Saunders
(2007), Tang et al. (2000)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017),
Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013)
He & Callahan (2017)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005)
Parsons & Reintenga (2013)
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014),
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017), Huang & Chen
(2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Parsons &
Reitenga, Sorokina (2003), Tang et al. (2000)
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Performance (and dimensions)
SAT Math, 25th percentile SAT Verbal,
75th percentile SAT Verbal
• Student quality
• Other
• Environmental sustainability score
• Social sustainability score
• Student service expenses

Sample Studies

He & Callahan (2017)
Pati & Lee (2016)
Pati & Lee (2016)
Cheng (2014)
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Table 4
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics
Institutional Characteristics (and dimensions)
Studies
• Size
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014),
• Enrollment
Ehrenberg et al. (2001), Galle & Walker (2014), He & Callahan (2017),
Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks
(2004), O’Connell (2005), Parsons & Reintenga (2013), Saunders (2007),
Tang et al. (2000)
Cheng (2014)
• Institutional support expenses
Gordon & Fischer (2014)
• Administration expenditures
Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017), Tang et al. (2000)
• Number of employees
Langbert (2006), Tang et al. (2000)
• Total expenditures
Gordon & Fischer (2014)
• Other expenditures
Bai (2014), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013),
• Total revenue
Monks (2004)
Bai
(2014), Banker et al. (2009), Saunders (2007), Tang et al. (2000)
• Tuition revenue
O’Connell (2005)
• Number of administrators
• Complexity
Huang & Chen (2013)
• Number of degree-granting
programs
Bai (2014), Banker et al. (2009), Huang & Chen (2013), He & Callahan
• Type of university/Carnegie
(2017), Langbert (2006), Parsons & Reitenga (2013), Pfeffer & Ross (1988),
classification
Saunders (2007), Tang et al. (2000)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), He & Callahan (2017), Sorokina (2003)
• University tier
• Other
Cheng (2014)
• % of aliens enrolled
Cheng (2014)
• % of students who receive
financial aid
Cheng (2014)
• % of students who receive grant
aid
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Institutional Characteristics (and dimensions)
Studies
Cheng (2014)
• Average graduate tuition
Langbert (2006), Tang et al. (2000)
• Geographic location
Saunders (2007)
• Member of the Council for
Christian Colleges and
Universities
Tang et al. (2000)
• Presence of business school
Tang et al. (2000)
• Presence of law school
Tang et al. (2000)
• Presence of medical school
Cheng (2014)
• Ratio of administrative staff
• Ratio of instructional and research Cheng (2014)
staff
Galle & Walker (2014), Langbert (2006), Langbert & Fox (2013), Saunders
• Religious affiliation
(2007)
Langbert
& Fox (2013)
• Size of surrounding community
Langbert & Fox (2013), He & Callahan (2017), Tang et al. (2000)
• Year the university was founded
Gordon & Fischer (2014)
• Tuition cost
Gordon & Fischer (2014)
• Tuition discount rate (what
students actually pay for tuition)
• Net tuition cost
O’Connell (2005)
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Table 5
Human Capital and Personal Characteristics
Personal Characteristics (and dimensions)
• Demographics
• Age
•

Gender

• Marital status
• Race
• Professional Experience
• Field of highest degree
• J.D. degree holder
• J.D., M.D., or other professional
degree
• Law, business, or economics
degree
• Past experience as a tenured
professor
• Past experience in educational
administration
• Ph.D. holder
• Prior presidency
• Tenure/Length of Experience
• Aggregate experience
• Job tenure
•

Number of working years

Studies
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Ehrenberg et al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017),
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004)
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et
al. (2001), He & Callahan (2017), Huang & Chen (2013), Langbert (2006),
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), O’Connell (2005), Pfeffer & Ross
(1988), Saunders (2007), Sorokina (2003)
Monks (2004)
Cheng (2014)
Monks (2004)
Banker et al. (2009)
He & Callahan, (2017)
Bartlett & Sorkina (2005)
Banker et al. (2009)
Banker et al. (2009)
Cheng (2014)
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014), Ehrenberg et
al. (2001), Monks (2004)
Banker et al. (2009)
Banker et al. (2009), Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), He & Callahan (2017),
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), Pati & Lee (2016), Sorokina (2003)
Banker et al. (2009)
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Personal Characteristics (and dimensions)
• Seniority
• University tenure
• Years of experience at prior
presidency
• Years on faculty before becoming
president
• Other Personal Characteristics
• Alumni status
• Hired from outside academia
• In their first year as president
• In their last year as president
• Interim president
• Internal hire
• Listed on Who’s Who
• Member of an external Board
• Member of clergy
• Performance at past university

Studies
Ehrenberg et al. (2001)
Banker et al. (2009)
Ehrenberg et al. (2001)
Monks (2004)

Bartlett & Sorokina (2005), Cheng (2014)
Monks (2004)
Cheng (2014), He & Callahan (2017)
Bartlett & Sorokina (2005)
Cheng (2014)
Langbert & Fox (2013), Monks (2004), Pfeffer & Ross (1988)
Saunders (2007), Sorokina (2003)
Monks (2004)
Ehrenberg et al. (2001)
Banker et al. (2009)
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Table 6
Search Strategy
Database
ABI/INFORM Complete
Academic Search Complete
Business Source Complete
Education Research Complete
ERIC
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
PsycInfo
ScienceDirect
Google Scholar

Keywords

Additional Search Restrictions
Results limited to journals, working
papers, reports, dissertation, and
conference papers
(“university” OR “college” OR N/A
“higher education”) AND
N/A
“president” AND
Results limited to journals and
(“compensation” OR
conference papers
“salary” OR “salaries” OR
N/A
“pay”)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Results Returned
58
46
30
155
275
104
24
11
~1.5 million

203
Table 7
Summary of the Results by Dimension for All Universities

Dimension

Total
number
of effect
sizes

Number of
positive
effect sizes

University Performance
Academic and Research
Performance
Academic and Research
Quality
Faculty Quality
Financial Performance
Reputation
Selectivity
Other

81
7

57 (70%)
4 (57%)

8

5 (63%)

Non-Performance
Institutional
Characteristics Related to
Size and Complexity
Size
Complexity
Other
Religiously affiliated
Demographics
Gender (male)
Age
Professional experience
Prior presidency
Tenure
Other
Alumni status

Number of positive
effect sizes that were
statistically
significant

Number of
negative effect
sizes

Panel A: University Performance
35 (67%)*
22 (27%)
1 (25%)
2 (29%)

Number of
negative effect
sizes that were
statistically
significant

Approximate magnitude
of results based on
standardized effect sizes

8 (36%)
0 (0%)

weak positive
weak positive

2 (67%)

weak to moderate positive

1 (100%)
3 (33%)
0 (0%)
1 (25%)
1 (50%)

moderate to strong positive
nil to weak positive
moderate positive
weak positive
nil to weak positive

60

6 (86%)
5 (100%)*
1 (14%)
17 (63%)
8 (53%)*
9 (33%)
8 (89%)
6 (75%)
1 (9%)
14 (78%)
9 (69%)*
4 (22%)
1 (33%)
1 (100%)
2 (67%)
Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics
47 (78%)
33 (73%)*
12 (20%)

5 (42%)

weak to moderate positive

34
25
25
6

31 (91%)
15 (60%)
9 (36%)
0 (0%)

0 (0%)
5 (50%)
9 (56%)
6 (100%)

moderate positive
weak positive
nil
weak to moderate negative

12
2

8 (67%)
2 (100%)

3 (43%)*
1 (100%)*

4 (33%)
0 (0%)

1 (25%)
NA

nil to weak positive
weak positive

6
13
11
2

6 (100%)
10 (77%)
5 (45%)
1 (50%)

2 (40%)*
6 (75%)*
4 (80%)
0 (0%)

0 (0%)
3 (23%)
6 (55%)
1 (50%)

NA
0 (0%)
2 (40%)*
0 (0%)

weak positive
nil to weak positive

7
27
9
18
3

3 (75%)*

3 (38%)

25 (83%)*
2 (6%)
7 (50%)*
10 (40%)
7 (78%)
16 (64%)
NA
6 (100%)
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics

nil to weak positive
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Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of
effect sizes.

205
Table 8
Summary of the Results by Dimension for Public Universities
Dimension

Total
number of
effect sizes

Number of
positive
effect sizes

University Performance
Academic and
Research Performance
Academic and
Research Quality
Faculty Quality
Financial Performance
Reputation
Selectivity
Other

30
3

18 (60 %)
1 (33%)

4

2 (50%)

Non-Performance
Institutional
Characteristics Related
to Size and Complexity
Size
Complexity
Other
Religiously affiliated

15

Demographics
Gender (male)
Age
Professional Experience
Prior presidency
Tenure
Other
Alumni status

2
7
5
8
1

Number of positive
effect sizes that
were statistically
significant

Number of
negative
effect sizes

Panel A: University Performance
11 (61%)
10 (30%)
0 (0%)
1 (33%)
2 (100%)

2 (50%)

1 (50%)
1 (100%)
1 (50%)
5 (71%)
3 (43%)
1 (14%)
4 (80%)
2 (50%)
1 (20%)
5 (63%)
3 (60%)
3 (38%)
0 (0%)
NA
1 (100%)
Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics
12 (80%)
8 (67%)
2 (13%)

11
9 (82%)
6 (67%)
1 (9%)
4
3 (75%)
2 (67%)
1 (25%)
9
2 (22%)
0 (0%)
7 (78%)
No relevant effect sizes
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics
3
3 (100%)
No relevant effect sizes
2
3
4
1

Number of
negative effect
sizes that were
statistically
significant

2 (100%
0 (0%)
1 (25%)
0 (0%)

Approximate magnitude of
results based on standardized
effect sizes

3 (30%)
0 (0%)

nil to weak positive
weak positive

1 (50%)

nil to weak positive

1 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (33%)
0 (0%)

nil to weak positive
weak negative to weak positive
moderate positive
weak positive
nil

0 (0%)

moderate positive

0 (0%)
0 (0%)
1 (14%)

moderate positive
moderate positive
nil to weak negative

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

NA

1 (50%)
NA
1 (100%)
NA

0 (0%)
3 (100%)
3 (75%)
1 (100%)

NA
0 (0%)
1 (33%)
0 (0%)

weak positive

weak positive
nil to weak negative
nil
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Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of
effect sizes.
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Table 9
Summary of the Results by Dimension for Private Universities
Dimension

University Performance
Academic and Research
Performance
Academic and Research
Quality
Faculty Quality
Financial Performance
Reputation
Selectivity
Other
Non-Performance
Institutional
Characteristics Related to
Size and Complexity
Size
Complexity
Other
Religiously affiliated

Total
number of
effect sizes

39
3

Number of
positive effect
Number of
Number of positive
sizes that were
negative effect
effect sizes
statistically
sizes
significant
Panel A: University Performance
29 (74%)
16 (67%)*
10 (26%)
3 (100%)
1 (33%)
0 (0%)

2
4
16
4
9
No relevant effect sizes
36

20
16
13
5

Number of
negative effect
sizes that were
statistically
significant

Approximate magnitude
of results based on
standardized effect sizes

4 (40%)
NA

weak positive
weak positive

1 (50%)

NA*

1 (50%)

1 (100%)

nil to weak positive

4 (100%)
8 (50%)
4 (100%)
8 (89%)

3 (100%)*
2 (33%)*
4 (100%)
5 (71%)*

0 (0%)
8 (50%)
0 (0%)
1 (11%)

NA
3 (38%)
NA
0 (0%)

strong positive
nil to weak positive
moderate positive
weak positive

Panel B: Non-Performance Institutional Characteristics
29 (81%)
19 (70%)
7 (19%)

3 (43%)

moderate positive

0 (0%)
3 (50%)
5 (83%)
4 (80%)

moderate positive
moderate positive
weak positive
weak to moderate negative

19 (95%)
16 (89%)*
1 (5%)
10 (63%)
3 (33%)*
6 (38%)
7 (54%)
7 (100%)
6 (46%)
0 (0%)
NA
5 (100%)
Panel C: President Personal Characteristics

Demographics
Gender (male)
8
4 (50%)
2 (66%)*
4 (50%)
1 (25%)
nil
Age
2
2 (100%)
0 (0%)*
0 (0%)
NA
weak positive
Professional experience
Prior presidency
4
4 (100%)
1 (33%)*
0 (0%)
NA
weak positive
Tenure
8
8 (100%)
4 (67%)*
0 (0%)
NA
weak positive
Other
Alumni status
1
1 (100%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
NA
weak positive
Note. *indicates the percentage is based on the number of effect sizes for which statistical significance information was available rather than the total number of
effect sizes.
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Table 10
Operationalizations of Compensation in Prior Studies
Article
1. Bai (2014)
2. Banker et al. (2009)
3. Bartlett and Sorokina (2005)
4. Cheng (2014)
5. Ehrenberg et al. (2001)
6. Galle and Walker (2014)
7. Gordon and Fischer (2014) 4
8. He and Callahan (2017)
9. Huang and Chen (2013)
10. Hunt et al. (2019)
11. Langbert (2006)
12. Langbert and Fox (2013)
13. Monks (2007)
14. O'Connell (2005)
15. Parsons and Reitenga (2014)
16. Pati and Lee (2016)
17. Pfeffer and Ross (1988)
18. Saunders (2007)
19. Sorokina (2003)
20. Tang et al. (1996)
21. Tang et al. (2000)
22.Tang et al. (2004)
Sum

President
Salary

President
Benefits

2

X

President
Salary +
Benefits

President
Total Cash
Total
Salary + Bonus Compensation Compensation
X1

X

X3

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X2
X5

X6
X

X7

1

X9
X9
5

X
X
X

10

X
X
2

4

X
X
X
9

Notes. Includes “all salaries, fees, bonuses, and severance payment” (Bai, 2014, p. 4); No results reported. The authors stated that they used this as a sensitivity
analysis; 3Includes “all salaries, fees, bonuses, and severance payment” (Bartlett & Sorokina, 2005, p. 58); 4Compensation is never defined; 5Private university
compensation was defined as salary plus benefits; 6Public university compensation included salary, benefits, deferred compensation, and bonuses; 7The authors
specified that total compensation includes salary, bonus, and deferred compensation; 9The authors specified that this included salaries, fees, bonuses, and
severance payments.
1

2
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Table 11
Study Variable Information
Variable
Total Compensation

Change in Total Compensation

Merit Pay

Bonus

Deferred Compensation, Set Aside

Endowment per FTE
Change in Endowment per FTE

Fundraising

Description
Natural log of all compensation provided to the
university president. Does not include deferred
compensation, set aside, or retirement
compensation
Natural log of the difference between current year’s
total compensation and previous year’s total
compensation; also calculated as the percentage
increase in total compensation from previous year
Natural log of the difference between current year’s
base salary and previous year’s base salary; also
calculated as a percentage of base salary
Natural log of bonuses and incentive compensation
provided to university president; also calculated as
a percentage of base salary
Natural log of deferred compensation that is set
aside for the university president to be paid out in
future years; also calculated as a percentage of
base salary
Natural log of the university’s endowment per FTE

Data source
CHE

Dimension
Compensation

CHE

Compensation

CHE

Compensation

CHE

Compensation

CHE

Compensation

IPEDS

UP: Financial
performance
UP: Financial
performance

Natural log of the difference between current year’s IPEDS
endowment per FTE and previous year’s
endowment per FTE
Natural log of a university’s reported private gifts
IPEDS

UP: Financial
performance
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Variable
Three-year Cohort Default Rate

Graduation Rate

Student to Faculty Ratio

Average Faculty Salary

Description
Data source
The percentage of students in a cohort that default
College Scorecard
on certain Federal loans within three years of
entering repayment; this metric was reverse scored
in the analyses.
Percentage of cohort that graduates within 150% of IPEDS
the normal time.
Total FTE students divided by total FTE faculty
(excludes students and faculty exclusively
associated with graduate and/or professional
degree programs)
Average full-time faculty salary earned per month

U.S. News and World Report Ranking Coded as 0 = unranked, 1 = ranked
Acceptance Rate
Number of admitted students divided by number of
applicants; this metric was reverse scored in the
analysis
SAT Average
Average SAT equivalent score for all admitted
students
Enrollment
Natural log of the university’s full-time equivalent
(FTE) enrollment
Carnegie Classification
Coded as 0 = Baccalaureate/Associate’s universities
or Associate’s colleges, 1 = Baccalaureate
university, 2 = Master’s university, 3 =
Doctoral/Professional university, 4 = Doctoral
university – High research activity, 5 = Doctoral
university – Very high research activity
Religion
Coded as 0 = not religious, 1 = religious

IPEDS

Dimension
UP: Academic and
research
performance
UP: Academic and
research
performance
UP: Academic and
research quality

College Scorecard UP: Faculty
quality
USNWR
UP: Reputation
IPEDS
UP: Selectivity

College Scorecard UP: Selectivity
IPEDS

NPIC: Size

IPEDS

NPIC: Complexity

IPEDS

NPIC: Other
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Variable
Institutional Ownership
Gender
Tenure
Ph.D.

Prior Presidency

Non-compete Enforceability

Description
Data source
Coded as 0 = public, 1 = private
CHE
Gender of university president; coded as 0 = male, 1 Web searches
= female
University president’s tenure in months
CHE
University president’s degree; coded as 0 = no Ph.D.
or equivalent degree; 1 = completed Ph.D. or
equivalent degree
If the university president had been a president at a
different university previously, coded as 0 = no
prior presidency, 1 = at least one prior presidency
(interim presidencies were not counted)
Indicator of how legally enforceable a non-compete
agreement is in the state the university resides in

Web searches

Web searches

Dimension
NPIC: Other
PC: Demographics
PC: Tenure-related
variables
PC: Professional
experience
PC: Professional
experience

Germaise (2011); Control variable
updated by Dr.
Joseph Coombs
University Density
Number of other colleges/universities in a
Calculated using Control variable
universities metropolitan statistical area
data from IPEDS
Notes. CHE = Chronicle of Higher Education; IPEDS = Integrated Postsecondary Data System; NPIC = Non-performance
institutional characteristics; PC = Personal characteristics; UP = University performance.
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Table 12
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Total Compensation - T1a

12.91

.67

2. Total Compensation - T2 a

12.97

.67

.937**

3. Total Compensation - T3 a

13.03

.72

.939**

.937**

1.52

.239

**

.238**

.237**

.239

**

.239

**

.238**

.999**

.229

**

.230

**

.227

**

.945**

.945**

.235

**

.230

**

.256

**

.397

**

.402**

.392**

.233

**

.225

**

.252

**

.418

**

.421

**

.410**

.929**

.218

**

.208

**

.235

**

.406

**

.409

**

**

.882**

.944**

4. Endowment per FTE - T1

a

5. Endowment per FTE - T2

a

6. Endowment per FTE - T3

a

7. Fundraising - T1

a

8. Fundraising - T2

a

9. Fundraising - T3

a

10.28
10.40
10.42
15.79
15.92

1.52
1.59
3.01
2.80

10

11

12

15.90

2.91

10. Graduation Rate - T1

63.97

17.32

.330**

.327**

.342**

.702**

.704**

.677**

.423**

.435**

.426**

11. Graduation Rate - T2

64.50

17.15

.330**

.327**

.342**

.696**

.697**

.667**

.428**

.438**

.425**

.976**

17.48

.336

**

.327

**

.343

**

.680

**

.682

**

.655

**

.425

**

.432

**

.416

**

.971**

.976**

.258

**

.242

**

.259

**

.516

**

.521

**

.502

**

.346

**

.355

**

.357

**

.790

**

.796**

.794**

.257

**

.246

**

.264

**

.491

**

.494

**

.479

**

.350

**

.355

**

.352

**

.766

**

.772

**

.773**

.249

**

.237

**

.258

**

.512

**

.514

**

.495

**

.347

**

.361

**

.354

**

.785

**

.787

**

.788**

-.108

*

-.709

**

-.317

**

-.337

**

-.521

**

-.507**

*

-.699

**

-.317

**

-.338

**

-.503

**

-.488**

12. Graduation Rate - T3

64.63

13. Three-year Default Rate - T1

b

14. Three-year Default Rate - T2

b

15. Three-year Default Rate - T3

b

16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2

93.67
94.29
95.28
13.97
13.66

18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3

13.59

19. Average Faculty Salary - T1

8405.85

20. Average Faculty Salary - T2
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3
22. Average SAT Score - T1
23. Average SAT Score - T2
24. Average SAT Score - T3

8568.34
8751.14
1140.96
1142.05
1145.37

4.27
3.95
3.46
4.38

-.103

*

4.18

-.093

-.100

-.713

**

-.077

-.703

**

-.086

-.092

.395

9

-.694

**

-.686

**

-.292

**

-.287

**

-.522

**

-.500

**

4.21

-.110*

-.108*

-.714**

-.712**

-.693**

-.296**

-.318**

-.345**

-.521**

-.517**

-.510**

2147.18

.491**

.503**

.513**

.380**

.384**

.363**

.367**

.374**

.359**

.618**

.617**

.633**

2201.33

.484

**

.498

**

.507

**

.379

**

.382

**

.361

**

.362

**

.368

**

.356

**

.625

**

.622

**

.638**

.487

**

.503

**

.516

**

.376

**

.379

**

.360

**

.352

**

.359

**

.337

**

.622

**

.623

**

.636**

.434

**

.451

**

.443

**

.628

**

.629

**

.601

**

.425

**

.452

**

.426

**

.863

**

.862

**

.869**

.430

**

.445

**

.439

**

.621

**

.622

**

.597

**

.430

**

.459

**

.433

**

.856

**

.859

**

.863**

.461

**

.471

**

.462

**

.612

**

.613

**

.586

**

.430

**

.459

**

.434

**

.855

**

.859

**

.862**

**

.354

**

.348

**

.483

**

.483

**

.460

**

.232

**

.233

**

.206

**

.512

**

.493

**

.500**

2296.87
132.01
132.68
138.28

b

39.90

19.49

.345

26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b

38.99

19.91

.333**

.345**

.340**

.496**

.496**

.477**

.284**

.294**

.266**

.522**

.507**

.506**

27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b

37.93

20.66

.326**

.333**

.337**

.511**

.510**

.491**

.279**

.287**

.267**

.530**

.513**

.512**

**

**

**

**

**

**

25. Acceptance Rate - T1

a

8.48

1.10

.309

.065

.050

.025

-.015

-.007

.016

29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a

8.48

1.10

.312**

.312**

.335**

-.386**

-.381**

-.374**

.065

.051

.024

-.013

-.006

.016

30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a
31. Tenure - T1

8.49
88.38

1.11
72.57

.314**
.056

.314**
.063

.337**
.045

-.384**
.057

-.379**
.053

-.373**
.060

.068
.016

.054
.001

.027
-.025

-.010
.021

-.003
.026

.019
.038

32. Tenure - T2

100.20

72.45

.058

.065

.046

.057

.053

.060

.016

.001

-.024

.024

.028

.040

33. Tenure - T3

112.91

73.15

.058

.064

.047

.052

.048

.056

.014

-.001

-.026

.023

.028

.040

28. FTE Enrollment - T1

.309

.332

-.386

-.381

-.374
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Variable

M

34. University Rank

SD

.22

.42

1
.361**

2
.372**

3

4

5

6

9

10

11

12

.394**

.162**

.164**

.163**

.310**

7

.314**

8

.308**

.395**

.393**

.397**

2.49

1.51

.309**

.312**

.338**

-.138**

-.134**

-.135**

.152**

.124*

.090

.126*

.134**

.148**

36. Religious

.39

.49

-.244**

-.244**

-.254**

.144**

.139**

.144**

.030

.049

.071

.014

.020

-.011

37. Institutional Ownership
38. Ph.D.

.72
.75

.45
.43

.035
.015

.048
.039

.032
.066

.562**
.020

.559**
.020

.552**
.000

.211**
.019

.243**
.018

.264**
.014

.362**
.094

.354**
.086

.327**
.085

39. Gender

.19

.40

-.030

-.053

-.044

.093

.096

.093

-.014

-.029

-.073

.052

.045

.044

40. Prior Presidency

.14

.35

-.018

-.004

-.032

-.047

-.049

-.081

-.042

-.054

-.034

-.092

-.109*

-.116*

4.41

1.99

.042

.042

.060

.055

.026

-.076

-.071

-.114*

-.029

-.016

-.037

.072

.073

.074

.076

.095

.105*

35. Carnegie Classification

41. Enforceability Index
42. University Density

55.69
a

83.62

.209

**

.236

.031
**

.236

**

b

Note. Ns range from 329 to 403; indicates that the variable was logged; indicates that the variable was reverse scored.

.192**

.195**

.203**

214
Table 12 (continued)
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I
Variable

13

14

15

16

17

18

14. Three-year Default Rate - T2

.925

15. Three-year Default Rate - T3

.905**

.925**

-.427

**

-.426**

-.433**

-.415

**

-.406

**

-.410**

.972**

-.424

**

-.419

**

**

.961**

.972**

16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

-.424

19. Average Faculty Salary - T1

.461**

.449**

.470**

-.176**

-.170**

-.182**

20. Average Faculty Salary - T2

.472**

.455**

.469**

-.167**

-.159**

-.173**

.976**

21. Average Faculty Salary - T3

.458

**

.447

**

.463

**

-.165

**

-.152

**

-.164

**

.976**

.980**

.680

**

.665

**

.695

**

-.402

**

-.382

**

-.386

**

.723

**

.725**

.724**

.673

**

.662

**

.685

**

-.394

**

-.376

**

-.381

**

.732

**

.734

**

.731**

.991**

.671

**

.657

**

.672

**

-.377

**

-.353

**

-.363

**

.740

**

.745

**

.740

**

.985**

.991**

.274

**

.262

**

.286

**

-.332

**

-.331

**

-.332

**

.547

**

.531

**

.541

**

.605

**

.594**

.592**

.287

**

.268

**

.290

**

-.351

**

-.349

**

-.349

**

.554

**

.542

**

.545

**

.619

**

**

.618**

.916**

22. Average SAT Score - T1
23. Average SAT Score - T2
24. Average SAT Score - T3
25. Acceptance Rate - T1

b

26. Acceptance Rate - T2

b

27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a

.310**
-.048

.274**
-.055

.290**

-.337**

-.338**

-.328**

.564**

.549**

.555**

.631**

.626**

.633**

.891**

.936**

.582**

.588**

.582**

.457**

.462**

.470**

.171**

.180**

.197**

.043

.052

.064

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

-.047

-.053

-.047

.581

30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a
31. Tenure - T1

-.045
-.011

-.051
.029

-.044
.026

.580**
-.095

.588**
-.093

.584**
-.096

.460**
.006

.464**
.006

32. Tenure - T2

-.009

.030

.028

-.097

-.095

-.098*

.008

.009

33. Tenure - T3

-.007

.031

.027

-.088

-.084

-.087

.008

.244**

.261**

.058

.074

.071

.623**
.542

**

-.358

**

34. University Rank
35. Carnegie Classification
36. Religious
37. Institutional Ownership
38. Ph.D.

.255**
.103

*

.047
.332
.042

.094

.111

.081
**

.370
.013

*

.072
**

.614

-.049

a

29. FTE Enrollment - T2

27

26

**

.360
.052

**

.349

**

-.283

**

-.732
.054

**

.589

.364

**

.358

**

-.272

**

-.734
.060

-.741
.077

**

-.281

**

.584

**

.458

-.078
.062

.462

.046

.053

.067

.174**
-.049

.183**
-.072

.200**
-.046

.048
.047

.054
.040

.070
.048

.001

-.048

-.071

-.043

.052

.045

.053

.009

.003

-.045

-.068

-.041

.046

.040

.048

.616**

.625**

.486**

.493**

.521**

.259**

.273**

**

.550

**

.234

**

**

**

-.352

**

-.162

**

-.101
.083

*

.160
.066

**

.542
-.355

**

-.091
.068

.470

.472**
-.001

.173

.183

.254

-.177
.141
.079

**

**

.199

.285
-.186

**

.122
.074

*

.110

*

-.157
.199
.050

**

**

.135**

**

-.168**

**

.191**
.030

.111
-.154

.305**

*

.204
.006

39. Gender

-.004

.044

.051

-.028

-.023

-.034

.030

.031

.052

.021

.023

.038

.082

.062

40. Prior Presidency

-.134**

-.141**

-.134**

.012

.006

-.002

-.044

-.043

-.043

-.093

-.092

-.103

.042

-.002

.021

41. Enforceability Index

-.047

-.047

-.055

-.066

-.041

-.052

-.132**

-.145**

-.127*

-.014

-.010

.004

-.043

-.033

-.060

-.130**

-.138**

-.138**

.383**

.357**

.358**

.187**

.194**

.242**

42. University Density

.179**

.197**

.221**

.195**

.224**

.082

.209**
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Table 12 (continued)
Correlation Table for the Full Sample for Part I
Variable
28. FTE Enrollment - T1

28

29

30

29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a

.999**

a

.998**
-.059

.999**
-.061

-.059

32. Tenure - T2

-.059

-.062

-.060

33. Tenure - T3

-.049

30. FTE Enrollment - T3
31. Tenure - T1

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

-.051
**

.595

.997**
.996**

-.049
**

.993**

.592

-.071

-.068

-.057

35. Carnegie Classification

.835**

.837**

.838**

-.049

-.052

-.039

.728**

**

**

**

.027

.029

.021

-.245**

-.384**

-.431

.597

**

34. University Rank
36. Religious

-.432

37. Institutional Ownership
38. Ph.D.

-.703**
.094

-.702**
.095

-.701**
.095

.170**
-.020

.175**
-.013

.157**
-.017

-.302**
.057

-.596**
.084

.499**
-.041

-.087

39. Gender

-.086

-.084

-.082

-.011

-.008

-.013

-.036

-.052

-.160**

.026

.061

40. Prior Presidency

-.028

-.028

-.030

-.035

-.034

-.038

-.067

-.078

.049

.020

.037

-.058

41. Enforceability Index

-.037

-.034

-.032

-.058

-.061

-.057

-.072

-.034

.029

.038

.031

-.010

.011

-.014

.006

-.016

42. University Density

41

a

.070

.069
a

-.430

.070

.112

*

.115

*

.109

*

b

.130

**

.076

-.071

.150

**

Note. Ns range from 329 to 403; indicates that the variable was logged; indicates that the variable was reverse scored.

-.218**
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Table 13
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Part I
Time 1 to Time 2
Variables

Full sample
β (p)

Private
β (p)

Time 2 to Time 3
Public
β (p)

Full sample
β (p)

Private
β (p)

Public
β (p)

Panel A: Including Outliers
University Performance
Endowment per FTE a

.144 (.079)

.171 (.125)

-.002 (.988)

.186 (.028)

.252 (.042)

-.045 (.698)

-.017 (.749)

.042 (.573)

-.007 (.944)

-.026 (.630)

.029 (.816)

.057 (.563)

-.036 (.609)

.015 (.844)

-.270 (.050)

.006 (.935)

.051 (.518)

-.118 (.365)

-.238 (.032)
.044 (.611)
.196 (.044)
.121 (.128)

-.247 (.050)
.064 (.373)
.211 (.102)
.235 (.043)

-.020 (.920)
-.025 (.794)
-.135 (.316)
.135 (.310)

-.177 (.088)
.073 (.384)
.150 (.111)
.109 (.155)

-.164 (.177)
.069 (.331)
.112 (.364)
.213 (.060)

.105 (.597)
.092 (.371)
-.067 (.631)
.087 (.521)

.023 (.702)

-.014 (.858)

-.030 (.754)

.003 (.966)

-.020 (.802)

-.074 (.459)

Average SAT Score
.252 (.021) .192 (.147)
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics

.320 (.110)

.143 (.191)

.044 (.754)

.065 (.744)

Fundraising

a

Three-year Default Rate

b

Graduation Rate
Student-to-faculty Ratio
Average Faculty Salary
University Rank
Acceptance Rate b

FTE Enrollment a

.342 (.006)

.343 (.006)

.500 (.000)

.430 (.001)

.292 (.028)

Carnegie Classification
-.117 (.350) -.263 (.053)
Religious
-.175 (.002) -.156 (.008)
Institutional Ownership
.390 (.000)
University President Personal Characteristics
Gender
-.066 (.142) -.075 (.161)
Tenure
.009 (.844) .026 (.619)
Ph.D.
.033 (.456) .022 (.674)
Prior Presidency
.032 (.466) .034 (.508)
Control Variables
Enforceability Index
.066 (.157) .072 (.185)
University Density
.049 (.338) .053 (.393)

.442 (.001)

.329 (.005)
-

-.057 (.634)
-.203 (.000)
.479 (.000)

-.207 (.112)
-.183 (.002)
-

.357 (.004)
-

.069 (.393)
-.051 (.515)
.035 (.672)
-.011 (.894)

-.067 (.137)
-.027 (.541)
.056 (.197)
-.013 (.768)

-.063 (.236)
-.014 (.790)
.049 (.338)
-.006 (.911)

.029 (.726)
-.028 (.726)
.006 (.946)
-.071 (.402)

.156 (.094)
.289 (.003)

.066 (.152)
.070 (.157)

.070 (.195)
.073 (.219)

.184 (.056)
.266 (.006)

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
University Performance
Endowment per FTE a

.121 (.104)

.146 (.093)

.000 (.998)

.132 (.080)

.195 (.037)

-.112 (.405)

.027 (.671)

.058 (.503)

.042 (.662)

.033 (.600)

.159 (.084)

.093 (.351)

-.115 (.067)

-.011 (.864)

-.358 (.014)

-.112 (.059)

-.007 (.913)

-.148 (.259)

Graduation Rate
-.256 (.008) -.285 (.004)
Student-to-faculty Ratio
.033 (.660) .057 (.292)
Average Faculty Salary
.218 (.007) .278 (.003)
University Rank
.147 (.032) .292 (.001)
Acceptance Rate
-.060 (.251) -.094 (.110)
Average SAT Score
.364 (.000) .279 (.009)
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics

.125 (.567)
-.074 (.446)
-.145 (.294)
.034 (.811)
-.053 (.582)
.335 (.099)

-.078 (.364)
.102 (.156)
.194 (.014)
.087 (.177)
-.085 (.085)
.195 (.029)

-.138 (.163)
.088 (.108)
.107 (.278)
.249 (.004)
-.107 (.083)
.115 (.301)

.145 (.466)
.043 (.663)
-.078 (.575)
.021 (.879)
-.097 (.321)
.139 (.503)

.387 (.003)

.597 (.000)

.418 (.000)

.331 (.014)

Fundraising

a

Three-year Default Rate

FTE Enrollment a

b

.604 (.000)

.407 (.000)
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Carnegie Classification
-.084 (.448) -.233 (.023) .320 (.016) .097 (.343) -.148 (.139) .374 (.006)
Religious
-.170 (.000) -.141 (.002)
-.205 (.000) -.190 (.000)
Institutional Ownership
.618 (.000)
.774 (.000)
University President Personal Characteristics
Gender
-.008 (.835) -.010 (.802) .071 (.409) -.032 (.388) .001 (.984) .048 (.596)
Tenure
.116 (.003) .166 (.000) -.113 (.165) .068 (.060) .128 (.002) -.081 (.322)
Ph.D.
.073 (.048) .084 (.027) .009 (.922) .060 (.092) .097 (.014) -.028 (.765)
Prior Presidency
.080 (.029) .085 (.027) -.014 (.863) .008 (.826) .032 (.421) -.072 (.407)
Control Variables
Enforceability Index
.059 (.133) .045 (.263) .075 (.414) .082 (.029) .045 (.279) .104 (.273)
University Density
.111 (.011) .100 (.033) .275 (.008) .082 (.047) .149 (.002) .262 (.008)
Note. Time 1 to Time 2 Ns: full sample = 352 (excluding outliers = 312); private universities = 254 (excluding
outliers = 237); public universities = 98 (excluding outliers = 91); Time 2 to Time 3 Ns: full sample = 355
(excluding outliers = 317); private universities = 256 (excluding outliers = 239); public universities = 99 (excluding
outliers = 92).; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored.
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Table 14
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for Part I
Variables
Full Sample
Private
estimate (SE)
R2 (CI)
estimate (SE)
R2 (CI)
Panel A: Including Outliers
University Performance
Endowment per FTE a
.116 (.034)** .024 (.051, .007)
.173 (.057)** .021 (.052, .004)
Fundraising a
-.003 (.009)
.000 (.008, .000)
.003 (.014)
.000 (.010, .000)
Three-year Default Rate b
.002 (.006)
.000 (.008, .000)
.003 (.008)
.000 (.010, .000)
Graduation Rate
-.004 (.003)
.002 (.015, .000)
-.004 (.003)
.002 (.017, .000)
Student-to-faculty Ratio
.009 (.010)
.001 (.012, .000)
.021 (.015)
.003 (.021, .000)
Average Faculty Salary
.000 (.000)
.003 (.017, .000)
.000 (.000)
.001 (.015, .000)
University Rank
.124 (.118)
.003 (.016, .000)
.435 (.233)
.013 (.039, .001)
Acceptance Rate b
.000 (.001)
.000 (.007, .000)
.000 (.002)
.000 (.010, .000)
Average SAT Score
.001 (.000)
.003 (.016, .000)
.000 (.001)
.001 (.014, .000)
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics
FTE Enrollment a
.305 (.066)** .045 (.079, .020)
.387 (.091)** .048 (.090, .019)
Carnegie Classification
-.020 (.051)
.000 (.009, .000)
-.127 (.078)
.009 (.033, .000)
Religious
-.263 (.075)** .031 (.006, .011) -.262 (.087)** .031 (.067, .008)
Institutional Ownership
.579 (.127)** .045 (.079, .020)
University President Personal Characteristics
Gender
-.122 (.075)
.007 (.025, .000)
-.132 (.100)
.007 (.028, .000)
Tenure
.001 (.000)
.004 (.018, .000)
.001 (.001)
.003 (.021, .000)
Ph.D.
.062 (.068)
.002 (.015, .000)
.041 (.086)
.001 (.014, .000)
Prior Presidency
.036 (.082)
.001 (.009, .000)
.040 (.107)
.001 (.012, .000)
Control Variables
Enforceability Index
.024 (.015)
.007 (.024, .000)
.028 (.020)
.007 (.029, .000)
University Density
.001 (.000)
.008 (.026, .000)
.001 (.000)
.007 (.029, .000)
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
University Performance
Endowment per FTE a
.134 (.031)** .035 (.066, .013)
.196 (.048)** .028 (.063, .006)
Fundraising a
.003 (.007)
.000 (.008, .000)
.006 (.009)
.000 (.011, .000)
Three-year Default Rate b
.003 (.004)
.000 (.008, .000)
.000 (.005)
.000 (.010, .000)
Graduation Rate
-.002 (.002)
.000 (.009, .000)
-.001 (.002)
.000 (.011, .000)

Public
estimate (SE)

R2 (CI)

.012 (.023)
.001 (.006)
-.002 (.007)
.002 (.003)
.003 (.007)
.000 (.000)
.040 (.069)
.000 (.001)
.000 (.000)

.002 (.035, .000)
.000 (.027, .000)
.001 (.028, .000)
.003 (.037, .000)
.001 (.030, .000)
.000 (.026, .000)
.003 (.037, .000)
.000 (.026, .000)
.000 (.026, .000)

.145 (.060)*
.126 (.041)**

.046 (.118, .007)
.081 (.164, .024)

.024 (.056)
.000 (.000)
.030 (.061)
-.046 (.067)

.002 (.032, .000)
.004 (.039, .000)
.002 (.034, .000)
.004 (.042, .000)

.028 (.012)*
.001 (.000)**

.052 (.125, .009)
.072 (.153, .019)

.019 (.022)
-.001 (.005)
-.002 (.006)
.000 (.003)

.007 (.049, .000)
.001 (.029, .000)
.000 (.028, .000)
.000 (.027, .000)
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Student-to-faculty Ratio
.006 (.007)
.001 (.010, .000)
.019 (.011)
.003 (.020, .000) .000 (.006)
.000 (.026, .000)
Average Faculty Salary
.000 (.000)*
.003 (.017, .000)
.000 (.000)
.001 (.016, .000) .000 (.000)
.004 (.040, .000)
University Rank
.064 (.116)
.001 (.011, .000)
.351 (.237)
.008 (.032, .000) .050 (.067)
.005 (.045, .000)
Acceptance Rate b
.000 (.001)
.000 (.008, .000)
-.001 (.001)
.001 (.013, .000) .000 (.001)
.000 (.026, .000)
Average SAT Score
.000 (.000)
.001 (.012, .000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.012, .000) .000 (.000)
.001 (.031, .000)
Non-performance Institutional Characteristics
FTE Enrollment a
.298 (.061)** .045 (.080, .020)
.399 (.084)** .052 (.096, .021) .136 (.056)*
.048 (.122, .007)
Carnegie Classification
-.035 (.050)
.001 (.012, .000)
-.132 (.077)
.010 (.035, .000) .100 (.040)*
.059 (.137, .011)
Religious
-.262 (.074)** .032 (.062, .011)
-.265 (.087)*
.033 (.070, .009)
Institutional Ownership
.402 (.123)** .022 (.049, .006)
University President Personal Characteristics
Gender
-.105 (.074)
.006 (.022, .000)
-.119 (.101)
.006 (.026, .000) .006 (.055)
.000 (.027, .000)
Tenure
.001 (.000)*
.012 (.034, .001)
.001 (.000)
.008 (.032, .000) .000 (.000)
.011 (.059, .000)
Ph.D.
.028 (.067)
.000 (.010, .000)
.009 (.087)
.000 (.010, .000) .054 (.059)
.008 (.053, .000)
Prior Presidency
.042 (.082)
.001 (.011, .000)
.044 (.108)
.001 (.013, .000) -.040 (.065)
.004 (.042, .000)
Control Variables
Enforceability Index
.023 (.015)
.007 (.025, .000)
.027 (.020)
.007 (.030, .000) .027 (.011)*
.053 (.129, .009)
University Density
.001 (.000)*
.010 (.030, .001)
.001 (.000)
.008 (.032, .000) .001 (.000)*
.057 (.134, .010)
Note. Ns: full sample = 705 (excluding outliers = 679); private universities = 507 (excluding outliers = 488); public universities = 198
(excluding outliers = 190); *indicates p < .05; **indicates p < .01; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was
reverse scored; all depicted models account for autocorrelation.
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Table 15
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I
Variable

M
(Private/Public)

SD
(Private/Public)

1. Total Compensation - T1 a
2. Total Compensation - T2 a
3. Total Compensation - T3 a
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a
7. Fundraising - T1 a
8. Fundraising - T2 a
9. Fundraising - T3 a
10. Graduation Rate - T1
11. Graduation Rate - T2
12. Graduation Rate - T3
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3
22. Average SAT Score - T1
23. Average SAT Score - T2
24. Average SAT Score - T3
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a
31. Tenure - T1
32. Tenure - T2
33. Tenure - T3

12.93/12.87
12.99/12.91
13.04/12.99
1.81/8.91
1.93/9.03
1.96/9.01
16.18/14.77
16.34/14.82
16.38/14.66
67.88/53.93
68.28/54.8
68.19/55.49
94.56/91.41
95.2/91.95
96.06/93.3
11.97/19.1
11.74/18.58
11.64/18.58
8301.17/8674.50
8443.99/8887.45
8606.98/9121.11
1154.22/1107.46
1153.77/1112.11
1156.37/1119.44
42.22/33.40
41.43/32.21
40.29/31.34
8.00/9.72
8.00/9.72
8.00/9.73
96.07/68.64
108.1/79.91
12.07/94.51

.76/.37
.77/.30
.82/.35
1.18/1.45
1.18/1.46
1.16/1.69
1.63/4.95
1.32/4.71
1.32/4.89
14.92/19
14.88/18.77
15.58/18.81
3.71/4.76
3.33/4.45
2.78/4.17
2.78/3.47
2.73/3.11
2.73/3.06
2308.32/1642.45
2368.81/1664.71
2473.96/1717.77
138.89/106.24
14.36/105.50
146.78/112.27
19.85/16.91
2.5/16.45
21.35/17.02
.85/.58
.85/.58
.86/.59
77.01/55.26
77.06/54.19
77.01/58.57

1
.949**
.953**
.234**
.235**
.242**
.389**
.455**
.463**
.324**
.323**
.324**
.229**
.240**
.227**
-.133*
-.120*
-.134*
.501**
.496**
.502**
.446**
.439**
.474**
.384**
.363**
.357**
.455**
.459**
.461**
.049
.049
.049

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.803**
.939**
.233**
.235**
.243**
.379**
.437**
.442**
.320**
.316**
.312**
.220**
.229**
.212**
-.122*
-.113
-.120*
.515**
.511**
.518**
.463**
.452**
.482**
.388**
.370**
.359**
.477**
.480**
.482**
.061
.061
.061

.773**
.914**
.248**
.250**
.256**
.417**
.484**
.486**
.353**
.348**
.345**
.246**
.258**
.248**
-.123*
-.104
-.114
.524**
.520**
.531**
.460**
.453**
.479**
.394**
.376**
.374**
.491**
.493**
.495**
.039
.039
.039

.492**
.535**
.479**
.998**
.988**
.479**
.598**
.558**
.633**
.617**
.613**
.351**
.282**
.333**
-.634**
-.616**
-.620**
.534**
.542**
.544**
.693**
.688**
.685**
.610**
.607**
.619**
-.123*
-.126*
-.124*
-.087
-.087
-.087

.490**
.530**
.476**
.999**
.990**
.480**
.600**
.560**
.635**
.616**
.614**
.357**
.287**
.337**
-.628**
-.612**
-.617**
.538**
.546**
.547**
.694**
.689**
.686**
.612**
.610**
.620**
-.119*
-.123*
-.122*
-.094
-.094
-.094

.410**
.438**
.398**
.829**
.827**
.491**
.610**
.570**
.644**
.623**
.620**
.368**
.296**
.340**
-.621**
-.606**
-.612**
.537**
.545**
.545**
.700**
.698**
.696**
.617**
.634**
.642**
-.093
-.098
-.098
-.096
-.096
-.096

.227*
.253**
.292**
.305**
.316**
.279**
.745**
.742**
.535**
.536**
.539**
.305**
.312**
.319**
-.343**
-.317**
-.317**
.614**
.618**
.618**
.621**
.612**
.609**
.575**
.549**
.566**
.431**
.430**
.431**
.020
.020
.020

.192*
.210*
.252**
.275**
.281**
.249**
.972**
.928**
.676**
.668**
.661**
.399**
.389**
.417**
-.421**
-.402**
-.401**
.740**
.742**
.746**
.789**
.787**
.792**
.656**
.651**
.667**
.543**
.543**
.545**
-.011
-.012
-.011

.143
.140
.198*
.258**
.263**
.224*
.911**
.943**
.679**
.670**
.666**
.418**
.406**
.435**
-.396**
-.376**
-.380**
.737**
.742**
.732**
.773**
.773**
.782**
.654**
.641**
.663**
.569**
.568**
.569**
-.058
-.059
-.058

.537**
.604**
.550**
.669**
.670**
.573**
.334**
.290**
.270**
.959**
.956**
.716**
.691**
.727**
-.468**
-.437**
-.457**
.708**
.723**
.720**
.879**
.879**
.874**
.559**
.567**
.559**
.308**
.306**
.308**
-.059
-.060
-.059

.536**
.620**
.563**
.683**
.686**
.581**
.346**
.304**
.277**
.993**
.962**
.728**
.703**
.735**
-.483**
-.462**
-.466**
.700**
.713**
.716**
.870**
.876**
.874**
.530**
.542**
.533**
.307**
.303**
.304**
-.056
-.056
-.056

.543**
.619**
.558**
.672**
.674**
.581**
.346**
.304**
.268**
.987**
.993**
.736**
.716**
.754**
-.496**
-.472**
-.493**
.707**
.722**
.717**
.877**
.876**
.874**
.528**
.532**
.521**
.307**
.302**
.302**
-.029
-.029
-.029
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Variable
34. University Ranked
35. Carnegie Classification
36. Religious
37. Ph.D.
38. Gender
39. Prior Presidency
40. Enforceability Index
41. University Density

M
(Private/Public)

SD
(Private/Public)

.14/.42
1.93/3.93
.54/.00
.73/.81
.20/.18
.15/.13
4.46/4.29
63.51/35.62

.35/.50
1.18/1.28
.50/.00
.44/.39
.4/.38
.36/.34
1.98/2.03
91.05/56.03

1
.430**
.388**
-.316**
.002
-.057
.017
.016
.208**

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.451**
.415**
-.318**
.023
-.075
.028
.016
.229**

.481**
.437**
-.323**
.051
-.059
.003
.003
.233**

.335**
.100
-.237**
.122*
.096
-.010
-.016
-.025

.334**
.100
-.245**
.124*
.100
-.015
-.021
-.023

.334**
.105
-.245**
.115
.098
-.016
-.030
-.026

.585**
.493**
-.188**
.035
.000
.016
-.048
.098

.715**
.624**
-.207**
.039
-.022
-.004
-.009
.152**

.709**
.620**
-.181**
.041
-.068
.030
-.047
.180**

.437**
.298**
-.264**
.124*
.032
-.066
-.039
.171**

.428**
.300**
-.246**
.107
.032
-.085
-.021
.173**

.423**
.293**
-.265**
.103
.024
-.083
-.058
.187**

Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored.
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Table 15 (cont.)
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I
Variable

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1. Total Compensation - T1 a
2. Total Compensation - T2 a
3. Total Compensation - T3 a
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a
7. Fundraising - T1 a
8. Fundraising - T2 a
9. Fundraising - T3 a
10. Graduation Rate - T1
11. Graduation Rate - T2
12. Graduation Rate - T3
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3
22. Average SAT Score - T1
23. Average SAT Score - T2
24. Average SAT Score - T3
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a
31. Tenure - T1
32. Tenure - T2
33. Tenure - T3

.494**
.499**
.486**
.538**
.542**
.457**
.340**
.301**
.289**
.835**
.834**
.826**
.894**
.877**
-.286**
-.285**
-.273**
.485**
.509**
.496**
.647**
.651**
.645**
.277**
.285**
.314**
.227**
.222**
.224**
-.098
-.098
-.098

.461**
.502**
.486**
.502**
.504**
.430**
.330**
.292**
.269**
.790**
.790**
.787**
.947**
.878**
-.243**
-.227**
-.223**
.486**
.504**
.500**
.629**
.637**
.633**
.246**
.240**
.259**
.281**
.276**
.276**
-.056
-.056
-.056

.475**
.530**
.513**
.498**
.499**
.426**
.312**
.283**
.256**
.793**
.790**
.779**
.920**
.962**
-.284**
-.258**
-.267**
.526**
.533**
.536**
.667**
.666**
.647**
.270**
.257**
.270**
.269**
.264**
.266**
-.062
-.062
-.062

-.070
-.096
-.044
-.371**
-.367**
-.357**
-.147
-.130
-.165
-.303**
-.293**
-.279**
-.286**
-.250**
-.244**
.953**
.923**
-.380**
-.381**
-.381**
-.539**
-.540**
-.536**
-.409**
-.428**
-.425**
.128*
.132*
.130*
.033
.034
.033

-.038
-.046
.020
-.333**
-.332**
-.335**
-.151
-.141
-.185
-.253**
-.241**
-.228*
-.238*
-.191*
-.194*
.920**
.943**
-.364**
-.367**
-.360**
-.506**
-.506**
-.491**
-.383**
-.407**
-.403**
.127*
.135*
.135*
.018
.019
.018

-.122
-.095
-.021
-.379**
-.380**
-.350**
-.179
-.146
-.202*
-.309**
-.297**
-.289**
-.295**
-.250**
-.231*
.901**
.930**
-.391**
-.393**
-.386**
-.498**
-.498**
-.498**
-.386**
-.406**
-.388**
.114
.124*
.126*
.023
.023
.023

.485**
.537**
.519**
.506**
.508**
.450**
.364**
.345**
.336**
.749**
.752**
.746**
.679**
.671**
.665**
-.276**
-.272**
-.286**
.975**
.977**
.770**
.778**
.779**
.642**
.633**
.630**
.584**
.582**
.582**
.029
.029
.029

.469**
.531**
.506**
.517**
.519**
.457**
.356**
.337**
.333**
.760**
.759**
.750**
.680**
.671**
.664**
-.275**
-.257**
-.279**
.981**
.981**
.777**
.786**
.788**
.632**
.627**
.621**
.576**
.573**
.573**
.030
.030
.030

.455**
.520**
.501**
.530**
.532**
.481**
.333**
.316**
.300**
.780**
.781**
.778**
.680**
.671**
.658**
-.310**
-.283**
-.293**
.969**
.972**
.773**
.780**
.781**
.637**
.629**
.623**
.581**
.578**
.578**
.023
.023
.023

.432**
.497**
.442**
.542**
.542**
.470**
.331**
.322**
.292**
.846**
.859**
.855**
.765**
.758**
.778**
-.248*
-.202*
-.212*
.684**
.688**
.714**
.991**
.986**
.663**
.660**
.671**
.425**
.428**
.429**
-.082
-.083
-.082

.423**
.502**
.440**
.549**
.548**
.488**
.364**
.353**
.322**
.829**
.844**
.842**
.740**
.738**
.757**
-.263**
-.227*
-.246*
.671**
.670**
.694**
.987**
.993**
.654**
.656**
.666**
.412**
.413**
.415**
-.101
-.102
-.101

.413**
.488**
.429**
.557**
.556**
.485**
.369**
.359**
.330**
.841**
.851**
.845**
.747**
.734**
.753**
-.254*
-.217*
-.229*
.703**
.712**
.729**
.982**
.986**
.665**
.669**
.680**
.408**
.408**
.409**
-.083
-.083
-.083

.178
.208*
.112
.016
.013
.011
-.152
-.146
-.195
.261**
.269**
.303**
.104
.130
.176
.009
-.026
-.010
.317**
.287**
.336**
.311**
.292**
.264**
.920**
.899**
.311**
.312**
.314**
.043
.043
.043

.196*
.247*
.156
.049
.045
.017
-.030
-.033
-.019
.279**
.287**
.315**
.124
.166
.222*
-.018
-.031
-.018
.390**
.363**
.385**
.376**
.373**
.362**
.881**
.938**
.314**
.314**
.315**
.022
.021
.022
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Variable
34. University Ranked
35. Carnegie Classification
36. Religious
37. Ph.D.
38. Gender
39. Prior Presidency
40. Enforceability Index
41. University Density

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

.257**
.218**
-.185**
.066
-.013
-.112
-.060
.156**

.288**
.257**
-.166**
.031
.047
-.111
-.074
.173**

.296**
.258**
-.181**
.064
.084
-.112
-.104
.207**

-.229**
-.106
.175**
-.054
-.048
.008
-.078
-.016

-.206**
-.102
.178**
-.042
-.042
.025
-.077
-.016

-.208**
-.096
.204**
-.008
-.051
.009
-.085
-.032

.656**
.633**
-.404**
.043
.030
.001
-.123*
.400**

.643**
.618**
-.391**
.047
.024
.003
-.131*
.378**

.646**
.624**
-.381**
.063
.047
.005
-.116*
.381**

.547**
.440**
-.323**
.111
.007
-.058
-.030
.182**

.555**
.452**
-.328**
.123*
.007
-.052
-.025
.175**

.569**
.465**
-.339**
.108
.013
-.064
.007
.185**

.456**
.387**
-.332**
.107
.074
.054
-.057
.194**

.467**
.392**
-.329**
.064
.064
.017
-.035
.171**

Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored.
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Table 15 (cont.)
Correlation Table for Private and Public Universities for Part I
Variable

27

1. Total Compensation - T1 a
2. Total Compensation - T2 a
3. Total Compensation - T3 a
4. Endowment per FTE - T1 a
5. Endowment per FTE - T2 a
6. Endowment per FTE - T3 a
7. Fundraising - T1 a
8. Fundraising - T2 a
9. Fundraising - T3 a
10. Graduation Rate - T1
11. Graduation Rate - T2
12. Graduation Rate - T3
13. Three-year Default Rate - T1 b
14. Three-year Default Rate - T2 b
15. Three-year Default Rate - T3 b
16. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T1
17. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T2
18. Student-to-Faculty Ratio - T3
19. Average Faculty Salary - T1
20. Average Faculty Salary - T2
21. Average Faculty Salary - T3
22. Average SAT Score - T1
23. Average SAT Score - T2
24. Average SAT Score - T3
25. Acceptance Rate - T1 b
26. Acceptance Rate - T2 b
27. Acceptance Rate - T3 b
28. FTE Enrollment - T1 a
29. FTE Enrollment - T2 a
30. FTE Enrollment - T3 a
31. Tenure - T1
32. Tenure - T2
33. Tenure - T3

.169
.205*
.136
.112
.110
.078
-.002
.003
-.032
.346**
.359**
.385**
.145
.149
.196*
.009
-.032
.001
.451**
.421**
.462**
.401**
.395**
.393**
-.837**
-.915**
.320**
.323**
.326**
.036
.036
.036

28
.596**
.614**
.624**
.438**
.442**
.324**
.347**
.318**
.267**
.569**
.580**
.590**
.460**
.443**
.473**
.195*
.230*
.184
.478**
.490**
.479**
.410**
.398**
.408**
.092
.141
.137
.999**
.996**
.084
.083
.084

29
.605**
.619**
.628**
.447**
.451**
.335**
.348**
.318**
.266**
.589**
.600**
.609**
.479**
.463**
.493**
.181
.222*
.176
.489**
.500**
.490**
.425**
.412**
.422**
.107
.149
.146
.997**
.999**
.081
.080
.081

30
.609**
.628**
.636**
.456**
.459**
.342**
.358**
.327**
.274**
.601**
.611**
.620**
.485**
.473**
.503**
.179
.222*
.175
.503**
.512**
.502**
.429**
.414**
.426**
.113
.153
.152
.995**
.999**
.085
.084
.085

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

.066
.021
.049
.067
.070
.091
-.082
-.102
-.138
-.008
.011
.007
-.008
.013
.015
.079
.143
.120
-.028
-.020
-.017
-.055
-.076
-.013
-.107
-.056
-.063
.104
.094
.091
1.000**
1.000**

.077
.031
.063
.055
.058
.081
-.086
-.105
-.144
-.002
.014
.010
-.005
.010
.017
.091
.155
.131
-.011
-.003
.000
-.051
-.071
.006
-.084
-.034
-.041
.131
.121
.118
.982**
1.000**

.084
.041
.072
.073
.075
.096
-.076
-.094
-.126
.018
.038
.031
.022
.036
.034
.062
.135
.109
-.015
-.007
-.002
-.023
-.044
.019
-.090
-.037
-.046
.110
.102
.099
.977**
.962**
-

.422**
.489**
.439**
.542**
.541**
.509**
.333**
.326**
.341**
.757**
.756**
.747**
.593**
.556**
.562**
-.283**
-.269**
-.292**
.675**
.670**
.692**
.715**
.706**
.716**
.137
.172
.233*
.446**
.458**
.471**
-.068
-.051
-.028

.629**
.681**
.657**
.674**
.678**
.594**
.327**
.257**
.219*
.758**
.764**
.766**
.734**
.720**
.728**
-.264**
-.205*
-.279**
.613**
.630**
.623**
.642**
.636**
.661**
.098
.098
.138
.592**
.605**
.617**
.102
.104
.115

-

.117
.203*
.205*
-.013
-.015
-.056
.056
.059
.052
.168
.173
.164
.101
.092
.150
.079
.089
.090
.107
.115
.127
-.015
-.007
.024
-.066
-.117
-.056
.313**
.318**
.316**
-.086
-.048
-.072

.106
.071
.030
.100
.101
.096
-.043
-.060
-.126
.075
.055
.070
-.016
.017
-.023
.061
.079
.049
.042
.071
.087
.057
.067
.105
.092
.035
.074
.091
.096
.092
-.034
-.026
-.041

-.218*
-.236*
-.271**
-.203*
-.196*
-.287**
-.118
-.126
-.108
-.196*
-.211*
-.234*
-.232*
-.257**
-.227*
.110
.045
.046
-.210*
-.211*
-.224*
-.262**
-.275**
-.283**
-.034
-.121
-.106
-.159
-.160
-.159
-.136
-.134
-.142

.175
.214*
.196*
.187*
.178
.078
-.142
-.164
-.231*
-.060
-.050
-.040
-.069
-.050
-.024
-.014
.105
.072
-.157
-.191*
-.157
.020
.020
-.014
-.032
-.052
-.111
.042
.049
.049
.043
.033
.046

.200*
.292**
.258**
.022
.025
.036
.008
.005
.000
.111
.119
.121
.112
.128
.162
-.084
-.141
-.074
.409**
.367**
.370**
.153
.148
.153
.365**
.375**
.377**
.059
.058
.066
-.040
-.032
-.043
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Variable
34. University Ranking
35. Carnegie Classification
36. Religious
37. Ph.D.
38. Gender
39. Prior Presidency
40. Enforceability Index
41. University Density

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

.485**
.408**
-.339**
.077
.081
.043
-.053
.154**

.643**
.784**
-.143*
-.016
-.144*
.016
-.031
.281**

.645**
.785**
-.143*
-.015
-.142*
.016
-.027
.278**

.644**
.784**
-.141*
-.013
-.136*
.012
-.024
.278**

-.004
.056
-.074
.014
-.010
-.013
-.097
.111

-.004
.056
-.074
.014
-.010
-.014
-.098
.112

-.004
.056
-.074
.014
-.010
-.013
-.097
.111

.853**
-.152**
.029
-.059
-.006
-.021
.216**

.497**
-.151*
-.020
-.075
-.002
-.034
.245**

.004
-.232**
.053
.014
-.182**

.042
.206*
.051
.012
.007
.007

.024
.026
.102
-.087
-.016
.037

-.178
-.285**
.120
.024
.036
-.019

-.142
.032
.114
.002
-.057
-.277**

.147
.090
-.039
-.151
-.023
-.045
-

Note. Private university correlations are below the diagonal; public university correlations are above the diagonal; Ns for private universities range from 231 to
290; Ns for public universities range from 98 to 113; a indicates that the variable was logged; b indicates that the variable was reverse scored.
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Table 16
R-square Change when Category of Variables is Entered Last into the Model for Part I
Variables

University performance
University Size and
Complexity
University President
Personal
Characteristics

University performance

Full sample
ΔR2 (p)

Time 1 to Time 2
Time 2 to Time 3
Private
Public
Full sample
Private
Public
ΔR2 (p)
ΔR2 (p)
ΔR2 (p)
ΔR2 (p)
ΔR2 (p)
(a) Including outliers

.075 (.000)

.096 (.000)

.048 (.442)

.052 (.001)

.075 (.001)

.020 (.939)

.025 (.001)

.022 (.015)

.147 (.000)

.038 (.000)

.030 (.003)

.141 (.000)

.006 (.504)

.007 (.577) .009 (.798)
(b) Excluding outliers

.007 (.409)

.006 (.685)

.006 (.915)

.103 (.000)

.128 (.000)

.060 (.000)

.099 (.000)

.024 (.908)

.064 (.269)

University Size and
Complexity
.037 (.000) .027 (.000) .143 (.000)
.049 (.000) .026 (.000) .143 (.000)
University President
Personal
Characteristics
.022 (.002) .038 (.000) .017 (.544)
.008 (.145) .025 (.003) .013 (.721)
Note. Time 1 to Time 2 Ns: full sample = 352 (excluding outliers = 312); private universities = 254 (excluding
outliers = 237); public universities = 98 (excluding outliers = 91); Time 2 to Time 3 Ns: full sample = 355
(excluding outliers = 317); private universities = 256 (excluding outliers = 239); public universities = 99 (excluding
outliers = 92).
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Table 17
Correlation Matrix for Part II
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Change Total Compensation - T1

15.54

0.81

2. Change Total Compensation - T2

14.56

0.75

-.017

3. Change Total Compensation - T3

15.27

0.78

-.008

-.086

4. Relative Change Total Compensation - T1

0.83

0.99

.043

-.005

5. Relative Change Total Compensation - T2

0.73

0.14

-.001

-.500**

.037

6. Relative Change Total Compensation - T3

0.73

0.13

.002

-.040

.298**

.004

7. Merit Pay - T1

12.32

0.69

.004

-.035

.007

.086

.014

.027

8. Merit Pay - T2

12.45

0.64

-.017

-.026

.003

.135**

.059

.014

9. Merit Pay - T3

.002

.233**

7

8

9

10

-.005

12.99

0.66

-.011

-.007

.003

10. Relative Merit Pay - T1

0.96

1.61

.013

.006

-.007

11. Relative Merit Pay - T2

0.77

0.80

.004

.002

12. Relative Merit Pay - T3

0.74

0.59

-.013

13. Bonus - T1

2.94

4.91

14. Bonus - T2

3.12

5.00

15. Bonus - T3

3.38

16. Relative Bonus - T1

-.390**
-.248**

-.011

.042

.483**

.025

-.016

.000
.188**

-.044
.054

.004

.004

.008

.023

-.020

-.691**

.109*

-.017

.002

.004

-.007

-.004

.000

.016

-.093

-.109*

-.094

-.045

-.046

.078

.046

-.093

-.095

-.093

-.052

.042

.029

.041

5.17

-.086

-.095

-.081

-.061

-.003

.206**

.024

0.05

0.11

-.080

-.229**

-.277**

-.032

.055

.005

.042

17. Relative Bonus - T2

0.08

0.63

-.079

-.023

-.044

-.043

.022

-.018

.030

18. Relative Bonus - T3

0.06

0.14

-.052

-.099*

-.265**

-.045

.116*

.218**

.032

.039

19. Deferred Compensation - T1

8.28

4.50

-.059

-.014

-.049

-.051

.038

.144**

.116*

20. Deferred Compensation - T2

8.34

4.45

-.058

-.022

-.008

-.022

-.036

.129*

21. Deferred Compensation - T3

8.33

4.48

-.058

-.021

-.013

-.095

-.018

22. Relative Deferred Compensation - T1

0.14

0.62

-.032

.015

-.050

-.031

23. Relative Deferred Compensation - T2

0.13

0.46

-.178**

.004

.015

-.039

24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3

0.11

0.13

-.157**

.013

.033

-.050

25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1

7.39

0.54

-.100

.015

.004

-.022

.042

26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2

9.29

0.90

.015

-.051

.030

-.018

.046

27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3

11.55

0.60

-.003

.019

-.003

.006

28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4

12.78

0.65

-.004

-.004

-.003

29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1

8.19

0.42

.001

-.018

30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2

9.87

0.50

-.003

-.005

31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3

7.08

0.29

-.021

32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4

7.89

0.44

-.017

-.980**

-.021

.103*

.002

.033

.034

-.004

-.090

.043

-.009

.050

.031

-.057

.036

.029

-.037

.041

-.047

.024

-.059

-.001

.100*

.035

.124*

-.005

.099*

.047

-.966**

.071

.015

-.001

.100*

.000

-.001

.006

.006

.010

-.019

-.025

.053

.058

.048

-.048

-.045

.125*

.033

.014

.043

-.057

-.055

.014

.014

.060

-.023

.058

.013

.037

.020

.028

.002

-.020

-.003

.001

-.003

.008

-.001

.008

.008

-.044

.001

-.003

.001

-.011

.016

-.002

-.033

.003

-.005

.003

.005

-.006

.008

.000

-.013

.007

.002

-.014

.008

-.032

-.052

-.054

.051

-.066

.006

.003

-.030

-.051

-.040

-.010

.002

.004

.017

-.020

-.003

.163**

-.952**

.247**

-.002
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Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

33. Religious

0.40

0.49

.044

.031

.035

.042

-.003

-.086

-.077

-.065

.031

.000

34. Institutional Ownership

0.73

0.44

-.029

-.023

-.031

.038

.037

-.021

-.019

-.026

.083

.073

35. Enforceability Index

4.43

2.00

.038

.039

-.043

.105*

.010

-.014

.030

-.069

-.069

.058

40471.22

27103.51

.057

.010

.003

.006

-.013

-.023

-.018

-.122*

.024

.032

36. University Density

Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density; * indicate p <
.05, ** indicates p < .01.
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Table 17 (cont.)
Correlation Matrix for Part II
Variable

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

12. Relative Merit Pay - T3

-.090

13. Bonus - T1

-.044

14. Bonus - T2

-.052

15. Bonus - T3

-.045

-.032

.684**

.714**

16. Relative Bonus - T1

-.032

-.019

.810**

.669**

.601**

17. Relative Bonus - T2

-.054

.082

.230**

.073

.118*

18. Relative Bonus - T3

-.032

-.023

.519**

.516**

.764**

.666**

.092

19. Deferred Compensation - T1

-.134**

.021

.143**

.097

.085

.129*

.026

.139**

20. Deferred Compensation - T2

-.138**

.018

.182**

.149**

.108*

.142**

.028

.114*

.772**

21. Deferred Compensation - T3

-.060

.020

.132**

.127*

.087

.108*

.027

.109*

.739**

.802**

22. Relative Deferred Compensation - T1

-.017

-.009

-.013

.006

-.008

.021

.164**

.006

23. Relative Deferred Compensation - T2

-.065

.011

.130**

.163**

24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3

-.052

25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1

-.012

26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2
27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3
28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4

21

22

-.027
.099*

.981**

.962**

.777**

-.010

-.014

.955**

-.002

-.005

.116*

-.006

-.007

-.026

.077

.072

.088

.055

-.017

.118*

.001

.094

.127*

.043

.044

.012

.037

.005

-.023

-.030

-.029

-.035

-.019

-.027

.015

.006

-.006

.021

.019

.021

.018

.001

.011

-.018

-.020

-.021

.433**
-.081
.225**

.485**
-.046
.230**

.131**
.569**
-.063
.237**

.021
.107*
-.009
.019
.000

.007

.003

.033

.034

.037

.027

.007

.025

-.032

-.034

-.033

.006

-.004

.003

-.080

-.064

-.063

-.020

-.003

-.034

-.048

-.047

-.034

-.002

30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2

.004

-.003

.032

-.071

-.066

.026

.002

.007

.089

-.038

-.038

.011

31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3

-.020

.007

-.003

.049

.012

.009

.094

-.159**

-.091

-.065

-.004

32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4

.000

.017

.058

.077

.073

.052

.010

.053

-.007

-.002

.014

33. Religious Orientation

.084

.059

-.053

-.106*

-.125*

-.063

.046

-.097

.127*

.127*

.110*

34. Institutional Ownership

.037

.033

.096

-.008

-.021

.095

.034

.060

.510**

.454**

.484**

35. Enforceability Index

-.004

.056

.067

.068

.092

.088

.093

.000

-.002

-.023

-.036

36. University Density

-.022

.113*

-.123*

-.117*

.089

-.109*

-.007

-.031

-.067

-.019

29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1

.136**
-.083

.101*

-.141**

.109*

Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density.

.049
.066
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Table 17 (cont.)
Correlation Matrix for Part II
Variable
24. Relative Deferred Compensation - T3

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

.195**

25. Change Endowment per FTE - T1

-.007

26. Change Endowment per FTE - T2

.011

-.039

27. Change Endowment per FTE - T3

-.002

-.002

28. Change Endowment per FTE - T4

.005

29. Change FTE Enrollment - T1

.003

30. Change FTE Enrollment - T2

.152**

-.028
.003

-.190**

.007

.008

-.088

.019

-.042

-.029

.002

-.002

-.002

-.016

-.021

.032

-.001

-.004

.001

31. Change FTE Enrollment - T3

.002

.019

.142**

-.046

-.007

.002

.043

-.126*

32. Change FTE Enrollment - T4

.023

.062

.044

.036

-.011

-.001

-.062

-.070

.228**

33. Religious

.045

-.060

.010

-.088

.047

.049

.021

.039

-.147**

-.074

34. Institutional Ownership

.057

-.022

-.041

-.060

.079

-.248**

-.055

35. Enforceability Index

.056

-.040

-.024

-.023

.108*

.018

-.045

.036

-.067

.014

.023

.026

36. University Density

.083

-.094

.003

.062

.006

.022

.045

.001

-.024

-.030

.081

.042

.146**

-.142**

.263**

-.030

.489**

Note. Ns range from 395 to 369; all variables were logged except for religion, institutional ownership, enforceability index, and university density.
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Table 18
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Δ Total Compensation
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE) estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.311 (.030)** .199 (.040)** -.024 (.059)
.189 (.041)**
.109 (.048)*
Institutional Ownership
.097 (.069)
-.136 (.069)*
-.115 (.070)
-.155 (.070)**
-.122 (.071)
Religious
.086 (.062)
.116 (.062)
.106 (.062)
.127 (.063)*
.103 (.063)
Enforceability Index
-.001 (.013)
.000 (.013)
-.001 (.013)
.001 (.013)
.001 (.013)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Endowment per FTE
.134 (.032)** .005 (.072)
.142 (.033)**
.264 (.050)**
Time
.705 (.140)**
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
.039 (.086)
Δ Endowment per FTE2
.010 (.007)
-.027 (.014)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
-.007 (.002)**
-913.350
-908.024
Log Likelihood
-922.913
-914.360
-901.146
Δ Log Likelihood
59.655** a
8.553** b
13.214** c
1.010 c
5.326** d
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
.416 (.005)** .409 (.006)** -.003 (.005)
Δ FTE Enrollment
.189 (.041)**
.133 (.008)*
.018 (.005)** .016 (.005)** .010 (.005)*
Institutional Ownership
-.155 (.070)*
.002 (.010)
Religious
-.006 (.005)
-.005 (.005)
-.006 (.004)
.127 (.063)*
-.008 (.009)
-.001 (.001)
Enforceability Index
-.001 (.001)
-.001 (.001)
.001 (.013)
.000 (.002)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Endowment per FTE
.007 (.003)
.005 (.006)
.142 (.033)**
.216 (.009)*
Time
.710 (.013)**
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
-.002 (.007)
2
Δ Endowment per FTE
.010 (.007)
-.029 (.002)*
Δ Endowment per FTE3
-.007 (.000)*
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 783 to 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Endowment per FTE, FTE
enrollment, and total compensation were logged; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Total
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 19
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Relative Δ Total Compensation
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.001 (.006)
-.005 (.007)
-.003 (.010)
-.006 (.007)
-.009 (.008)
Institutional Ownership
.012 (.010)
.010 (.010)
.010 (.010)
.000 (.002)
.000 (.002)
Religious
-.017 (.009)
-.015 (.009)
-.015 (.009)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Enforceability Index
.000 (.002)
.000 (.002)
.000 (.002)
.007 (.010)
.009 (.010)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
-.014 (.009)
-.015 (.009)
Δ Endowment per FTE
.008 (.005)
.008 (.012)
.009 (.005)
.013 (.008)
Time
-.006 (.024)
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
.001 (.014)
Δ Endowment per FTE2
.001 (.001)
.000 (.002)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.000)
480.091
481.155
481.818
482.053
Log Likelihood
481.192
Δ Log Likelihood
34.388** a
1.064 b
0.037 c
0.663 c
0.235 d
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
-.002 (.003)
Δ FTE Enrollment
-.006 (.004)
-.006 (.006)
-.007 (.004)
-.009 (.005)
-.006 (.006)
Institutional Ownership
-.007 (.006)
-.005 (.006)
-.009 (.006)
-.008 (.006)
Religious
-.006 (.005)
-.004 (.005)
-.006 (.006)
-.003 (.005)
-.004 (.006)
-.001 (.001)
Enforceability Index
-.001 (.001)
-.001 (.001)
-.001 (.001)
-.002 (.001)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Endowment per FTE
.005 (.003)
.016 (.007)*
.007 (.003)*
.011 (.005)*
Time
-.006 (.014)
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
-.014 (.008)
2
Δ Endowment per FTE
.001 (.001)
-.001 (.001)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.000)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 756 to 757 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE
Enrollment, and Relative Δ Total Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 20
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE) estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.242 (.025)** .164 (.034)** -.012 (.050)
Institutional Ownership
.074 (.059)
.048 (.059)
.075 (.061)
Religious
-.054 (.054)
-.033 (.054)
-.047 (.054)
Enforceability Index
-.022 (.011)
-.021 (.011)
-.022 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Endowment per FTE
.091 (.027)** .028 (.062)
Time
.532 (.119)**
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
-.023 (.073)
Δ Endowment per FTE2

Model 4
estimate (SE)

Model 5
estimate (SE)

.159 (.035)**
.039 (.060)
-.028 (.054)
-.021 (.011)
.000 (.000)
.095 (.028)**

.096 (.041)**
.065 (.061)
-.047 (.054)
-.021 (.011)
.000 (.000)
.191 (.042)**

.005 (.006)

-.025 (.012)*

Δ Endowment per FTE3
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-791.625
50.983**a

-786.087
5.538**b

-774.7041
11.383**c

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
.322 (.005)** .227 (.008)**
-.010 (.008)
.016 (.009)
.007 (.011)
.009 (.009)
-.012 (.008)
-.008 (.010)
-.011 (.008)
-.001 (.002)
.000 (.002)
-.002 (.002)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.053 (.006)**
.009 (.010)
.546 (.019)*

-785.818
0.269c

-.006 (.002)**
-781.253
4.565**d

.222 (.008)**
.000 (.011)
-.004 (.010)
.000 (.002)
.000 (.000)
.056 (.006)**

.097 (.008)**
.001 (.011)
-.012 (.010)
-.001 (.002)
.000 (.000)
.182 (.009)**

-.002 (.012)

.003 (.001)** -.023 (.002)**
Δ Endowment per FTE3
-.005 (.000)**
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and ranged from 785 to 786 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE
Enrollment, and Merit Pay were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 21
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay as a Percentage of Base Salary
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
estimate (SE) estimate (SE) estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

Panel A: Including Outliers
-.015 (.027)
-.006 (.037)
-.009 (.054)
-.001 (.062)
.002 (.063)
.001 (.065)
.101 (.056)
.099 (.056)
.099 (.057)
.007 (.012)
.007 (.012)
.007 (.012)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
-.011 (.029)
-.018 (.067)
.013 (.129)

-.004 (.037)
.005 (.064)
.097 (.057)
.007 (.012)
.000 (.000)
-.013 (.030)

.004 (.044)
.001 (.065)
.100 (.057)
.007 (.012)
.000 (.000)
-.025 (.045)

-.001 (.007)

.003 (.012)

.008 (.079)

Δ Endowment per FTE3
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-838.193
4.470 a
-.003 (.003)
-.001 (.006)
-.001 (.006)
-.002 (.001)
.000 (.000)

-838.116
.077 b

-838.108
.008 c

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
-.004 (.004)
-.003 (.005)
-.001 (.006)
-.002 (.006)
-.001 (.006)
-.001 (.006)
-.002 (.001)
-.002 (.001)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.002 (.003)
.001 (.007)
-.002 (.013)

-838.093
.024 c
-.004 (.004)
-.002 (.006)
-.001 (.006)
-.002 (.001)
.000 (.000)
.002 (.003)

.001 (.002)
-838.021
.072 d
-.004 (.004)
-.002 (.006)
-.001 (.006)
-.002 (.001)
.000 (.000)
.001 (.005)

.001 (.008)

.000 (.001)
.000 (.001)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.000)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different cases are not
comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were
grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment,
and Relative Merit Pay were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 22
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

Panel A: Including Outliers
.104 (.107)
-.090 (.176)
-.161 (.275)
.610 (.603)
-1.408 (.546)*
.269 (.116)*
.000 (.000)*

.551 (.604)
-1.361 (.546)*
.271 (.116)*
.000 (.000)*
.201 (.145)

.771 (.607)
-1.489 (.546)**
.271 (.116)*
.000 (.000)*
.936 (.335)**
-.235 (.619)

Model 4
estimate (SE)

Model 5
estimate (SE)

-.024 (.178)

-.182 (.222)

.676 (.607)
-1.434 (.547)**
.266 (.116)*
.000 (.000)*
.153 (.146)

.731 (.607)
-1.475 (.547)**
.265 (.116)*
.000 (.000)*
.362 (.228)

-.069 (.033)*

-.133 (.063)*

-1.066 (.396)**

Δ Endowment per FTE3
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-2253.644
9.350** a

-2252.680
.964 b

-2248.937
3.743* c

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
.045 (.051)
.039 (.076)
-.007 (.131)
.694 (.626)
.644 (.626)
.948 (.624)
-1.550 (.566)** -1.451 (.566)* -1.680 (.563)**
.286 (.122)*
.277 (.122)*
.295 (.121)*
.000 (.000)*
.000 (.000)*
.000 (.000)*
.022 (.064)
.879 (.168)**
-.589 (.299)*

-2250.458
2.222* c

-.012 (.010)
-2249.746
-.712 d

-.005 (.087)
.866 (.626)
-1.631 (.566)**
.280 (.122)*
.000 (.000)*
.102 (.071)

.021 (.104)
.811 (.626)
-1.577 (.565)**
.282 (.122)*
.000 (.000)**
.084 (.107)

-.965 (.198)**

-.067 (.016)**
-.056 (.029)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.002 (.005)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and ranges from 735 to 738 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to
Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log
likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different Ns
are not comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per
FTE) were grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE
Enrollment, and Bonuses were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 23
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses as a Percentage of Base Salary
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

Panel A: Including Outliers
-.009 (.017)
-.010 (.024)
-.001 (.035)
.032 (.043)
-.003 (.039)
.017 (.008)*
.000 (.000)

.032 (.043)
-.003 (.039)
.017 (.008)*
.000 (.000)
.000 (.019)

.035 (.045)
-.005 (.040)
.017 (.008)*
.000 (.000)
.019 (.044)
-.034 (.083)

-.009 (.024)

-.008 (.028)

.033 (.044)
-.003 (.039)
.017 (.008)*
.000 (.000)
.000 (.019)

.017 (.008)*
.000 (.000)
.033 (.045)
-.003 (.040)
-.001 (.030)

-.001 (.004)

-.001 (.008)

-500.692

.000 (.001)
-500.692

-.022 (.052)

Δ Endowment per FTE3
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-500.709
3.330 a

-500.709
.000 b

-500.575
0.134 c

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
.006 (.003)*
.001 (.005)
.002 (.007)
.033 (.014)*
.031 (.014)*
.035 (.015)*
-.037 (.013)** -.036 (.013)** -.038 (.013)**
.007 (.003)**
.007 (.003)**
.007 (.003)**
.000 (.000)*
.000 (.000)*
.000 (.000)*
.006 (.004)
.021 (.009)*
-.012 (.016)

0.017c
.002 (.005)
.032 (.014)*
-.036 (.013)**
.007 (.003)**
.000 (.000)*
.005 (.004)

.000 d
-.002 (.006)
.034 (.015)*
-.037 (.013)**
.007 (.003)**
.000 (.000)*
.010 (.006)

-.020 (.010)

-.001 (.001)
-.002 (.002)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.000)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and 788 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different case are not comparable;
unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were grand mean
centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative
Bonuses were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 24
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Deferred Compensation
Variable

Model 1
estimate (SE)

Model 2
estimate (SE)

Model 3
estimate (SE)

Model 4
estimate (SE)

Model 5
estimate (SE)

-.200 (.130)
5.418 (.478)**
-1.222 (.432)**
-.040 (.092)
.000 (.000)
.161 (.107)

-.234 (.163)
5.430 (.480)**
-1.230 (.432)**
-.040 (.092)
.000 (.000)
.207 (.168)

.019 (.024)

.005 (.046)

Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2
Δ Endowment per FTE

-.038 (.077)
5.496 (.477)**
-1.277 (.431)**
-.043 (.092)
.000 (.000)

-.182 (.128)
5.452 (.477)**
-1.242 (.431)**
-.042 (.092)
.000 (.000)
.148 (.106)

-.168 (.201)
5.454 (.481)**
-1.243 (.433)**
-.042 (.092)
.000 (.000)
.165 (.246)
-.045 (.453)
-.015 (.290)

3

Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood

-2031.444
61.711** a

-2030.455
.989 b

-2030.449
.006 c

-2030.145
.310 c

-.003 (.007)
-2030.083
.062d

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

.015 (.012)
5.814 (.506)**
-1.316 (.443)**
-.013 (.096)
.000 (.000)

-.029 (.020)
5.800 (.506)**
-1.305 (.443)**
-.013 (.096)
.000 (.000)
.044 (.016)**

-.032 (.031)
5.811 (.507)**
-1.312 (.443)**
-.013 (.096)
.000 (.000)
.084 (.039)*
-.015 (.070)

-.030 (.020)
5.798 (.506)**
-1.303 (.443)**
-.013 (.096)
.000 (.000)
.045 (.017)**

-.035 (.026)
5.799 (.507)**
-1.304 (.443)**
-.013 (.096)
.000 (.000)
.051 (.026)

-.057 (.045)

.001 (.004)
.000 (.007)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.001)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and 738 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different case are not comparable;
unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were grand mean
centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Deferred
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 25
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Endowment on Deferred Compensation as a Percentage of
Base Salary
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-.011 (.012)
.057 (.033)
-.014 (.030)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)

Panel A: Including Outliers
-.015 (.017)
-.003 (.026)
.056 (.033)
.051 (.034)
-.013 (.030)
-.010 (.030)
.005 (.006)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.005 (.014)
.001 (.032)
-.033 (.061)

-.017 (.018)
.053 (.034)
-.011 (.030)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)
.006 (.014)

-.011 (.021)
.050 (.034)
-.009 (.030)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)
-.003 (.022)

.002 (.003)

.004 (.006)

-259.841
.137 c

.000 (.001)
-259.705
.135 d

.014 (.038)

Δ Endowment per FTE3
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Δ Endowment per FTE
Time
Time* Δ Endowment per
FTE
Δ Endowment per FTE2

-260.034
2.868 a

-259.978
.056 b

-259.684
.294 c

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
-.002 (.002)
-.006 (.003)*
-.002 (.005)
.056 (.014)**
.055 (.014)**
.055 (.015)**
-.038 (.013)** -.037 (.013)** -.037 (.013)**
-.002 (.003)
-.002 (.003)
-.002 (.003)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.005 (.002)
.010 (.005)
-.013 (.010)

-.007 (.003)*
.054 (.015)**
-.036 (.013)**
-.002 (.003)
.000 (.000)
.005 (.002)

-.005 (.004)
.053 (.015)**
-.036 (.013)**
-.002 (.003)
.000 (.000)
.002 (.004)

-.004 (.006)

.000 (.001)
.001 (.001)
Δ Endowment per FTE3
.000 (.000)
Note. N = 789 before outlier removal and 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01; a
indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates model was compared to Model 1; c indicates
that model was compared to Model 2, d indicates that model was compared to Model 4; log likelihood values and
change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because models with different cases are not
comparable; unstandardized estimates are shown; level 1 variables (FTE Enrollment and Endowment per FTE) were
grand mean centered; all depicted models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment,
and Relative Deferred Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 26
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Δ Total Compensation on Endowment
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.739 (.051)**
.638 (.054)**
-.007 (.061)
Institutional Ownership
-.064 (.067)
-.090 (.067)
-.109 (.059)
Religious
.135 (.059)*
.150 (.059)*
.106 (.052)*
Enforceability Index
.022 (.013)
.024 (.013)
.019 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Total Compensation
-.187 (.032)**
-.010 (.041)
Time
1.224 (.074)**
Time* Δ Total Compensation
.000 (.059)
-863.962
-847.300
-729.120
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
122.194**a
16.662** b
118.180 c
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.207 (.021)**
Δ FTE Enrollment
.198 (.023)**
-.008 (.007)
.109 (.030)**
Institutional Ownership
.020 (.014)
-.014 (.008)
Religious
.031 (.026)
.006 (.012)
.016 (.007)*
.006
(.006)
Enforceability Index
.001 (.003)
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Total Compensation
-1.036 (.022)**
-.001 (.005)
Time
1.242 (.009)**
Time* Δ Total Compensation
-.002 (.007)
Note. N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Total Compensation were
logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 27
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Relative Δ Total Compensation on Δ Endowment
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.739 (.051)**
.737 (.051)**
-.007 (.061)
Institutional Ownership
-.064 (.067)
-.063 (.067)
-.108 (.059)
Religious
.135 (.059)*
.135 (.059)*
.106 (.052)*
Enforceability Index
.022 (.013)
.022 (.013)
.019 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Relative Total Compensation
-.021 (.039)
-.001 (.034)
Time
1.236 (.069)**
Time* Δ Relative Total
Compensation
.049 (.225)
-863.962
-863.823
-729.148
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
122.194** a
.139 b
134.675** c
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.207 (.021)**
Δ FTE Enrollment
1.207 (.022)**
-.008 (.007)
.109 (.030)**
Institutional Ownership
.109 (.030)**
-.014 (.008)
Religious
.031 (.026)
.031 (.026)
.016 (.007)*
.006 (.006)
Enforceability Index
.006 (.006)
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Δ Relative Total Compensation
.002 (.015)
.000 (.004)
Time
1.244 (.008)**
Time* Δ Relative Total
Compensation
-.007 (.027)
Note. N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Δ Relative Total Compensation
were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 28
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Merit Pay on Δ Endowment
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Merit Pay
Time
Time*Merit Pay
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Merit Pay
Time

.739 (.051)**
-.064 (.067)
.135 (.059)*
.022 (.013)
.000 (.000)

-863.962
122.194**

.738 (.051)**
-.065 (.067)
.139 (.059)*
.022 (.013)
.000 (.000)
.042 (.041)

-863.447
a

.515 b

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.207 (.021)**
1.205 (.022)*
.109 (.030)**
.108 (.030)**
.031 (.026)
.006 (.006)
.000 (.000)

.033 (.026)
.006 (.006)
.000 (.000)
.017 (.016)

-.007 (.061)
-.108 (.059)
.106 (.052)*
.019 (.011)
.000 (.000)
-.001 (.048)
1.233 (.068)**
.011 (.069)
-729.153
134.295 c
-.008 (.007)
-.014 (.008)
.016 (.007)*
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
-.004 (.006)
1.245 (.008)**

Time*Merit Pay
.004 (.008)
Note. N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Merit Pay were logged; Δ =
‘change in’.
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Table 29
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Merit Pay as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ Endowment
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.739 (.051)**
.738 (.051)*
-.006 (.061)
Institutional Ownership
-.064 (.067)
-.063 (.067)
-.108 (.059)
Religious
.135 (.059)*
.135 (.059)**
.106 (.052)*
Enforceability Index
.022 (.013)
.022 (.013)
.019 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Merit Pay - Relative
-.008 (.022)
.004 (.021)
Time
1.234 (.068)**
Time*Merit Pay - Relative
-.001 (.045)
-863.962
-863.893
-729.153
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
122.194** a
0.069 b
134.74 c
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.207 (.021)**
Δ FTE Enrollment
1.207 (.022)**
-.008 (.007)
.109
(.030)**
Institutional Ownership
.109 (.030)**
-.014 (.008)
Religious
.031 (.026)
.031 (.026)
.016 (.007)*
.006 (.006)
Enforceability Index
.006 (.006)
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Merit Pay - Relative
.000 (.008)
.001 (.002)
Time
1.244 (.008)**
Time*Merit Pay - Relative
.000 (.005)
Note. N = 762 before outlier removal and ranged from 755 to 758 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Merit Pay were
logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 30
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Bonuses on Δ Endowment
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.737 (.050)**
.735 (.050)**
-.009 (.060)
Institutional Ownership
-.040 (.063)
-.043 (.064)
-.110 (.057)
Religious
.131 (.057)*
.134 (.057)*
.109 (.051)*
Enforceability Index
.020 (.012)
.020 (.012)
.018 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Bonus
.002 (.005)
.004 (.006)
Time
1.236 (.066)**
Time*Bonus
.001 (.009)
-883.060
-882.942
-740.460
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
129.867 a
0.118 b
142.481** c
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.202 (.021)**
Δ FTE Enrollment
1.202 (.021)**
-.008 (.007)
.120
(.029)**
Institutional Ownership
.122 (.029)**
-.012 (.007)
Religious
.030 (.026)
.028 (.026)
.015 (.007)*
.005 (.006)
Enforceability Index
.006 (.006)
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Bonus
-.002 (.002)
.000 (.001)
Time
1.245 (.008)**
Time*Bonus
.001 (.001)
Note. N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Bonuses were logged; Δ =
‘change in’.
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Table 31
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Bonuses as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ Endowment
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
estimate (SE)
Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
.737 (.050)**
.737 (.050)**
-.006 (.060)
Institutional Ownership
-.040 (.063)
-.041 (.063)
-.107 (.058)
Religious
.131 (.057)*
.131 (.057)*
.106 (.052)*
Enforceability Index
.020 (.012)
.020 (.012)
.018 (.011)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Bonus - Relative
.013 (.058)
.147 (.298)
Time
1.232 (.066)**
Time*Bonus - Relative
-.148 (.302)
-883.060
-883.033
-741.124
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
129.867** a
.027b
141.909** c
Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.202 (.021)**
Δ FTE Enrollment
1.202 (.021)**
-.007 (.008)
.120
(.029)**
Institutional Ownership
.120 (.029)**
-.018 (.009)*
Religious
.030 (.026)
.030 (.026)
.021 (.008)**
.005 (.006)
Enforceability Index
.005 (.006)
.001 (.002)
.000 (.000)
University Density
.000 (.000)
.000 (.000)
Bonus - Relative
.003 (.023)
-.004 (.042)
Time
1.242 (.009)**
Time*Bonus - Relative
.004 (.042)
Note. N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 785 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Bonuses were logged;
Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 32
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Deferred Compensation on Δ Endowment
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Deferred Compensation
Time
Time*Deferred Compensation
Log Likelihood
Δ Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Deferred Compensation
Time

.737 (.050)**
-.040 (.063)
.131 (.057)*
.020 (.012)
.000 (.000)

.739 (.050)**
-.016 (.073)
.126 (.058)*
.020 (.012)
.000 (.000)
-.004 (.006)

-883.060

-882.836

129.867**

a

.224 b

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.202 (.021)**
1.202 (.021)**
.120 (.029)**
.123 (.033)**
.030 (.026)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)

.029 (.026)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)
-.001 (.003)

-.004 (.060)
-.104 (.065)
.104 (.052)*
.019 (.011)
.000 (.000)
.001 (.008)
1.232 (.067)**
-.003 (.010)
-740.874
141.962** c
-.006 (.007)
-.011 (.008)
.015 (.007)*
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
.000 (.001)
1.244 (.008)**

Time*Deferred Compensation
-.002 (.001)
Note. N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Deferred Compensation were
logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Table 33
Random Coefficient Modeling Results for the Effect of Deferred Compensation as a Percentage of Base Salary on Δ
Endowment
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

estimate (SE)

Panel A: Including Outliers
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Deferred Compensation - Relative
Time
Time*Deferred Compensation - Relative
Log Likelihood
Change in Log Likelihood
Δ FTE Enrollment
Institutional Ownership
Religious
Enforceability Index
University Density
Deferred Compensation - Relative
Time

.737 (.050)**
-.040 (.063)
.131 (.057)*
.020 (.012)
.000 (.000)

-883.060
129.867**

.737 (.050)**
-.039 (.063)
.131 (.057)*
.020 (.012)
.000 (.000)
-.013 (.048)

-883.025
a

0.035 b

Panel B: Excluding Outliers
1.202 (.021)**
1.202 (.021)**
.120 (.029)**
.121 (.029)**
.030 (.026)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)

.030 (.026)
.005 (.006)
.000 (.000)
-.012 (.019)

-.006 (.060)
-.105 (.057)
.104 (.051)*
.019 (.011)
.000 (.000)
.003 (.051)
1.234 (.066)**
-.002 (.085)
-740.918
142.107** c
-.008 (.007)
-.013 (.007)
.016 (.006)**
-.001 (.001)
.000 (.000)
-.003 (.006)
1.245 (.008)**

Time*Deferred Compensation - Relative
.001 (.010)
Note. N = 788 before outlier removal and ranged from 781 to 784 after outlier removal; * indicates p < .05; **
indicates p < .01; log likelihood values and change in log likelihood values were not reported in Panel B because
models with different Ns are not comparable; a indicates model was compared to null model (not shown); b indicates
model was compared to Model 1; c indicates that model was compared to Model 2; unstandardized coefficients are
shown; level 1 variables (Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment) were grand mean centered; all depicted
models account for autocorrelation; Δ Endowment per FTE, Δ FTE Enrollment, and Relative Deferred
Compensation were logged; Δ = ‘change in’.
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Figure 1
Chapter 2 Proposed Model
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Figure 2
Proposed Relation Between Performance and Compensation
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Figure 3
Adaptation of Figure 1 from Indjejikian and Nanda (2002)
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Figure 4
PRISMA diagram

251

Figure 5
Plot of the Δ Endowment by Time Interaction on Bonuses

Panel A: Including Outliers

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

Note. Red lines represent the effect of Δ Endowment at Time 1 on Bonus at Time 2; Blue lines represent the effects of Δ Endowment
at Time 2 on Bonus at Time 3.
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Figure 6
Plot of the Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Δ Endowment on Δ Total Compensation

Panel A: Including Outliers

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

Legend
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Figure 7
Plot of the Linear and Nonlinear Effects of Δ Endowment on Merit Pay

Panel A: Including Outliers

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

Legend
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Figure 8
Plot of the Quadratic Effect of Δ Endowment on Bonuses
Panel A: Including Outliers

Panel B: Excluding Outliers

Legend
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